The Protective Power of the Presidency by Monaghan, Henry Paul
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Faculty Scholarship Faculty Publications 
1993 
The Protective Power of the Presidency 
Henry Paul Monaghan 
Columbia Law School, monaghan@law.columbia.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1993). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/160 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Scholarship Archive. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more 
information, please contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu. 
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
VOL. 93 JANUARY 1993 NO. 1
THE PROTECTIVE POWER OF THE PRESIDENCY
Heny P. Monaghan*
The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America.'
The President's power, if any, to issue the order must stem
either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution .... 2
Obviously .... the Constitution's central mechanism of separa-
tion of powers depends largely upon common understanding
of what activities are appropriate to legislatures, to executives,
and to courts. 3
INTRODUCTION
Walter Bagehot's still-admired study of the English Constitution4
distinguished between its "dignified" and "efficient" parts. Bagehot
argued that the English Constitution's "dignified" theory of parliamen-
tary supremacy masked the (then) dominant reality of cabinet govern-
ment.5 Attacking what he described as the "literary" theory of the
American Constitution, Woodrow Wilson posited a similar distinction.
Writing in 1885, Wilson asserted that the "literary" theory of American
government embodied in Federalist's "ideal checks and balances of the
federal system" obscured its efficient principle: "government by the
chairmen of the Standing Committees of Congress." 6 An ardent ad-
mirer of ministerial government, Wilson especially lamented the condi-
tion of the American presidency:
The business of the president, occasionally great, is usually
not much above the routine. Most of the time it is mere admin-
istration, mere obedience of directions from the masters of
policy, the Standing Committees. Except in so far as his
* Copyright 1992, Henry Paul Monaghan, Harlan Fiske Stone Professor of
Constitutional Law, Columbia University School of Law.
1. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1.
2. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952) (Steel Seizure).
3. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992).
4. Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution (Cornell Univ. Press 1963) (1915).
5. See id. at 65-66. "The efficient secret of the English Constitution may be
described as the close union, the nearly complete fusion, of the executive and legislative
powers" through the cabinet. Id. For Bagehot, the cabinet possessed a genuine collegial
aspect, and parliament did play some independent checking role. R. H. Crossman's
excellent introduction to the 1963 edition observes that the current reality is the
dominance of a single figure, the Prime Minister. Id. at 51-52.
6. Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government 30-31, 82 (Johns Hopkins
Paperbacks 1981) (1885). Wilson consciously emulated Bagehot. See id. at 11.
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power of veto constitutes him a part of the legislature, the
President might, not inconveniently, be a permanent officer;
the first official of a carefully graded and impartially regulated
civil services system.
7
When Wilson revisited this topic a little more than two decades
later, he had undergone a conversion. He now believed that the Presi-
dent could become a figure comparable to the Prime Minister: "The
President is at liberty, both in law and conscience, to be as big a man as
he can." Wilson insisted, however, that this position was contrary to
the "Whig" theory of the founding generation:
The makers of the Constitution seem to have thought of the
President as what the stricter Whig theorists wished the king
to be: only the legal executive, the presiding and guiding au-
thority in the application of law and the execution of policy.
His veto upon legislation was only his 'check' on Congress,-
was a power of restraint, not of guidance.9
Wilson saw no tension between his belief that the Constitution
contemplated only a Whig Executive and his conception of the Presi-
dent as Prime Minister because he was quite dismissive of the relevance
of constitutional theory;' 0 his concern was with the realities of govern-
mental power. Among modern students of the presidency, Wilson's
pragmatic orientation has flourished. Thus, in his influential book
Richard Neustadt insisted that "the probabilities of[presidential]power do not
derive from the literary theory of the Constitution";I I he argued that its real
source stems from the President's power to persuade.' 2
7. Id. at 170. While Wilson's general scholarly ability has been subject to
challenge, see Garry Wills, The Presbyterian Nietzsche, N.Y. of Rev. Books, Jan. 16,
1992, at 3-4, his account of the Presidency is defended in Theodore J. Lowi, The
Personal Presidency 28 (1985). In 1891, Justice Samuel Miller described the executive
department as "the most crippled, confined, and limited in its practical use ... of the
power really conferred on it," Samuel F. Miller, The Executive Branch of Government,
in Lectures on the Constitution of the United States 157 (New York, Bank and Brothers
1891).
8. Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States 70 (1908)
[hereinafter Wilson, Constitutional Government]. In his elegant and witty work,
Professor Arthur Schlesinger takes note of the numerous proposals that, following
Wilson, would make the American governmental system more like a parliamentary one,
even though English and Canadian reformers are advocating changes that would make
their governments more like ours. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presidency
464-73 (2d ed. 1989).
9. Wilson, Constitutional Government, supra note 8, at 59.
10. Wilson wrote that the Constitution "cannot be regarded as a mere legal
document," but must be understood "as a vehicle for life." Wilson, Constitutional
Government, supra note 8, at 192. Despite his assertion that the Constitution envisaged
the Whig theory of the presidency, he insisted that "the constitution contains no
theories." Id. at 60.
11. Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents 37 (1990).
12. See id. at 10-11, 30-32. For a rare dissent among political scientists as to the
importance of constitutional law, see Richard M. Pious, The American Presidency 17
(1979) ("[The fundamental and irreducible core of presidential power rests not on
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Even for hard-nosed realists, however, the constitutional theory of
the greatest political office on earth cannot simply be brushed aside.
Time has only confirmed the wisdom of Judge Story's observation that
"What is the best constitution for the executive department, and what
are the powers, with which it should be entrusted, are problems among
the most important, and probably the most difficult to be satisfactorily
solved .... in the theory of free governments."' 3
The Constitution seemingly contemplates only a "law enforce-
ment" Executive; that is, the President simply "executes" the will of
Congress. Professor Mansfield characterizes this as the "dictionary"
conception of executive power. 14 This conception recognizes little in-
dependent presidential authority, at least when presidential authority
would directly interfere with pre-existing private rights. As Justice
Scalia recently observed:
The Executive .... in addition to "tak[ing] Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed," Art. II, § 3, has no power to bind pri-
vate conduct in areas not specifically committed to his control
by Constitution or statute; such a perception of "[t]he Execu-
tive power" may be familiar to other legal systems, but is alien
to our own. 15
In Currin v. Wallace, the government's brief put this theory of the execu-
tive power well: "[T]he Executive was excluded from legislative func-
tions beyond those considered necessary in filling in the details of
legislation and in determining its applicability."' 16 Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure) 17 provides the classic illustration of this
conception of presidential authority. There, the Supreme Court invali-
influence, persuasion, public opinion, elections, or party, but rather on the successful
assertion of constitutional authority to resolve crises and significant domestic issues.").
More recently, Terry Eastland made a similar claim, see Terry Eastland, Energy in the
Executive 9-12 (1992), but his focus was in reality only on political leadership by the
President during the Reagan and Bush administrations.
13. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 515
(Carolina Academic Press 1987) (1833) (abridged by the author) [hereinafter Story,
Commentaries]. This version is an abridgement of Judge Story's earlier three-volume
work, and should not be confused with a work intended for popular consumption,
Joseph Story, A Familiar Exposition of the Constitution of the United States (Regnery
Gateway 1986) (1840).
14. Harvey C. Mansfield, Taming the Prince 2-4 (1989). Mansfield's work is a
comprehensive examination of ideas about executive power from the perspective of
political theory. For a briefer treatment of the same material, see Harvey C. Mansfield,
The Modem Doctrine of Executive Power, 17 Presidential Stud. Q. 237 (1987).
15. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, I I1 S. Ct. 2439, 2450 (1991) (Scalia,
J., concurring).
16. Brief for the United States at 47, Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939) (No. 275)
[hereinafter Currin v. Wallace Brief]. But see William Howard Taft, Our Chief
Magistrate and His Powers, 78-79 (1916) ("Statutory construction is practically one of
the greatest of executive powers," particularly in cases that do not "affect private
right[s]. ... [which are] likely to come before the courts.").
17. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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dated President Truman's attempt to seize the nation's steel mills in the
face of a threatened strike that Mr. Truman feared would jeopardize the
national defense and military operations in the Korean conflict.' 8 The
Court said that "[i]n the framework of our constitution, the President's
power to see that the laws are faithfully executed refutes the idea that
he is to be a lawmaker."'19 While the Court did not see the issue before
it as involving in any significant way presidential authority in foreign
affairs, 20 its premise is fully applicable to presidential conduct in for-
eign as well as domestic affairs: no independent, free-standing presi-
dential law-making authority exists insofar as the rights of American
citizens are concerned. 2'
Well before Steel Seizure, however, the reality behind the constitu-
tional theory of the law enforcment Executive had been transformed.
Alexander Hamilton wrote that "[t]he essence of the legislative authority is
to enact laws, or in other words, to prescribe rules for the regulation of the
society." '22 In theory, this congressional authority was nondelegable,
23
18. President Truman ordered the Secretary of Commerce to "seize" the mills and
keep them running. See id. at 582-83. See generally Maeva Marcus, Truman and the
Steel Seizure Case (1977). Truman decried the selfishness of the companies in refusing
to offer reasonable wage increases to the unions. See David McCullough, Truman
896-903 (1992). The steel companies in turn challenged the seizure. See 343 U.S. at
582-83. The "opinion of the Court" sustained the challenge, on the ground that no
statute authorized the conduct and that the President had no independent constitutional
authority to so act. See id. at 585-88 (plurality opinion). Several concurring opinions
concluded that the President's conduct was contrary to existing legislation. See id. at
598-602 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 631 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 639
(Jackson, J., concurring); id. at 659 (Burton, J., concurring); id. at 662-66 (Clark, J.,
concurring). Three justices dissented in an elaborate opinion by Chief Justice Vinson.
See id. at 667-710 (Vinson, CJ., dissenting).
19. Id. at 587. "And the constitution is neither silent nor equivocal about who shall
make laws which the President is to execute." Id.
20. See Schlesinger, supra note 8, at 144; Paul G. Kauper, The Steel Seizure Case:
Congress, the President and the Supreme Court, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 141, 175 n.99, 182
(1952).
21. My earlier views need at least some revision on this point. See Henry P.
Monaghan, Presidential War-Making, 50 B.U. L. Rev. 19, 31-32 (1970 Special Issue)
("Like federalism, the doctrine of separation of powers should, at least in the area of
foreign affairs, be viewed as essentially a political, not a legal construct."). Harold Koh,
relying on Steel Seizure, goes perhaps further than my claim in the text and argues that
'normal' separation-of-powers principles were intended to be applicable in the foreign
affairs context. See Harold H. Koh, The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power
after the Iran-Contra Affair 105-13 (1990).
22. The Federalist No. 75, at 504 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(emphasis added); accord Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810) (using
virtually identical language to describe the nature of legislation).
23. The Court's efforts in such cases as The Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382
(1813), and Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892), to stay within the maxim are reviewed in
Louis Fisher, Delegating Power to the President, 19 EmoryJ. Pub. L. 251, 252, 255-56
(1970). Interestingly, early students of public administration insisted that the
nondelegation principle applied only to delegations to the President and not to
administrative agencies, Nathan D. Grundstein, Presidential Power, Administration and
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but-and the "but" is pretty nearly everything-the nondelegation bar-
rier, never very sturdy, has collapsed. Only the fiction remains.2 4 The
reality is that frequently executive officials shape and reshape the rele-
vant legal rules. 25 Congress itself is no longer required to "prescribe
[the] rules for the regulation of society; ' 26 it can, instead, transfer
much of that task to the executive. As Steel Seizure illustrates, what re-
mains of the old constitutional jurisprudence is the quite different re-
quirement that, from the President on down, all executive officials must
exhibit some statutory warrant at least when their conduct invades the
private rights of American citizens. 27
Current practice, however, seems both to obscure the underlying
constitutional theory and to demonstrate the need for an adequate
legal conception of presidential authority. The concept of the law-en-
forcement Executive cannot give a full account of the nature of the
Presidency. Quite plainly, for example, this model cannot account for
the policy-setting authority of the President in foreign affairs. How-
ever, there have been troublesome claims of presidential authority.
The relevant examples go well beyond the highly controversial presi-
dential efforts to use military force as a discretionary instrument of
presidential foreign policy.28 Theodore Draper argues persuasively
Administrative Law, 18 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 285, 304-05 (1950), and the government
advanced such an argument in Currin v. Wallace Brief, supra note 16, at 47.
24. U.S. Const. art. I, § 1 means "that Congress may not constitutionally delegate
its legislative power to another Branch of government." Touby v. United States, 111 S.
Ct. 1752, 1755 (1991). Fig leaf declarations that no "forbidden" delegation occurs if
Congress supplies an "intelligible principle" to guide the executive and the courts,
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989) (citingJ.W. Hampton,Jr., & Co. v.
United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)), cannot conceal the transformative and (to my
mind irreversible) change that has occurred in public administration. See generally
Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administrative State, 89 Colum. L. Rev.
369, 380-85 (1989) (characterizing statutes that authorize administrative officials to
make rules as "intransitive").
25. See infra text accompanying notes 265-287. For a recent example of a
regulatory agency shaping and then reshaping rules under an open-ended grant of
legislative authority, see Mobil Oil Exploration v. United Distribution Co., 111 S. Ct.
615 (1991) (finding that regulatory agency's authority to set price ceiling for gas was not
restricted by formula).
26. The Federalist No. 75, at 504 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
27. This requirement was, of course, inherent in the premise that Congress must
prescribe the rules governing society, and is today so deeply ingrained in our
constitutional tradition that it is seldom articulated. For example, in Rust v. Sullivan,
111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (abortion counseling case in which the Court rejected First and
Fifth Amendment challenges to executive regulations restricting abortion referrals by
recipients of federal family planning funds), every Justice assumed that the executive
regulations required adequate statutory underpinning. See id. at 1767-69 (Rehnquist,
CJ., opinion of Court); id. at 1778 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 1787-88 (Stevens,
J., dissenting); id. at 1789 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
28. The legal controversy surrounding the Middle East war is a recent example of
the generally most noticed constitutional issue: presidential "war-making." President
1993]
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that much of the wrongdoing in the Iran-Contra episode flowed di-
rectly from the constitutionally impermissible conceptions of presiden-
tial power held by administration officials such as Admiral John
Poindexter and Colonel Oliver North.29 To dismiss such views ad
hominem is unacceptable; very considerable disagreement exists con-
cerning many legal aspects of the Presidency.
30
Bush sought Congressional authorization for United States military action in Iraq in
1991, see Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution, Pub. L. No.
102-1, 105 Stat. 3 (1991), and, in finally securing it, averted a serious constitutional
controversy. Many constitutional law specialists had insisted on the need for at least this
much if the original constitutional understanding was to be respected. See
Memorandum Amicus Curiae of Law Professors at 3, Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp.
1141 (D.D.C. 1990) (No. 90-2866); see also Michael J. Glennon, The Gulf War and the
Constitution, Foreign Aff., Spring 1991, at 84, 87-89 (arguing that "Framers' intent was
clear and abundant" to vest war-making power in Congress). But see Eastland, supra
note 12, at 124-31 (describing the President's action before the war as "a rebuke to the
unconstitutional assumption" that congressional authorization was necessary). In
Dellums, the district court dismissed a challenge to presidential authority on, inter alia,
ripeness grounds, see 752 F. Supp. at 1149, but it also opined that Congressional
authorization would be needed. See id. at 1145. The administration nonetheless
proclaimed victory: "'[t]he prerogatives of the president have been undisturbed.' "
Stephanie Saul, Judge Backs Bush on War Consent, Newsday, Dec. 14, 1990, News, at 7
(statement of Assistant Attorney General Gerson). Then-Deputy Attorney General Barr
advised President Bush that the President had the power to act, but that this was a
constitutional gray area and that the President should thus seek congressional
authorization. See Bob Woodward, The Commanders 356-57 (1991). Defense
Secretary Cheney opposed seeking authorization, expressing distrust for Congress in
the war context. See id. at 355. Mr. Bush himself seems to have believed that he had
authority to act, see Interview with Middle Eastern Journalists, 27 Weekly Comp. Pres.
Doc. 275, 284 (Mar. 8, 1991), and he suggested, erroneously in my judgment, that the
U.N. resolutions alone provided a sufficient source of presidential legal authority. See
Theodore Draper, Presidential Wars, N.Y. Rev. of Books, Sept. 26, 1991, at 64.
At the risk of being a textualist (that is, reading the document itself), it is worth
noting that the President is not my (or your, or Congress') Commander-in-Chief. He is
the Commander-in-Chief only of the armed forces and of the militia in active service.
See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1. In any event, when the President acts as a warrior-king,
nothing much generally happens, because, as Professor Ely tirelessly points out,
Congress hides from its own constitutional responsibilities. See John H. Ely, Kuwait,
the Constitution, and the Courts: Two Cheers forJudge Greene, 8 Const. Commentary
1, 4 (1991); see also John H. Ely, Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act That
Worked, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1379 (1988) (proposing amendments to the War Powers
Resolution of 1973 to make it effective).
29. See Theodore Draper, A Very Thin Line 219-20, 580-92 (1991).
30. Indeed, at the end of the 1991 term, the Supreme Court emphasized the
"unique constitutional position of the president" and on that basis alone concluded that
presidential conduct does not constitute "agency action" subject to review under the
Administrative Procedure Act. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S. Ct. 2767, 2775 (1992)
(plurality opinion). A plurality went on to state that it was an open question whether the
President "might be subject to a judicial injunction requiring the performance of a
purely 'ministerial' duty ... but [that] in general 'this court has no jurisdiction ... to
enjoin the president in the performance of his official duties.' " Id. at 2776-77 (plurality
opinion) (quoting from Mississippi v.Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 501 (1866)). The
Court's reliance on Johnson was misplaced. Jurisdiction was declined, in a brief and
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Former President Nixon's well-known interview with David Frost
presents, I believe, a particularly striking illustration of the need for an
adequate theory of the scope of the President's constitutional powers.
An accomplished lawyer who had appeared before the Supreme Court,
Mr. Nixon insisted that the Constitution itself invested the President
with a wide ranging "national security" power.3 ' In its name, he de-
fended a White House intelligence plan that included domestic wiretap-
pings, burglaries, and so forth.3 2 Referring to the President as the
"sovereign," Mr. Nixon stated that "by definition" presidential ap-
proval of a domestic national security plan meant that the ensuing con-
duct was not illegal:
FROST: So what, in a sense, you're saying is that there are
certain situations .... where the President can decide that it's
in the best interests of the nation or something, and do some-
thing illegal.
NIXON: Well, when the President does it, that means that it is
not illegal.
FROST: By definition.
NIXON: Exactly. Exactly. If the President, for example, ap-
proves something because of the national security, or in this
case because of a threat to internal peace and order of signifi-
cant magnitude, then the President's decision in that instance
is one that enables those who carry it out, to carry it out with-
out violating a law. Otherwise they're in an impossible
position.
33
Here, too, Mr. Nixon's challenge cannot be brushed aside on rhetorical
opaque opinion, not because the President was a defendant but because the issues
raised by the litigation were thought to be essentially political in nature. See Johnson, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) at 499. For criticism ofJohnson, see David P. Currie, The Constitution in
the Supreme Court: The First Hundred Years, 1789-1888, at 299-301 (1985). Justice
Scalia's concurring opinion went even further, flatly denying that the Court could
"direct the President to take an official act," save perhaps of a ministerial nature.
Franklin, 112 S. Ct. at 2788 (Scalia, J., concurring).
31. See Excerpts from Interview with Nixon About Domestic Effects of Indochina
War, N.Y. Times, May 20, 1977, at A16.
32. See id.
33. Id. The sweep of Mr. Nixon's claim for presidential prerogative perhaps
becomes more apparent when joined with his strong claim to an executive right to
secrecy. He remarked that C.I.A. and F.B.I. covert operations had been "disclosed on a
very, very limited basis to trusted members of Congress. I don't know whether it can be
done today or not." Id. Mr. Nixon emphasized that the existence of such presidential
power was not dangerous because adequate political controls exist, such as elections and
the need for congressional appropriations. See id. Mr. Nixon did not distinguish
between limits imposed on the President because of a lack of statutory authority and
limits imposed by the Bill of Rights. Cf. United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407
U.S. 297, 321 (1972) (constitutional power of President justifying warrantless domestic
surveillance to protect national security held to be limited by Fourth Amendment);
Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1201-02 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (power to authorize
domestic wiretap limited by First and Fourth Amendments to reasonableness standard
19931
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grounds, for example, by condescendingly explaining that in American
constitutional theory the president is not "sovereign." The failure of
any such move is apparent once one examines Nixon's subsequent but
little-noticed restatement of his position. The President is not above
the law, Mr. Nixon said; rather "[t]he question is what the law is and
how it is to be applied with respect to the President in fulfilling the
duties of his office."
34
That twentieth-century Presidents and their advisers should hold
expansive and perhaps ill-formed views of "inherent" presidential
power is not surprising. Most Americans expect modem Presidents to
provide solutions for every significant political, military, social, and
economic problem. 35 In the face of such demands, various organiza-
tional and legal categories possess little meaning for the President. As
Richard Neustadt describes it:
In the American political system the President sits in a
unique seat and works within a unique frame of reference.
The things he personally has to do are no respecters of the
lines between "civil" and "military," or "foreign" and "do-
mestic," or "legislative" and "executive," or "administrative"
and "political." At his desk-and there alone-distinctions of
these sorts lose their last shred of meaning. The expectations
centered in his person converge upon no other individual; ...
His place and frame of reference are unique.
36
Modem Presidents, moreover, frequently must operate in a high-pres-
sure, "fast track" context. In Theodore Lowi's characterization:
The Fast Track is the track of secrecy, unilateral action, en-
ergy, commitment, decisiveness, where time is always of the
essence. The Slow Track is a Separation of Powers Track, per-
and, in cases not involving national security, by Title III of Crime Control Act), aff'd in
part, appeal dismissed in part, 452 U.S. 713 (1981).
34. Boston Globe, June 5, 1977, at 1.
35. See Neustadt, supra note 11, at 184-85. To be sure, identification of the
President with American society at large is a long-standing phenomenon, see
Schlesinger, supra note 8, at 429-30 (discussing Taft's view of the presidency), and
modem communication has only increased that identification. But the Whig theory of
the presidency-which stressed congressional dominance in the formulation of policy-
held up throughout much of the nineteenth century. Now, as the recent election shows,
the President is blamed for much of what is "wrong" in society at any moment.
Professor Lowi, for example, argues that presidential "failure" is inevitable because the
President has too many constituencies to satisfy, and thus constituency alienation is
inevitable. See Lowi, supra note 7, at 11. For recent empirical accounts of the nature
and interaction between Congress and the President in the legislative process marked by
"divided government," see Mark A. Peterson, Legislating Together: The White House
and Capitol Hill from Eisenhower to Reagan (1990); David R. Mayhew, Divided We
Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946-1990 (1991).
36. Neustadt, supra note 11, at 154. "Presidents now routinely try to shape the
nation's political agenda . . . . Those outside the White House-Congress, the
bureaucracy, the news media and the public-have responded to presidential direction
by expecting more of it." John P. Burke, The Institutional Presidency 34 (1992).
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mitted by a longer time horizon, and desirable wherever time
permits, yet highly unpredictable, uncontrollable, public, full
of leaky holes, and dominated not merely by the legislature
but by a large and pluralistic process fueled by greed, other-
wise called the pursuit of happiness. Unfortunately, the dis-
tinction of the two tracks, while logical, is breaking down
because conservative drivers on the Fast Track are like Pac-
Man characters eating up the pedestrians of the Slow Track.
37
In the environment in which Presidents must operate, it is not surpris-
ing that "law" of any kind (the Constitution included) can easily be-
come merely one more factor to be considered, or even an obstacle to
be overcome.38
An article directed towards contributing to an adequate "literary"
theory of presidential power must be limited to manageable propor-
tions. My primary focus is the extent of presidential authority to invade
the "private rights" of American citizens absent legislative authority-that
is, presidential authority independently to alter negatively what in com-
mon legal understanding would be viewed as a prior liberty or property
baseline.3 9 I do not, of course, refer to presidential invasions of consti-
37. TheodoreJ. Lowi, Afterword: Presidential Power and the Ideological Struggle
Over Its Interpretation, in The Constitution and the American Presidency 227, 238-39
(Martin L. Fausold & Alan Shank eds., 1991) [hereinafter American Presidency]. Lowi
expands on a metaphor introduced earlier in the foreign affairs context by Louis Koenig.
38. For example, the congressional committees investigating the Iran-Contra Affair
concluded that executive officials "viewed the law not as setting boundaries for their
actions, but raising impediments to their goals. When the goals and the law collided,
the law gave way." Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-
Contra Affair, H.R. Rep. No. 433, S. Rep. No. 216, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. 18 (1987).
Another example is the recent claim that high administration officials impermissibly
allowed U.S. credits to be used to aid Iraq. See, e.g., Notes and Comments, The New
Yorker, Aug. 17, 1992, at 21-22; Elaine Sciolino, U.S. Was Aware the Iraqis Were
Buying Technology, N.Y. Times, July 22, 1992, at A10.
39. "Citizens" is intended, somewhat awkwardly, to include corporations. What I
seek to avoid here is an inquiry into "Whose Constitution," that is, who, other than
conventional American litigants, can assert constitutional separation-of-power claims, as
well as claims of statutory violation. See generally Gerald L. Neumann, Whose
Constitution?, 100 Yale LJ. 909 (1991) (exploring personal and geographical scope of
constitutional rights in both historical and contemporary terms). My thesis may have
implications for "noncitizens," but I have not focused on them. Some light on this issue
may come from Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1992),
cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3215 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1992) (No. 92-344), involving a challenge
to the President's executive order allowing interdiction of aliens on the high seas. In
order to avoid another potential diversion, I also exclude from my focus presidential
conduct that affects American citizens located in foreign countries. See, e.g.,
Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25 (1982) (holding that executive agreement providing
for preferential treatment of Filipino citizens at U.S. military base did not violate U.S.
statute prohibiting employment discrimination against U.S. citizens on military bases
overseas); Monroe Leigh & Jo Anne Swindler, Constitutional Restraints on Foreign
Economic Sanctions, in Private Property and National Security 31 (1991) (providing
examples and arguing that "the obstacles to proving a 'takings' claim in the foreign
affairs context are not entirely insurmountable"). Whether the separation-of-powers
1993]
COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW
tutionally protected interests, because Congress could confer no such
authorization. But the President is not Congress, and so the question
persists: to what extent can the President, acting on his or her own,
invade the rights of American citizens in circumstances which Congress
could-but did not-authorize. As used here, the term "private rights"
is conventional in nature. The point of reference is to contemporary
legal understanding. The term includes those liberties secured by the
common law, as well as presidential imposition of conditions upon
those receiving government contracts and benefits when, in the frame-
work of the modern administrative state, the conditions would be per-
ceived in common understanding to have altered a commonly
understood baseline of liberty.4
0
I argue that such a presidential "law-making" authority is virtually
nonexistent, and in so doing I make two fundamental claims.4 1 First,
the law-enforcement model of the Presidency is substantially accurate
insofar as the President's authority to invade the private rights of Amer-
ican citizens is concerned. Steel Seizure represents the bedrock principle
of the constitutional order: except perhaps when acting pursuant to
some "specific" constitutional power, the President has no inherent
power to invade private rights; the President not only cannot act contra
legem, he or she must point to affirmative legislative authorization when
so acting.42 Whether, despite the foregoing, the President possesses
thesis described below needs modification in either of these contexts requires a separate
inquiry.
40. Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. 1759 (1991), is, of course, an excellent example of
the latter situation. It is most frequently discussed in the literature under the rubric of
unconstitutional conditions. Other examples of such conditions would include
"downstream" restrictions on the internal management of government contractors,
such as affirmative action requirements. See infra notes 278-280 and accompanying
text. In invoking the label "private rights" to describe all these instances, I consciously
reshape a familiar term. Historically, constitutional law has, for many purposes,
distinguished between governmental interference with nongovernmentally created-i.e.
"private"-rights, and governmental burdens imposed in connection with governmental
largesse. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83
Colum. L. Rev. 1, 14-30 (1983) (indicating contexts within which this distinction is
made, including the meaning of due process, the right to trial by jury, and Article III).
But in the specific context of the President's independent regulatory power both
categories can be grouped together as involving claims of private right.
41. My inquiry consciously proceeds from the perspective of original
understanding supplemented by the Presidency's subsequent line of growth in our
nation's experience. See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) ("The case
before us must be considered in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that
of what was said a hundred years ago.").
42. The one exception, as noted, is where the President acts pursuant to "specific"
constitutional power. See infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text. Professors
Eskridge & Frickey decry as silly any idea that the President lacks law-making authority
apart from delegation; however, they do not tell us the extent of this power, nor do they
cite any decision inconsistent with the thesis advanced in this Article. See William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Cases and Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the
Creation of Public Policy 264 (1988).
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some narrow residuum of lawful authority to act in a genuine national
emergency is a troublesome question that has existed since the founda-
tion of the Republic. While I argue no presidential authority to act con-
tra legem exists, I otherwise do not attempt to resolve that issue.
Second, the considerable debate on the issue of a presidential emer-
gency power has obscured the existence of a narrower, inherent execu-
tive authority, namely, an executive "protective" power. I contend that
the constitutional conception of a Chief Executive authorized to en-
force the laws includes a general authority to protect and defend the
personnel, property, and instrumentalities of the United States from
harm. While the occasion for exercise of this presidential authority will
often arise in emergencies, some relatively small, such as assigning a
marshal to protect the life of a judge, the protective power is, strictly
speaking, not a doctrine of emergency power. For example, acting with-
out statutory authority, the Executive has standing to enforce the con-
tract or property rights of the United States.
The reader is asked to be forgiving. No such endeavor (at least not
mine) can claim to account satisfactorily for all the relevant data.4 3
This Article is intended to be a working paper only, whose thesis repre-
sents a partial contribution towards a more comprehensive understand-
ing of the legal nature of the American presidency. 44 Part I consists of
an analysis of the sources traditionally cited concerning the nature of
"The executive Power," including sources that both pre-date and ante-
date the Constitution, the notion of a "residuum" power in the execu-
tive, and the parameters of the presidential emergency power
controversy. Part II addresses the modern dimensions of the "law en-
forcement" executive. Part III draws on constitutional case law to es-
tablish a presidential protective power and concludes with a sketch of
the limits of this protective function.
43. I especially regret what because of inadvertence I fear to be inevitable: the
failure to give adequate credit to those writers on whom I have drawn and who have
contributed to this topic before I did, making the relevant points far more lucidly than I.
44. The best known work on this general topic is, of course, Edward Corwin, The
President: Office and Powers 1787-1984 (Randall W. Bland et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984).
Elegantly written, full of information, and providing genuine insight, the book is
nonetheless disappointingly lacking in systematic and close reasoning about the legal
nature of the presidency. Superior from a lawyer's perspective is Louis Henkin, Foreign
Affairs and the Constitution (1972). Abraham D. Sofaer's War, Foreign Affairs and
Constitutional Power: The Origins (1976) is an admirable historical study of our
constitutional beginnings. Other historical studies include Henry B. Cox, War, Foreign
Affairs and Constitutional Powers: 1829-1901 (1984), which provides a careful analysis
of constitutional theory during the nineteenth century, and James G. Randall,
Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln (1926). Interestingly, much of the best current
writing on the legal nature of presidential power is by political scientists and historians.
See Joseph M. Bessette & Jeffrey Tullis, The Presidency in the Constitutional Order
(1981); The Constitution and the American Presidency (Martin L. Fausold & Alan Shank




I. SOURCES OF THE CONCEPT OF "THE EXECUTIVE POWER"
Here, as elsewhere, language matters. The terminology expres-
sing claims of presidential authority all too frequently obscures clear
analysis. The terminology must be unpacked, a process that requires
not only examination of the language used but also of the historical
context that has affected conceptions of presidential power.
A. Historical Antecedents and Textual Sources of Executive Authority
The rich tradition out of which the concept of "The executive
Power" sprang is best explored through Locke's notion of executive
power, which was in place nearly a full century before ratification of the
American Constitution. This vantage point provides insight into the
concepts of executive that the Framers understood and transformed.
1. John Locke's Taxonomy of Executive Power. - Eighteenth-century
English conceptions of legislative authority did not include many of the
substantive powers now held wholly or partially by Congress. More-
over, English conceptions did not include the notion of a Parliament
actively shaping policy so much as that of a Parliament either assenting
to or rejecting policy formulated by the Executive. 45 As St. George
Tucker recognized, "the laws do in fact originate with the executive."
46
In allocating the powers of their new national government, the framers
of the American Constitution clearly broke new ground; indeed, the
American Constitution can be seen as a revolutionary document both
in the powers it assigned to Congress and in the "active" role it con-
templated for that body. In the process, the Constitution's terminology
displaced that of Locke.
In 1690, John Locke described three kinds of powers possessed by
the executive department, 47 powers, I should add, that were thought to
be compatible with the Glorious Revolution's principle of parliamen-
tary supremacy.48 First, Locke mentioned executive power in what, for
us, is its "law enforcement" sense: "Execution of the Laws." '49 Sec-
ond, Locke described the federative power: "This therefore contains
the Power of War and Peace, Leagues and Alliances, and all the Trans-
actions, with all Persons and Communities without the commonwealth,
45. See John P. Reid, The Concept of Representation in the Age of the American
Revolution 7, 28-30 (1989).
46. St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commentaries with Notes of Reference to the
Constitution and Laws of the Federal Government of the United States and of the
Commonwealth of Virginia 324 (1970) [hereinafter Tucker Appendix].
47. SeeJohn Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government §§ 144-148, 155-168, at
106-08, 113-25 (Gateway Editions 1955) (1690).
48. Corwin, however, argues that, "what Locke gives us in the final analysis is not
legislative supremacy really, but-as his Whig commentators pointed out-'a balanced
constitution.'" Corwin, supra note 44, at 8.
49. See Locke, supra note 47, § 144, at 106. Of course, the modern "law-
enforcement" executive possesses large law-making powers conferred by statute.
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and may be called Federative, if any one pleases. So the thing be under-
stood, I am indifferent as to the name."' 50 Third, and finally, Locke
referred to "prerogative" power. This term is not now common in
American legal discourse because, for the founding generation, it was
invariably a term of opprobrium. 5 1 While prerogative is often simply a
synonym for the exercise of lawfully conferred discretion, 5 2 Locke pos-
ited two other troublesome formulations. Prerogative, he said, is
"nothing but the Power of doing public good without a Rule," 53 that is,
without statutory authority. Indeed, he went further: "This Power to
act according to discretion, for the publick good, without the prescrip-
tion of the Law, and sometimes even against it, is that which is called
Prerogative."'5 4 Three-quarters of a century later, Blackstone endorsed
similar conceptions of prerogative power, although apparently not in-
cluding the authority to disregard legislation.
5 5
Behind the Lockean taxonomy stood important conceptions of the
nature of what powers were inherent in the "Executive." With the ex-
ception of taxation, most of the great governmental powers were held
by the Executive, including the legal right to make treaties, to decide on
war and peace, to lay embargoes, to create offices, to raise armies and
navies, to act in emergencies, and so on.5 6 And, as noted, "laws" gen-
erally originated in the Executive. Even after the Glorious Revolution,
the Executive remained the dominant figure in government, as Bagehot
fully recognized. But even advocates of a strong American Chief Exec-
50. Id. § 146, at 107 (emphasis added). This seems to embrace most of the foreign
affairs power.
51. "The first thing to notice is that Americans [in the founding era] only rarely
used the word 'prerogative' in connection with the laws and then always, it appears, in a
pejorative way." Robert Scigliano, The President's "Prerogative Power," in Inventing,
supra note 44, at 248. This, of course, rested on a rejection of the substantive
conception of executive authority prerogative avowed. Thus, the Virginia constitution
stated that the governor "shall not, under any pretence, exercise any power or
prerogative, by virtue of any law, statute or custom of England." Francis N. Thorpe,
The Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and Other Organic Laws of the
States, Territories and Colonies Now or Heretofore Forming the United States of
America 38162-17 (1909). "'[P]rerogative' it is presumed was annihilated in America
with kingly government," wrote St. George Tucker in his famous treatise. See St.
George Tucker, 2 Blackstone's Commentaries: With Notes and References to the
Constitution and Laws of the Federal Government and of the Commonwealth of
Virginia 237 n.1 (1970).
52. As it is so used, American lawyers would find many illustrations for the concept.
They would include such diverse instances as the President's authority to urge measures
or to veto proposed legislation when, in his or her judgment, the public good so
requires, and presidential exercises of statutorily delegated discretion.
53. Locke, supra note 47, § 166, at 122-23. Locke advanced the still-classic
defense of the need for such a power: the delays inevitably inherent in the legislative
process and the impossibility that any legislation could adequately take into account all
future contingencies.
54. Id. § 160, at 119.
55. See I William Blackstone, Commentaries *243-44.
56. See, e.g., id. at 249-52.
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utive distanced themselves from the Crown as an acceptable conception
of executive authority. 57 This is reflected in the disappearance of Lock-
ean terminology from American legal discourse.
2. The Constitution and the "Law Enforcement" Executive. - In the
overwhelming majority of cases, presidential conduct is defended on
the straightforward ground that the President has simply "executed"
identifiable congressional commands. 58 This is the "law enforcement"
President-a President who simply executes the authority (however
open-ended) conferred by Congress.
When, however, no readily identifiable legislative warrant exists,
and arguably the President is implementing presidential policy alone, a
different constitutional vocabulary surfaces. The Vesting Clause,59 the
Take Care Clause,60 the Presidential Oath to "preserve, protect and
defend the constitution of the United States, ' 61 and the President's
"inherent," "implied" or "aggregate" powers are all invoked in de-
fense of the President's conduct.62
With one exception, each of these terms is simply a different for-
mulation of the fundamental claim that the President's conduct is valid
even though no statutory authority exists. Like the term "The execu-
tive Power," terms such as "inherent" and "aggregate" presidential
power derive their substantive content from some external reference
points, express or implied. Accordingly, one may assign all such claims
of inherent, implied, or aggregate presidential power to the Vesting
Clause, that is, "The executive Power." Moreover, the same seems true
of both the Take Care and Oath Clauses; at bottom, they are simply
expressions of the constitutional nature of "The executive Power."' 65
The term "implied powers" is not invariably amenable to such a
reduction. To be sure, some such claims are. On analysis, however,
other such claims rest on the notion of implied legislative authoriza-
57. In The Federalist, Hamilton repeatedly disclaims the Crown as a model for the
American Presidency. See, e.g., The Federalist Nos. 67-77 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob
E. Cooke ed., 1961).
58. See, e.g., AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 443 U.S.
915 (1979). Congressional authorization can generally be subdivided into instances in
which Congress specifies the private duties that result when the President makes certain
findings and those in which the President himself shapes the real scope of those duties.
But in the late twentieth century that distinction lacks constitutional significance.
59. "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of
America." U.S. Const. art. II, § 1.
60. "[Hie shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Id. § 3.
61. Id. § 1.
62. In Steel Seizure, Justice Jackson decried the "[1]oose and irresponsible use of
[such] adjectives." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
63. Cf. Westel Woodbury Willoughby, An Introduction to the Study of the
Government of Modern States 254-55 (1919) (contending that the executive power




tion, and thus invoke the "law enforcement" executive envisaged by the
Whig theory. Some implied power claims, moreover, are based upon a
"specific" presidential grant or duty, such as the grant of pardon power
or the president's "duty" to receive foreign ambassadors. Since the
Washington Presidency, the latter "duty" has been understood by pres-
idents to imply a concomitant presidential power, namely, to decide the
issue of recognition, vel non, of foreign countries. 64 As we shall see,
implied powers in this sense are an important, albeit limited, source of
an independent presidential law-making authority.
3. Early American Constitutional History. - We turn now from termi-
nology to the substance behind the terminology. Whatever other un-
certainties may exist about the founding generation's vision of the
American presidency, no reasonable doubt existed on one point: the
President possessed no independent law-making power. A good deal
of the relevant evidence is negative in character, inferable simply from
the complete absence of any claims. 6 5 The silence is, however, fully
consistent with what was said. Jefferson's Proposed Constitution for
Virginia, 66 drafted in 1783, contains perhaps the best statement of the
limited nature of American conceptions of "executive power":
By executive powers, we mean no reference to those powers
exercised under our former government by the crown as of its
prerogative, nor that these shall be the standard of what may
or may not be deemed the rightful powers of the Governor.
We give them those powers only, which are necessary to exe-
cute the laws (and administer the government), and which are
not in their nature either legislative or judiciary. The application of
this idea must be left to reason.
67
64. This development was by no means inevitable; not only does the duty appear to
be only ministerial, but as Judge Story recognized, the power has important
ramifications for the nation. The Senate could have claimed at least to share such a
power, because of its right to participate in the treaty making process. See Story,
Commentaries, supra note 13, at 578. Compare The Federalist No. 69, at 468
(Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (describing the clause as "more a
matter of dignity than of authority") with Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law of
the United States § 204 (1987) [hereinafter Restatement Foreign Relations] (describing
presidential prerogative in terms of recognition of foreign nation).
65. Like the silence of Sherlock Holmes' famous dog, this absence of affirmative
claims is instructive.
"Is there any point to which you would wish to draw my attention?"
"To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time."
"The dog did nothing in the night-time."
"That was the curious incident."
Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze, in 1 The Complete Sherlock Holmes 335, 347 (1905).
66. See Thomas Jefferson, Proposed Constitution for Virginia, reprinted in 3 The
Writings of Thomas Jefferson 320 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1894) [hereinafter Jefferson,
Writings].
67. Id. at 155-56 (emphasis added). This document was referred to by Madison in
The Federalist No. 48, at 335-36 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). The
state practice prior to the adoption of the Constitution is consistent with Mr. Jefferson's
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This is, of course, the "Whig" theory of executive power, one that
is incompatible with the recognition of an independent executive regu-
latory power, or indeed with much of the modern presidency, because
the modern Executive quite plainly executes laws that "are ... in their
nature ... [both] legislative or judiciary."' 68 Jefferson went on, more-
over, to reject specific substantive attributes of the Crown's federative
and prerogative powers:
We do however expressly deny him the prerogative powers of
erecting courts, offices, boroughs, corporations, fairs, markets,
ports, beacons, light-houses, and sea marks; of laying embargoes,
of establishing precedence, of retaining within the State, or re-
calling to it any citizen thereof, and of making denizens, except so
far as he may be authorized from time to time by the legisla-
ture to exercise any of those powers. '"69
Although Jefferson was concerned only with the powers of a state
governor, the Constitutional Convention reflected similar views of the
American Chief Executive. 70 The delegates acknowledged the need for
both efficiency in public administration and restriction of legislative ex-
cesses, but their response was entirely institutional: a strong, legally
and politically independent chief executive who could enforce national
law.
7 1
The Constitutional Convention focused on the various "specific"
powers conferred on the President by Article 11.72 On only one occa-
sion did it seriously address the general nature of executive power,
when it rejected proposals that might have inched beyond the "law en-
description of executive power in his "Draft". It shows a pattern of legally weak
governors, except in New York and perhaps Massachusetts. See Charles C. Thach, Jr.,
The Creation of the Presidency 1775-1789: A Study in Constitutional History 25-54
(1923); see also CharlesJ. Cooper, et al., Symposium, What the Constitution Means by
Executive Power, 43 U. Miami L. Rev. 165, 168-69 (1988) (Charles J. Cooper)
(hereinafter Symposium]. Even in New York, however, no evidence exists that the
governor had an independent ordinance power that could be employed when that
official's political leadership and veto power failed to bring about the desired result.
68. See 3 Jefferson, Writings, supra note 66, at 326.
69. Id. (emphasis added).
70. That history has been ably canvassed far too many times to justify any extensive
discussion here, most notably in Charles Thach's elegant study, The Creation of the
Presidency. See Thach, supra note 67, at 76-139.
71. Thus the President was given a salary and duration in office that were
independent of Congress. The sole "legislative" power assigned to the President under
the Constitution is the qualified veto. Before he became ChiefJustice, Taft wrote, "The
character of the veto power is purely legislative.... It has been suggested by some that
the veto power is executive. I do not quite see how." Taft, supra note 16, at 14. Taft
went on to argue that the Constitution's use of the word "approve" confirmed the
legislative role of the veto. See id. at 16. But see Wilson, quoted supra in text
accompanying note 9.
72. The various ratifying conventions also seemed concerned with specific
presidential powers. See Herbert J. Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For 49
(1981); see also The Antifederalists 87, 194, 299 (Cecelia M. Kenyon ed., 1966)
(reproducing texts of editorials and a speech protesting powers granted to President).
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forcement" Executive. Resolution 7 of the Virginia plan had provided
for an executive who would possess the "general authority to execute
the National laws [and] enjoy the Executive rights vested in Congress
by the Confederation. ' 7 3 On June 1, 1787, Madison proposed to add
"and to execute such Powers, not legislative nor judiciary in their na-
ture, as may from time to time be delegated by the national legisla-
ture."74 Advanced to allay concerns that "improper powers" could be
delegated to the President, this proposal was nonetheless rejected, ap-
parently because it was perceived to be unnecessary; under the Consti-
tution, no "improper" powers could be delegated.
75
Not surprisingly, therefore, the most important datum-the Con-
stitution itself-contains no hint of an independent presidential regula-
tory power. The great powers of the national government are vested in
Congress. Some of the Crown's important powers-to create offices, to
declare war-were transferred outright to Congress; other formerly im-
portant "executive" powers, such as making appointments and treaties,
were shared with the Senate.7 6 Forrest McDonald summarizes the mat-
ter quite well: "Article II vests 'the executive power' in the president,
but only after Article I has given most of the traditional royal preroga-
tives, or at least a share in them, to one or both houses of Congress.
' 77
Federalist, the great canonical authority, is fully consistent with this
view. Hamilton expressly disclaimed the Crown's powers as a model
for the American presidency. While he emphasized that "[e]nergy in
the executive is a leading character in the definition of good govern-
ment," s7 8 that energy largely consisted in authority to use the military,
73. 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 21 (Max Farrand ed., rev.
ed. 1966) [hereinafter Farrand].
74. Id. at 63.
75. See id. at 67; Sidney M. Milkis & Michael Nelson, The American Presidency:
Origins and Development, 1776-1990, at 50 (1990). On the same day, the Convention
also rejected a proposal to invest the President with "the executive rights vested in
Congress by the confederation." 1 Farrand, supra note 73, at 63. Later, the Convention
passed over a proposal, pending a committee report, concerning the President's use of
the military. See 2 Farrand, supra note 73, at 69-70.
76. One writer observes of the treaty power that "from the perspective of the
framers, this arrangement probably represented the Senate sharing its powers with the
President, rather than the converse." Jack S. Weiss, The Approval of Arms Control
Agreements as Congressional-Executive Agreements, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 1533, 1540
(1991) (emphasis omitted). Justice Scalia's assertion that "[t]he Appointments Clause is,
intentionally and self-evidently, a limitation on Congress" is a misleading
oversimplification. Freytag v. Commissioner, 111 S. Ct. 2631, 2652 n.4 (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
77. Forrest McDonald, Foreword, in American Presidency, supra note 37, at ix.
"So strong is the position of Congress that we might easily have had a complete
government if the Framers had stopped at the end of Article I." Charles L. Black, Jr.,
The Presidency and Congress, 32 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 841, 853 (1975).




when necessary, to enforce national law and for the common defense. 79
Similarly, none of the famous treatises by Tucker, Kent, Story, or Rawle
even hint that the founding generation envisaged any independent
presidential law-making power.8 0
Governmental practice in the early decades of American govern-
ment proceeded on this premise. Washington's conduct was particu-
larly noteworthy. During Washington's first term, he did not "attempt
to achieve by executive order any matter which the strictest interpreta-
tion of the Constitution could regard as within the legislative do-
main.""' During his administration, moreover, a singularly
illuminating illustration of the absence of presidential law-making au-
79. See id. Nos. 72, 74 (Alexander Hamilton).
80. Tucker's discussion appears as an appendix to his edition of Blackstone. See
Tucker Appendix, supra note 46. His work, the first, is also the most penetrating.
Tucker so feared a powerful President that he argued against legislative delegations
giving the President discretion. "[C]ongress have [sic], from time to time, with a liberal
hand, conferred other[] [powers] still more extensive; many of them altogether
discretionary, and not infrequently questionable, as to their constitutionality." Id. at
348-49; cf. Sofaer, supra note 44, at 74-77 (expansive delegations given early on in the
foreign affairs context). Tucker's narrow conception of executive power is illuminated
in his discussion of presidential proclamations: "[p]roclamations are then only binding,
when they reinforce the observance of a duty, enjoined by law, but connected with some
particular fact, which it may be the duty of the executive to make known." See Tucker
Appendix, supra note 46, at 346-47. In a footnote, Tucker asserted that two former
Presidents had exceeded their power when, in proclamations, they recommended
fasting and prayer to the nation. See id.
Kent's entire discussion of American constitutional law is disappointingly
superficial. For him, the Constitution envisaged only a dictionary executive narrowly
conceived: "But when laws are duly made and promulgated, they only remain to be
executed. No discretion is submitted to the executive officer. It is not for him to
deliberate and decide upon the wisdom or expediency of the law." I James Kent,
Commentaries on American Law 253 (1826).
Rawle, referring to the Take Care Clause, wrote:
The simplicity of the language accords with the general character of the
instrument. It declares what is [the President's] duty, and it gives him no power
beyond it. The Constitution, treaties, and acts of congress, are declared to be
the supreme law of the land. He is bound to enforce them; if he attempts to
carry his power further, he violates the Constitution.
William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the United States of America 148-49 (2d
ed. 1829).
WhileJustice Story rejected the idea of a "feeble executive," he too gives no hint of
a presidential regulatory power. See Story, Commentaries, supra note 13, at 516-18.
Speaking of the Take Care Clause, he writes that the carrying out, by the President, of
"the duty imposed upon him to take care, that the laws be faithfully executed ... [is]
[t]he great object of the executive department . Id. at 576. Beyond that he has
nothing to say.
81. James T. Flexner, George Washington and the New Nation 221 (1st ed. 1969);
accord Forrest McDonald, The Presidency of George Washington 27-28 (1974)
(describing President Washington's restlessness while waiting for Congress to take some
action for him to enforce). The most recent study is Glenn Phelps, George Washington




thority occurred. In 1794, and for a decade-and-a-half thereafter, Con-
gress repeatedly authorized the President to impose or lift trade
embargoes upon certain conditions.8 2 While some in Congress
claimed that the President's role offended nondelegation principles,8 3
no one, the President included, suggested that the President indepen-
dently possessed the Crown's prerogative to impose embargoes.8 4
Thus, whatever its scope, presidential power, .even in the context of
foreign relations, was not understood to include the power to prescribe
rules for the regulation of the rights of American citizens.8 5
For a number of reasons, little sustained discussion of the legal
nature of presidential power occurred until the presidency of Andrew
Jackson.8 6 In 1833, as part of his bitter "war" on the Bank of the
United States, Jackson asserted the power to remove Secretary of the
Treasury Duane to enforce his decision that government-owned specie
be withdrawn from the Bank of the United States.8 7 The matter is best
judged a stand-off: Jackson succeeded in his efforts, but in the Senate
debate, Senators Webster, Clay, and Calhoun denounced his conduct,
in the process strongly attacking the idea of any inherent executive
power.88 Not until the war administration of Lincoln was any serious
82. See Resolution of Mar. 26, 1794, S. Con. Res. 2, 3d Cong., 1st Sess., 1 Stat.
400; Act ofJune 4, 1794, ch. 41, 1 Stat. 372. See generally Sofaer, supra note 44, at 132,
175-76 (discussing amount of presidential discretion during early administrations). At
the Constitutional Convention, one delegate recognized that imposition of an embargo
could constitute an act of war. See 2 Farrand, supra note 73, at 362.
83. See Fisher, supra note 23, at 253-56. These concerns were tersely brushed
aside by the Supreme Court in The Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch)
382, 386-88 (1813), the first of the delegation cases.
84. As noted, Jefferson had already denied that the executive Power included any
such power; indeed, The Declaration of Independence listed that power as one of the
grievances justifying independence, and the Constitution assigned to Congress power
over foreign commerce. See supra text accompanying notes 67-70.
85. See Henkin, supra note 44, at 253 ("[Tjhe President's plenary power in foreign
affairs, of course, like every other governmental power, must be exercised in
subordination to the applicable provisions of the Constitution."); id. at 99 ("The Courts
will be particularly reluctant to uphold unilateral executive acts that impinge on
individual rights.").
86. Some of those reasons were a long period of weak domestic national
government and the increasing dominance of the Whig theory of the American
Presidency. De Tocqueville saw the dormant nature of the national government clearly.
See 1 Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America 125-32 (Phillips Bradley ed.,
Random House 1954) (1835); see also Robert H. Wiebe, The Opening of American
Society 200-08 (1984) (describing dormant nature of national government). The
"Whig theory" of the Presidency-the law-enforcement Executive combined with
congressional political dominance-took early hold.
87. For discussions of the incident, see 3 Robert V. Remini, Andrew Jackson and
the Course of American Democracy, 1833-1845, 84-107 (1984); Merrill D. Petersen,
The Great Triumvirate 236-52 (1987).
88. Their arguments are ably summarized by Justice McReynolds in his dissenting




challenge made to the Whig conception of the American presidency.89
The absence of any significant discussion of a presidential law-
making authority in the Constitutional Convention, Federalist, the early
treatises, and early governmental practice confirms that:
[T]he original design [of the Constitution] was intended to
give Congress the legislative authority that was, in fact, the
power to determine national policy. The president had the ca-
pacity to stimulate the exercise of this legislative power by his
information and his recommendations and to constrain or
even negate it by his veto but not to assume it by virtue of any
inherent or implied executive or legislative power.90
Given the foregoing, many modern commentators reject the claim
that "The executive Power" has any independent substantive con-
tent.9' For them, the power confirms the idea of a unitary Executive
and, perhaps, constitutes a short-hand phrase for the powers subse-
quently conferred by Article II. Otherwise, they contend, Article II
could have been limited to a single sentence, the Vesting Clause.92
B. The Residuum Argument
The view that the "executive Power" lacks independent substan-
tive content has not gone unchallenged. Implicitly taking the Crown's
powers (or Locke's description) as a bench-mark, some commentators
have insisted that, in 1789, "The executive Power" had a substantive
content.93 Accordingly, unless the Constitution reallocates formerly
"executive" powers to Congress generally, or to the Senate particu-
larly, whatever power was held by the "Executive" in 1789 must have
been understood to inhere in the President.94
89. For a discussion of Lincoln, see infra notes 131-136 and accompanying text.
90. StephenJ. Wayne, The Legislative Presidency 7 (1978).
91. See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution:
Unitary Executive, Plural Judiciary, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1155, 1169 nn.75-76, 1198 n.222
(1992) (collecting citations).
92. See A. Michael Froomkin, Note, In Defense of Administrative Agency
Autonomy, 96 Yale LJ. 787, 799-800 (1987).
93. Speaking of the English Constitution, Herman Finer observes that the executive
is the "residuary legatee in government after other claimants like Parliament and the law
courts have taken their share." Herman Finer, Theory and Practice of Modern
Government, in 5 Handbook of Political Science 173 (1975).
94. See, e.g., Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 91, at 1165-68; see also id. at 1166
nn. 54-57 (citing sources) Symposium, supra note 67, at 177 ("[T]he founding
generation understood executive power as conferring a broad authority beyond the
mere execution of the laws.") (Charles J. Cooper). Early Congresses met infrequently,
poor communications and travel conditions prevented contact between the seat of
central government and the periphery, and the god-like Washington was certain to be
the first President. These factors point to some substantive conception of executive
power. The confidence of the Convention's delegates in Washington's character proved
to be fully warranted. See Gerhard Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some
Early Versions and Practices, 30 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 211, 260-61 (1989). Moreover,
even though most state governors were legally weak, the governor of New York, the
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Writing as "Pacificus," Hamilton first articulated the public foun-
dation for this "residuum" argument in June 1793 in his well-known
defense of Washington's Proclamation of Neutrality in the conflict be-
tween Great Britain and France.9 5 Emphasizing the language differ-
ences between the Constitution's grants of "all legislative Powers
hereinafter granted" and "The executive Power," Hamilton insisted
that the Constitution embodied an independent, substantive concep-
tion of executive power. Article II's subsequent "enumerations" of
specific executive powers were, he insisted, only "intended by way of
greater caution, to specify and regulate the principal articles implied in
the definition of Executive Power."
9 6
In Myers v. United States,9 7 Chief Justice Taft appeared to endorse
the Hamiltonian conception: "The executive power was given in gen-
eral terms, strengthened by specific terms where emphasis was re-
garded as appropriate, and was limited by direct expressions where
limitation was needed." 9 8 Taft attacked the notion that the subsequent
grants of power to the Executive were unnecessary if the Vesting
Clause possessed an independent substantive content. He insisted that
much of Article II, such as the treaty and appointments powers, limited
closest model for the presidency, was invested with the " 'supreme executive power and
authority.'" Thach, supra note 67, at 35 (quoting N.Y. Const. of 1777, art. 17).
95. See Pacificus No. 1 (June 29, 1793), reprinted in 15 The Papers of Alexander
Hamilton, June 1793-January 1794, at 33-43 (Harold C. Syrett et al. eds., 1969)
[hereinafter Hamilton]. Hamilton had long held expansive conceptions of executive
authority. See Pious, supra note 12, at 36-37.
96. 15 Hamilton, supra note 95, at 39. Hamilton also noted: "The general
doctrine then of our constitution is, that the EXECUTIVE POWER of the Nation is
vested in the President; subject only to the exceptions and qu[aflifications which are
expressed in the instrument." Id. Madison, writing in response as "Helvidius," made
the classic statement of the "law enforcement" executive narrowly conceived: "[t]he
natural province of the executive magistrate is to execute laws, as that of the magistrate
is to make laws. All his acts, therefore, properly executive, must presuppose the
existence of laws to be executed." James Madison, Letters of Helvidius No. 1
(Aug.-Sept. 1793), reprinted in 6 The Writings of James Madison 138-51 (Gaillard
Hunt ed., 1906) [hereinafter Madison, Writings]. For Madison, the President's power
over foreign affairs was "instrumental only," embracing only "matters of fact." Id.
Madison had earlier recognized a doctrine of implied powers in the national
government. See Fisher, supra note 23, at 9. But the existence of those powers does
not establish that they exist other than in Congress. Cf. United States v. Hudson, 11
U.S. (7 Cranch) 31, 33-34 (1812) (existence of implied powers in national government
does not mean that they are in the courts); Corwin, supra note 44, at 180.
97. 272 U.S. 52 (1926) (Taft, C.J.).
98. Id. at 118. Justice McReynolds' powerful but now neglected dissent rejected
Hamilton, and Taft to the extent that he embraced Hamilton. For McReynolds, it was
"beyond the ordinary imagination to picture forty or fifty capable men, presided over by
George Washington, vainly discussing, in the heat of a Philadelphia summer, whether
express authority to require opinions in writing should be delegated to a President in
whom they had already vested the illimitable executive power." Id. at 207 (McReynolds,
J., dissenting).
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powers that otherwise would have been plenary in the Executive.09
Taft's endorsement was, however, limited, focusing only on presiden-
tial control over public administration, specifically on the President's
power to remove subordinates he appointed. 100 For Taft, this control
was an inherent aspect of executive power. While Taft wrote an elabo-
rate opinion, in fact, he thought the issue so clear that in Our Chief Mag-
istrate And His Powers,101 a set of lectures given at Columbia University
several years before, he devoted only two unequivocating sentences to
it.1 0 2 Later in that work, however, the former President elaborately
criticized Theodore Roosevelt's expansive conceptions of presidential
power, insisting that "[t]here is no undefined residuum of power which
[the president] can exercise because it seems to him to be in the public
interest."10
3
Moreover, the "legislative history" of the difference in language
between the legislative powers "herein granted" and "The executive
Power" provides no basis for ascribing any importance to this differ-
ence. That discrepancy occurred late in the Convention, on September
12, 1787, as a result of a Report of the Committee on Style, which had
narrowed Congress' legislative powers to those "herein granted," but
left unchanged "The executive Power."' 1 4  This change seemed
designed only to reflect the limits of federalism on national regulatory
power, not to ratify or to recognize substantive executive power.'0 5
Nonetheless, defenders of the "residuum" position must be
awarded the palm. Rejection of a simple "law enforcement" model of
the Presidency is inherent not only in my defense of a protective power,
but also in the fact of the President's independent and wide-ranging
policy-setting powers in the foreign affairs area. The real question,
however, is the size of the palm. General arguments about the nature
of executive power invariably yield to more specific analysis. Quite
plainly, for example, any executive residuum can operate only on what
remains after the enormous reallocation of former Crown powers to
99. Id. at 128-30, 164 (Taft, C.J.).
100. Outside that area, however, the Vesting Clause, standing alone, cannot be
understood to limit congressional power over administration. See Louis Henkin,
Constitutionalism, Democracy, and Foreign Affairs 29-32 (1990). Even in the foreign
affairs context, "[n]one of these [early nineteenth century] presidents ever claimed that
he possessed inherent constitutional powers as chief executive or commander-in-chief
that lay beyond legislative control." Koh, supra note 21, at 80.
101. See Taft, supra note 16, at 56.
102. For Taft, the first Congress settled the point that "the President had the
absolute power to remove [officials] without consulting the Senate. This was on the
principle that the power of removal was incident to the Executive power and must be
untrammeled." Id.; see also id. at 76 (reemphasizing President's power to remove
officials as a means of carrying out executive responsibility).
103. Id. at 140.
104. See 2 Farrand, supra note 73, at 590, 597 (describing a Report of the
Committee on Style).
105. See Sofaer, supra note 44, at 37.
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Congress or to the Senate. Accordingly, "under no circumstances does
the [residuum] argument allow any strong basis for claiming an implied
grant of [executive] powers inconsistent with specific grants to other
branches." 106 Nor did Hamilton contend otherwise. He advanced only
a theory of concurrent power, and perhaps only in the foreign affairs
context: "From the division of the Executive Power there results, in
reference to it, a concurrent authority . *... ,17 Hamilton recognized,
however, that Congress had the final say.' 08 During the founding gen-
eration, apparently "[n]o doubt was entertained about the ultimate au-
thority of the Congress."' 0 9 Even more to the point is Lincoln's
presidency. Acting as Commander-in-Chief, Lincoln generally claimed
no more than Hamilton's "concurrent authority"; he generally acknowl-
edged that, if it so chose, Congress could completely prescribe the
terms of Reconstruction. As the administration's principal constitu-
tional theorist framed it: " 'The power of Congress to pass laws on the
subjects expressly placed in its charge by the terms of the constitution
cannot be taken away from it, by reason of the fact that the President
... also has powers, equally constitutional, to act upon the same sub-
ject-matters.' "110 Indeed, during Reconstruction the real disagree-
ment was over whether the President, even when acting as
Commander-in-Chief, had any independent regulatory power when
Congress was silent.' 11
106. Id. But see Symposium, supra note 67, at 200-04 (arguing that congressional
legislation that "micromanages" foreign policy is unconstitutional invasion of executive
prerogative) (Orrin Hatch).
107. Hamilton, supra note 95, at 42. In asserting the concurrent authority of the
President, Hamilton fully anticipated Justice Jackson's well known "zone of twilight" in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring) (Steel Seizure) ("When the President acts in absence of either a congressional
grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but
there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in
which its distribution is uncertain.").
108. Hamilton acknowledged that congressional power "includes the right of
judg[ing] whether the Nation is under obligations to m[ake] war or not." Hamilton,
supra note 95, at 40.
109. Casper, supra note 94, at 246; accord Sofaer, supra note 44, at 56 (discussing
congressional supremacy even in the context of foreign affairs); cf. Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2123, 2134 (1991) (opinion of the Court) (recognizing that the
claim of "inherent judicial power" was subject to ultimate congressional control); id. at
2141 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (same); id. at 2143 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (same); Locke,
supra note 47, at 150 ("[T]he king's authority being given him only by the law, he
cannot empower any one to act against the law, or justify him by his commission in so
doing.").
110. Michael L. Benedict, The Constitution of the Lincoln Presidency and the
Republican Era, in American Presidency, supra note 37, at 45, 56 (quoting William
Whiting, Lincoln's Solicitor of the War Department). The Supreme Court agreed. See
the discussion of Texas v. White, infra note 259.
111. "[W]here congressmen divided was not over Congress's power to legislate on
Reconstruction, but the president's. Despite the growing power of the president as a
political force, legal theory held that, except for the veto power, his office was divorced
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Laid bare, the limitations of an acceptable residuum argument
must be stressed. Its principal use is in the area of foreign affairs, to
free the President from the need for statutory authority for every action
taken. But even here we shall see that it provides no basis for a claim
that the President can disregard the will of Congress or invade the pri-
vate rights of American citizens without statutory warrant.
C. Presidential Power to Violate the Law
The Supreme Court has steadfastly held that the President lacks
authority to act contra legem, even in an emergency. 1 2 Little v.
Barreme113 settled that fundamental point long ago. During the naval
war with France at the end of the eighteenth century, an American war-
ship, acting in accordance with presidential instructions, seized a ship
contrary to the terms of an Act of Congress. 1 4 Chief Justice Marshall
said that while the seizure might have been lawful had Congress not
spoken, Congress had "prescribed ... the manner in which this law
shall be carried into execution."' 115 Accordingly, the President's in-
structions could not "change the nature of the transaction, or legalize
an act which without those instructions would have been a plain
trespass."' 16
Presidents, however, have asserted the need, if not the right, to act
contra legem, at least in an emergency. Jefferson wrote:
Sir .... The question you propose, whether circumstances
do not sometimes occur, which make it a duty in officers of
high trust, to assume authorities beyond the law, is easy of so-
from legislation." Michael L. Benedict, A Compromise of Principle 74 (1974); accord
infra text accompanying notes 180-183.
112. In Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838), a case
in which pension payments were being withheld, the Court went out of its way to state
that Presidential "dispensing power ... has no countenance for its support in any part of
the constitution." Id. at 613; accord Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281 (1979)
(interpretive agency regulations issued pursuant to executive order cannot permit
agency disclosure of information protected by statute absent sufficient nexus between
such regulations and some delegation of requisite legislative authority by Congress);
Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35, 47 (1975) (President cannot impound funds in
contravention of an appropriations statute). For an illuminating discussion of Kendall,
see Grundstein, supra note 23, at 309-21.
113. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804); see also United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192,
1230 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342) (Patterson, Cir.J.) ("The president of the United
States cannot control the statute, nor dispense with its execution, and still less can he
authorize a person to do what the law forbids.").
114. See 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 176-77.
115. Id. at 177-78.
116. Id. at 179. Indeed, the instructions were insufficient even to confer a qualified
immunity to a damage action. See id.; see also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 485-96
(1978) (re-affirming Little v. Barreme and rejecting absolute immunity for offical actions
that violate constitutional limits). The result in Little v. Barreme is entirely consistent with
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 168-73 (1803), which gave no hint that the
President could have authorized the Secretary of State to violate the law.
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lution in principle, but sometimes embarrassing in practice. A
strict observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the
high duties of a good citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws
of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when
in danger, are of higher obligation." 17
Jefferson appeared to embrace the premise of Little v. Barreme, invoking
the "justice of his country," not that of the courts: "[T]he good officer
is bound to draw [the line of discrimination between important and un-
important occasions] at his own peril, and throw himself on the justice
of his country and the rectitude of his motives."' 18
Professor Wilmerding and others argue that a "political" defense
of emergency presidential conduct, such as Jefferson's, comports with
the Framers' general understanding: emergency conduct, either not
authorized by statute or contrary to statute, is extra-constitutional in
nature. While an emergency could not justify presidential conduct, the
President and his subordinates could expect indemnification. 19 Per-
117. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John B. Colvin (Sept. 20, 1810) in 9
Jefferson, Writings, supra note 66, at 279 [hereinafter Jefferson, Colvin Letter].
Jefferson discussed unauthorized land purchases, use of unappropriated funds in
anticipation of hostilities, and the Burr/Wilkinson affair. While Jefferson denied that
this power existed with respect to "persons charged with petty duties, where
consequences are trifling, and time allowed for a legal course," he thought that "those
who accept of great charges, [must] risk themselves on great occasions, when the safety
of the nation, or some of its very high interests are at stake." Id. at 281; see also Sofaer,
supra note 44, at 226 (under Jefferson's doctrine of emergency power, "a President is
permitted to violate the Constitution in an emergency, though he does so at the risk of
having his judgment rejected by the legislature or the people"). Jefferson repeated this
theme frequently. See Schlesinger, supra note 8, at 23-25; George M. Dennison,
Martial Law: The Development of a Theory of Emergency Powers, 1776-1861, 18 Am.
J. Legal Hist. 52, 58 (1974); Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline of
Liberalism, 98 Yale LJ. 1385, 1392, 1393 (1989); see also Clinton L. Rossiter,
Constitutional Dictatorship: Crisis Government in Modern Democracies 218 (1948)
(defending presidential emergency power in wartime); J. Malcolm Smith & Cornelius P.
Cotter, Powers of the President During Crises 5-7 (1960) (discussing Locke and
Rousseau's recognition of the need for an executive emergency power); George
Winterton, The Concept of Extra-Constitutional Executive Power in Domestic Affairs, 7
Hastings Const. L.Q. 1, 10 (1979) (drawing parallel between common recognition by
Locke and Jefferson that necessity could support legitimate use of extra-constitutional
powers). Harry S Truman said that "in the interest of the people," the President "must
use whatever power the Constitution does not expressly deny him." Marcus Cunliffe,
The Presidency 296 (3d ed. 1987) (quoting Harry S Truman).
118. Jefferson, Colvin Letter, supra note 117, at 279.
119. "That this doctrine was accepted by every single one of our early statesmen
can easily be shown." Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., The President and the Law, 67 Pol. Sci.
Q. 321, 324 (1952); accord Lobel, supra note 117, at 1394-96. Professor Lobel, see id.
at 1395, quotes Judge Story's opinion in The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362 (1824):
It may be fit and proper for the government, in the exercise of the high
discretion confided to the executive, for great public purposes, to act on a
sudden emergency, or to prevent an irreparable mischief, by summary
measures, which are not found in the text of the laws. Such measures are
properly matters of state, and if the responsibility is taken, under justifiable
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haps the best solution is to "separat[e] and protect[] the normal consti-
tutional order from the dark world of crisis government."' 120
Wilmerding argued, for example, that the President would become
more cautious in invoking an emergency power than if such a power
were legally institutionalized.' 2 1
This separation has significant costs. First, our constitutional the-
ory is upended. The Constitution need not be amended in order to
change it, at least temporarily; acting outside the framework of Article
V, popular or congressional approval as a form of indemnification pro-
vides the President with a vehicle for temporarily suspending constitu-
tional limitations. 122 Second, the political process almost invariably
will sustain popular presidential conduct even though it sacrifices an
individual interest or that of some "discrete and insular" group. 12 3 Fi-
nally, the reference to an "indemnity" can mislead. Such references in
judicial decisions and by commentators suggest compensation for the
circumstances, the Legislature will doubtless apply a proper indemnity. But
this Court can only look to the questions, whether the laws have been violated;
and if they were, justice demands, that the injured party should receive a suitable
redress.
Id. at 366-67 (emphasis added).
120. Lobel, supra note 117, at 1388.
121. See Schlesinger, supra note 8, at 148-49; Wilmerding, supra note 119, at 329.
122. Rossiter acknowledged the power of the presidency in an emergency, but
insisted on the need for an active Congressional role: "constitutional dictatorship
should be legitimate." Rossiter, supra note 117, at 300. However, this does not address
the point that there may be conduct that even Congress lacks the power to authorize.
For a recent treatment of the emergency topic, in the context of Northern Ireland and
Germany, see John E. Finn, Constitutions in Crisis: Political Violence and the Rule of
Law (1991).
123. Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938)
(recognizing that political process may sometimes fail to protect "discrete and insular
minorities," and suggesting that statutes impinging their rights may be subject to higher
level of scrutiny). In his engaging work, Our Chief Magistrate and His Powers, Taft makes
much of the point. He recounts the travails of Edward Livingston objecting to
Jefferson's unauthorized presidential interference with his property. An elegant and
lucid writer, Livingston attacked the political check argument:
When a public functionary abuses his power by an act which bears on the
community, his conduct excites attention, provokes popular resentment, and
seldom fails to receive the punishment it merits. Should an individual be
chosen for the victim, little sympathy is created for his sufferings, if the interest
of all is supposed to be promoted by the ruin of one. The gloss of zeal for the
public is therefore always spread over acts of oppression, and as a brilliant
exertion of energy in their favor, which, when viewed in its true light, would be
found a fatal blow to their rights.
In no government is this effect so easily produced as in a free republic;
party spirit, inseparable from its existence, there aids the illusion, and a
popular leader is allowed in many instances impunity, and sometimes rewarded
with applause for acts that would make a tyrant tremble on his throne.
Taft, supra note 16, at 150. Taft thought those remarks fully applicable to a proposal
entertained by Theodore Roosevelt to seize certain coal mines, even though no statute
conferred such authority to invade private rights. See id. at 145-50.
[Vol. 93:1
PROTECTIVE POWER
injured party with the costs ultimately removed from the official to the
United States. 124 This was the result in Little v. Barreme.125 But "in-
demnity" acts need not so operate; from their origins in English his-
tory, they were frequently immunity acts.1 2 6 Thus, the Indemnity Act
of 1863, as amended in 1866 and 1867, provided retrospective de-
fenses in damage actions brought against federal officials for alleged
misconduct based upon presidential directives. 12 7 In Mitchell v.
Clark,128 the Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of the legis-
lation as "ordinary acts of indemnity passed by all governments when
the occasion requires it."'129
A bloody Civil War, an event wholly unforeseen by the founding
generation, may not be a fruitful source for deriving constitutional les-
sons.' 3 0 Lincoln's war-time conduct involved massive interference with
private rights, including arrests, suspension of habeas corpus, and even
conscription.' 3 1 To the extent that his actions contravened positive
law, Lincoln's conduct was illegal.' 3 2 Lincoln's response was to ask:
124. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
125. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804). For an illuminating discussion of this result, see
Lobel, supra note 117, at 1394; see also Sofaer, supra note 44, at 333-36 (describing
congressional grant of indemnity to General Jackson many years after underlying events
had occurred).
126. See Randall, supra note 44, at 188.
127. See Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755, 756, amended by Act of May 11,
1866, ch.80, 14 Stat. 46, and Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 155, 14 Stat. 432. The "failure to
preserve remedies for the individual was frequently referred to by the opponents of the
act." Randall, supra note 44, at 205. Randall added: "A different course might well
have been taken; for the injured party could have been permitted to recover damages,
and then the damages could have been assumed by the United States." Id.
128. 110 U.S. 633 (1884).
129. 110 U.S. at 640; cf. Bean v. Beckwith, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 510, 516 (1873)
(dictum) (assuming, for purpose of assessing adequacy of pleadings invoking defense
under Acts of 1863 and 1867, that these statutes are constitutional); The Prize Cases, 67
U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862) (upholding constitutionality, against ex post facto challenge, of
congressional legislation retroactively ratifying President Lincoln's assumption of power
to blockade Confederate ports at start of Civil War). Moreover, under modern "official
immunity" case law, many officials will possess an immunity from damage suits even for
unconstitutional conduct. See infra text accompanying notes 331-332. In these
.circumstances, the injured party will not receive compensation. But this is a problem of
greater dimension on the state rather than on the national level.
130. Professor Dunning long ago argued that during war a "temporary
dictatorship" must be admitted as part of the constitutional system, William A. Dunning,
The Constitution of the United States in Civil War, 1 Pol. Sci. Q. 163, 175 (1886), and
many years later Clinton Rossiter, reflecting on World War II, agreed. See Rossiter,
supra note 117 at 4-8; see also supra note 122.
131. See, e.g., Randall, supra note 44, at 36-37. See generally Mark E. Neely, Jr.,
The Fate of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties (1991) (emphasizing that
Lincoln did not cause arrests simply on the basis that persons disagreed with his
policies); Lincoln the War President: The Gettysburg Lectures (Gabor Borrit ed. 1992)
(seven essays by prominent historians tracing origins and conduct of Civil War and
development of Lincoln Presidency).
132. For a summary, see Randall, supra note 44, at 35-41.
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"[A]re all the laws but one to go unexecuted, and the government itself
go to pieces, lest that one be violated?"' 1 3 While his question builds
on unassailable intuition that the Constitution and laws exist for the
nation and not vice versa,134 the legal answer to Lincoln's question has
been clear from the very beginning: yes.' 35 That Lincoln himself un-
derstood this is reflected in the fact that he assumed the need for con-
gressional ratification for his conduct.' 36
133. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 6
Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln 297, 309 (John G. Nicolay &John Hay eds., 1894)
[hereinafter Lincoln, Complete Works]. "Was it possible to lose the nation and yet
preserve the Constitution?" Alexander J. Groth, Lincoln and the Standards of
Presidential Conduct, XXII Presidential Stud. Q. 765, 766 (1992)(quoting President
Lincoln). He might have also observed that the President's oath to "execute the office of
the President of the United States, and [to] preserve, protect and defend the
Constitution of the United States," U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, does not in its terms refer to
laws.
134. In Jefferson's words, "To lose our country by a scrupulous adherence to
written law, would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty, property and all those who
are enjoying them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the means." See
Jefferson, Colvin Letter, supra note 117, at 279.
135. In Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 114-16 (1866), the entire Court
agreed that, even acting as Commander-in-Chief, President Lincoln could not disregard
a statutory requirement governing the release of prisoners, although, to be sure, the
decision was rendered after the Civil War had ended. For a discussion of Ex parte
Milligan, see Clinton L. Rossiter & Richard P. Longaker, The Supreme Court and the
Commander in Chief 26-39 (1976). The field of international law is instructive here.
Earlier on, the Court held that international law was part of our law and was of binding
force on a theory that we would now call federal common law. In Brown v. United
States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 153-54 (1814), the Court recognized that the President
(but not Congress) was bound by these norms. Disagreement exists to this day as to
whether this is sound doctrine. See Fernandez-Roque v. Smith, 622 F. Supp. 887, 903
(N.D. Ga. 1985) ("[T]he President has the authority to ignore our country's obligations
arising under customary international law .. "), order stayed in part on other grounds
sub. nom. Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 781 F.2d 1450 (11th Cir. 1986). For a succinct and
admirable recent discussion of the problem, see The Supreme Court 1991 Term,
Leading Cases, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 163, 322-28 (1992) (expressing doubt that President
has power to violate customary international law).
136. Indeed, Lincoln claimed to be exercising powers no greater than those
possessed by Congress, and that "Congress would readily ratify them. It is believed that
nothing has been done beyond the constitutional competency of Congress." 6 Abraham
Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in Lincoln, Complete
Works, supra note 133, at 308. Randall criticizes as a "bad practice" executive conduct
taken in anticipation of congressional ratification. See Randall, supra note 44, at 58-59.
Congress did ratify most of Lincoln's statutory transgressions and invasions of private
right. See Act of Aug. 6, 1861, ch. 63, § 3, 12 Stat. 326; The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2
Black) 635, 670-71 (1862) (blockade of the southern ports authorized by legislation
"approving, legalizing, and making valid all the [President's prior] acts, proclamations,
and orders"); see also Mitchell v. Clark, 110 U.S. 633, 640 (1884) ("[A]ct passed after
the event, which in effect ratifies what has been done ... is valid, so far as Congress
could have conferred such authority before ...."); supra text accompanying notes
128-129. In The Prize Cases, the dissent refused to find the congressional ratification
effective because, they said, the legislation constituted an ex post facto law. 110 U.S. at
697-98 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
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Outright claims of "executive Power" to disregard statutes are now
seldom advanced before the senior judges.137 In Steel Seizure, for exam-
ple, the President did not deny in the Supreme Court that Congress
was the ultimate master of the situation.138 There is, however, one
sweeping claim of presidential prerogative that should not go unmen-
tioned. In September of 1942, during his World War II presidency,
President Franklin D. Roosevelt demanded that Congress repeal a pro-
vision of the Emergency Price Control Act.' 3 9 His demand was not an
arbitrary one; the offending provision was a protectionist measure for
farmers that the President believed seriously impeded his administra-
tion's efforts to control inflation.140 The President stated that "[i]n the
event that the Congress should fail to act, and act adequately, I shall
accept the responsibility, and I will act."1 41 What is not well known is
that the President made this threat only after having been advised by
Wayne Morse, then Dean of the Oregon Law School, that "if you de-
cide that a certain course of action is essential as a war measure, it su-
persedes congressional action."' 42 Congress yielded, one day after the
presidential deadline.
Could the Supreme Court have sustained so bold a presidential
prerogative, even during the dark days of World War II? The un-
bounded nature of Roosevelt's claim is particularly striking at the end
of the President's message, when, after referring to the Civil War, he
said:
137. In circumstances in which no private rights are concerned, Presidents during
times of stress have often treated statutes as no more than paper barriers. See, e.g.,
Pious, supra note 12, at 53-55 (describing President Franklin Roosevelt's conduct
before the Second World War).
138. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 676-77, 701
(1952) (Vinson, CJ., dissenting) (administration was at all times willing to obey
congressional mandate in this matter). The President argued, however, that not only
did no relevant statute prohibit his conduct, but also that his conduct implemented
specific congressional legislation. The lengthy dissenting opinion of Chief Justice
Vinson draws extensively on the government's submission. See id. at 667-710. Justice
Jackson's well known concurring opinion distinguished among presidential conduct with
Congressional authorization, without it, and contrary to the expressed or implied will of
Congress. Id. at 635-38 (Jackson, J., concurring). As to the latter, he said the
President's "power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own
constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter."
Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring). While the bulk of his opinion was devoted to a
demonstration that the President's seizure could not be sustained under the last
category, Jackson's analysis made no contact whatever with the government's
submission.
139. The relevant events, including the behind-the-scenes activities of Justices
Black and Byrnes, are described in Frank Freidel, Franklin D. Roosevelt: A Rendezvous
With Destiny 437-39 (1990).
140. See id.
141. 88 Cong. Rec. 7044 (1942).
142. Freidel, supra note 139, at 437.
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I cannot tell what powers may have to be exercised in or-
der to win this war.
The American people can be sure that I will use my pow-
ers with a full sense of my responsibility to the Constitution
and to my country. The American people can also be sure that
I shall not hesitate to use every power vested in me to accom-
plish the defeat of our enemies in any part of the world where
our own safety demands such defeat.
When the war is won, the powers under which I act automati-
cally revert to the people-to whom they belong. 14
3
This is dangerous and unconstitutional doctrine. No matter how
closely the President approaches a "plebiscitary presidency" as a mat-
ter of political reality, no such legal relationship is contemplated by the
Constitution. 144 The President does not stand in some direct and un-
143. 88 Cong. Rec. 7044 (1942) (emphasis added). It is, perhaps worth noting here
that although Roosevelt exercised wide powers during the war, most of the justifications
asserted were statutory in nature. See Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., War and the
Constitution: Abraham Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt 144, 162-74 in Lincoln the
War President: The Gettysburg Lectures, supra note 131. Indeed, even when invoking
his powers as Commander-in-Chief, Lincoln "generally signified only the narrow and
traditional view of the Commander-in-Chief as the fellow who gave orders to the armed
forces." Id. at 168.
144. On the "plebiscitary" presidency, see Schlesinger, supra note 8, at 254-55;
see also Koh, supra note 21, at 97. In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the opinion of the Court suggests that its holding
was grounded on the special nature of the presidency:
In contrast [to courts], an agency to which Congress has delegated policy-
making responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely
upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to inform its
judgements. While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the
Government to make such policy choices ....
Id. at 865. This paragraph was, it should be noted, uttered in the context of
demonstrating the institutional superiority of the executive over the courts in resolving
ambiguous policy questions. That point may be well-taken if generalized to all
administrative agencies: all agencies are politically more accountable than courts. But
the authority exercised by the President (and other administrative officials) under
Chevron in fact exists only by virtue of a congressional delegation. See Pauley v.
Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2524, 2534 (1991); Antonin Scalia, Judicial
Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 Duke LJ. 511; Michael Herz,
Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and Law Making under Chevron, 6
Admin. L.J. Am. U. 187, 188-89 (1992). Executive authority is not the result of some
invisible radiation from the President's supposed special "accountability" to the people.
As Henry Clay put it in his dispute with Jackson, "By what authority does the president
derive power from the mere result of an election . . . . I had supposed that the
Constitution and the laws were the sole source of executive authority." Remini, supra
note 87, at 126. The Court's careless language is, moreover, potentially dangerous.
Taken literally, the Court intimates that Congress itself could not overrule Chevron and
require courts, rather than the executive, to resolve all issues of statutory ambiguity.
Moreover, the Court implies that, as against other executive and administrative officials,
the President legally must have the last say on the meaning of all ambiguous statutes, a
result that would overturn a vast amount of administrative law.
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mediated relationship with "the people," drawing legal authority from
them. The President is not "democracy personified, the nation made
man."14
5
Whether or not any president can live with it, the literary theory of
"The executive Power" recognizes no presidential license to disregard
otherwise concededly applicable legislation, even in an emergency. 146
The Steel Seizure Court endorsed this proposition, 147 and decisions too
numerous to cite fully assume it. 148 Yet, in the last half of this century,
challenges to this doctrine have been increasing, particularly when the
President claims to be acting as Commander-in-Chief and invoking the
special presidential role in foreign affairs. This challenge did not ema-
nate from the "hard right" only;' 49 in fact, the strongest such claim
came during the Truman Administration. Testifying before the Senate
Committees on Foreign Relations and Armed Services on the Presi-
dent's proposal to send four additional divisions to Europe, Secretary
of State Acheson said:
Not only has the President the authority to use the Armed
Forces in carrying out the broad foreign policy of the United
States and implementing treaties, but it is equally clear that
this authority may not be interfered with by the Congress in
the exercise of powers which it has under the Constitution.150
While now a staple of presidential advocacy, Secretary Acheson's testi-
mony is startling if read to make claims concerning the nature of the
President's authority beyond that possessed as Commander-in-Chief.
Even were it conceded-although I would not-that the Commander-
in-Chief could move the military forces at will even in defiance of Con-
gress, that is the limit of permissible argument. If Mr. Acheson is also
suggesting that the President's important role in foreign affairs and in
implementing treaties permits executive defiance of Congress, that po-
145. See Schlesinger, supra note 8, at 254 (quoting Laboulaye on Napoleon III);
see also text accompanying notes 31-34, where President Nixon comes close to
asserting such a proposition. Professor Schlesinger argues that the Nixon presidency
pushed hard the idea that the President's accountability diminished need for a strict
reading of constitutional limitations, "Nixon was carrying the imperial Presidency
toward its ultimate form in the plebiscitary Presidency-with the President accountable
only once every four years .... Schlesinger, supra note 8, at 255.
146. This difficulty is significantly ameliorated by conventional tools of statutory
construction and the recognition of a protective function (and perhaps of some
residuum of a general emergency presidential power). See infra text accompanying
notes 188-202.
147. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 586 (1952) (Steel
Seizure).
148. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1767 (1991). For other cases, see
supra notes 112 and 116.
149. On claims by the Nixon administration, see Schlesinger, supra note 8, at
165-67. Professor Schlesinger's elegant work treats the Nixon administration as
seeking a revolution in the constitutional theory of the presidency. See id. at 187-93.
150. Quoted in Rossiter & Longaker, supra note 135, at 135.
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sition finds little support in our constitutional heritage. Moreover, Mr.
Acheson's claim sits quite uneasily with the Truman administration's
concession in Steel Seizure that Congress was the ultimate master.
Whatever the extent of congressional authority to regulate in the few
areas in which the President has "specific" authority, 15 1 no doubt
should exist that the congressional will must prevail when the President
possesses only concurrent authority.
152
D. Presidential Emergency Power.
Advocates of presidential emergency power seldom distinguish be-
tween claims concerning presidential emergency conduct contrary to
law and such conduct when statutes are silent. The fact that this dis-
tinction is not made is not surprising: an emergency is an emergency,
and the need for a "Fast Track" response is apparent, whether or not
some law seems more or less applicable. 153 Moreover, the very coher-
ence of the underlying distinction is troublesome.' 54 Nonetheless, the
Court's unanimous opinion in Little v. Barreme apparently made the dis-
151. This is not necessarily true, however, when the President acts pursuant to a
specific power, such as the pardon power. See, e.g., United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 128, 141-42 (1871). In his Myers dissent, Justice McReynolds wrote that "[i]f it
be admitted that the Constitution by direct grant vests the President with all executive
power, it does not follow that he can proceed in defiance of congressional action."
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 231 (1926) (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
152. See Henkin, supra note 100, at 33-34 (President's powers "includ[e] perhaps
[the power to initiate] covert activities and even some uses of the armed forces for
foreign policy purposes short of war. But those activities are subject to control by
Congress, whether by legislation or by control of appropriations."). There are some
dissenters. See, e.g.,Joint Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Secret Military
Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition and the House Select Comm. to
Investigate Covert Arms Transactions with Iran, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. Part II 36-39
(1987) (testimony of Lt. Col. Oliver L. North) (President has inherent power to use
unappropriated funds in foreign affairs context); Koh, supra note 21, at 28 (citing a
Justice Department memorandum filed in support of Oliver North in the Iran-Contra
trials); Geoffrey Miller, The Appropriations Power and the Necessary and Proper
Clause, 68 Wash. U. L.Q. 640, 643 (1990) ("[The] appropriations power cannot be used
to circumvent or intrude on the President's inherent authority."); Symposium, supra
note 67, at 200-04 (Congress cannot constitutionally micromanage foreign affairs)
(Orrin Hatch). The appropriations argument is an old one, see Sofaer, supra note 44, at
170-73, and it has never received the assent of Congress. But the Constitution may
impose some funding obligations on Congress. See, e.g., Harvey Flaumenhaft, The
Effective Republic 122-23 (1992) (describing Hamilton's argument that Congress must
fund the salaries ofjudges).
153. See infra text accompanying notes 170-176.
154. An examination of the concurring opinions and the dissent in Steel Seizure
shows that, even for judges, the distinction can prove difficult to apply, even if
conceptually plausible. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952) (Steel Seizure). In The Apollon, for example, Judge Story first rejected two
purported statutory justifications for the executive's conduct; in the end, however, he
thought that the executive seizure violated positive law, specifically, settled principles of
international law. See The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 367-72 (1824).
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tinction, and it is a plausible one.' 55
The American Constitution contains no general provision author-
izing suspension of the normal governmental processes when an emer-
gency is declared by an appropriate governmental authority. While the
grants of power to the national government include some emergency
powers, they seem largely confined to protection against violence, both
foreign and domestic, including the power to repel sudden attacks,
"suppress Insurrections," suspend the privilege of habeas corpus in
cases of "Rebellion or Invasion," and protect the states against "do-
mestic violence."' 56 Moreover, the literary theory holds that the rele-
vant constitutional limitations are not suspended during an
emergency.' 5 7 To be sure, on occasion some limited emergency power
within the Constitution has been recognized by the Supreme Court:
"for the government, within the Constitution, has all the powers
granted to it which are necessary to preserve its existence.' 58 But
155. See 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804). The Court held that although the President
may have had the power to order that ships suspected of trading with France during
wartime be seized, such power was limited by Congress' express designation of the
limits of seizure. See id. at 177-79. But one must proceed with caution here. "No
single fault has been the source of so much bad history as the reading back of later and
sharper distinctions into earlier periods where they have no place." Charles H.
McIlwain, The American Revolution: A Constitutional Interpretation 64 (Great Seal
Books 1958) (1923).
156. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 15; id. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; id. art. IV, § 4.
157. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 121 (1866) ("No doctrine, involving
more pernicious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of [the
Constitution's] provisions can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of
government.") (emphasis added). Many Latin American constitutions do provide for
extensive derogations from rights in emergencies. See generally Claudio Grossman,
States of Emergencies, in 16 The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant and
Political Rights (Louis Henkin ed., 1981).
The general problem of reconciling the tradition of limited (i.e. constitutional)
government with the need for effective government in times of emergency is one that
affects all liberal democracies. In his message to Congress ofJuly 4, 1861, Lincoln put
the dilemma well, "Must government, of necessity, be too strong for the liberties of its
own people, or too weak to maintain its own existence?" Abraham Lincoln, Message to
Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 6 Lincoln, Complete Works, supra note
133, at 301.
In The Democratic and Authoritarian State, Franz Neumann wrote:
No society in recorded history has ever been able to dispense with political
power. This is as true of liberalism as of absolutism, as true of laissez faire as of
an interventionist state. No greater disservice has been rendered to political
science than the statement that the liberal state was a "weak" state. It was
precisely as strong as it needed to be in the circumstances. It acquired
substantial colonial empires, waged wars, held down internal disorders, and
stabilized itself over long periods of time.
Franz Neumann, The Democratic and the Authoritarian State 8 (Herbert Marcuse ed.,
1957). I accept the proposition that the government will act in an emergency when the
dominant interests so require. And so, for me the question is whether in legal analysis
the national government's emergency power is extra-constitutional.
158. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 121 (1866); see also Rossiter,
1993]
COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW
more typical of the literary theory are statements that an "[e]mergency
does not create power ... or diminish the restrictions imposed upon
power granted." 5 9
Objections to any residuum of presidential emergency power tradi-
tionally have run along two lines: federalism and separation of powers.
The federalism justification, simply put, is that no general emergency
power can exist in the presidency because none exists in the national
government.' 60 Twentieth-century developments, however, have evis-
cerated that argument because the powers of Congress, as now con-
strued by the courts, are fully adequate to deal with any emergency. 16 1
Put differently, an emergency does create powers, at least as against any
argument resting on the supposedly "limited" nature of congressional
power.
But the President is not Congress. What "emergency" powers,
then, can the President claim? While the President cannot lawfully dis-
regard positive law in an emergency, what if no relevant positive law
exists? Given its origin and line of growth, should presidential author-
ity be understood to include some emergency power?' 6 2 Powerful ar-
Constitutional Dictatorship, supra note 117, at 211-15 (framers believed that
Constitution conferred adequate powers to deal with an emergency).
159. Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425 (1934).
160. See supra notes 156-159 and accompanying text. With respect to the
Louisiana Purchase, Jefferson believed not that the President, but that the entire
national government lacked constitutional authority to acquire the territory: "The
constitution has made no provision for our holding foreign territory, still less for
incorporating foreign nations into our Union." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John
C. Breckenridge (Aug. 12, 1803), in 8Jefferson, Writings, supra note 67, at 244; see also
Schlesinger, supra note 8, at 23-25 (discussing Jefferson's beliefs that the Louisiana
Purchase was outside the power of the federal government and that, as a practical
matter, presidential acts done in an emergency, and with impending congressional
approval, are necessary even if not lawful); cf. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. 388,
410, 1 Pet. 511, 542 (1828) (power to acquire territory implied from treaty provision of
U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2).
161. Cf. Henry P. Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88
Colum. L. Rev. 723, 730-34 (1988) (describing collapse of federalism limits on
congressional power). Daniel Franklin fails to see this point, arguing that emergency
powers, while once powers of the Crown, are now powers of the state as a whole, and are
extra-constitutional. See Daniel P. Franklin, Extraordinary Measures: The Exercise of
Prerogative Powers in the United States 12-13, 20-24 (1991). This argument conflates
political theory with constitutional law: Congress now has all the legal authority needed
to deal with virtually any emergency. I deal here only with a case in which it is assumed
that Congress could legislate. Lincoln, it is true, at one point suggested the existence of
a presidential emergency power not possessed by Congress. See Benedict, supra note
111, at 83.
162. "Prerogative" power is authority that "accrue[s] to all states" outside "the
limits of the written constitution" that allows the government to "take extraordinary
actions for the protection of the state." Franklin, supra note 161, at 3. Emergency
powers, by contrast, allow the President to "go beyond the bounds of the Constitution
or laws," by "exercis[ing] the legislative powers," Pious, supra note 12, at 44, but do
not allow the President to take actions that are beyond the power of the federal
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guments against any such prerogative can be adduced: The President
already possesses considerable delegated "emergency" powers; 16 3 no
further need exists to aggrandize the legal position of the greatest
political office on earth; judicial recognition of a general, inherent pres-
idential "emergency" power would result in authority both indefinite in
description and uncontainable in practice; the result would threaten
separation-of-power and civil liberties values. 164 Even in the truncated
manner just stated, this argument has considerable force.
For me, however, the most troublesome question is whether judi-
cial recognition of any general presidential emergency power would in
practice simply amount to a routine discretionary authority in the Presi-
dent to act whenever the President thought it expedient: "Let him
once win the admiration and confidence of the country, and no other
single force can withstand him, no combination of forces will easily
overpower him." 165 So wrote Woodrow Wilson many years ago.166
President Theodore Roosevelt's stewardship theory has been repeat-
edly criticized along precisely these lines.' 67 No acceptable conception
of "The executive Power" can permit the Presidency to function so in
its routine operation.' 68 The general conception of executive authority
government as a whole. The distincion in terminology is, of course, conventional, not
intrinsic.
163. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 332-334 (1988) (authorizing President to use armed forces
to enforce laws or suppress rebellion, insurrection, or domestic violence); see also
Lobel, supra note 117, at 1390 ("[L]iberalism seeks to separate emergency rule from the
normal constitutional order, thereby preserving the Constitution in its pristine form
while preserving the executive with the power, but not legal authority, to act in an
emergency."); Sofaer, supra note 44, at 378 (early Presidents made no claim of inherent
presidential power to initiate conflicts).
164. See Schlesinger, supra note 8, at 442-64. William Pitt noted in 1783 that
"'[n]ecessity is the plea for every infringement of human freedom. It is the argument of
tyrants; is the creed of slaves.' " Mark M. Stavsky, The Doctrine of Necessity in Pakistan,
16 Cornell Int'l LJ. 341, 341 (1983) (quoting William Pitt, Speech in the House of
Commons, Nov. 18, 1783).
165. Wilson, Constitutional Government, supra note 8, at 68.
166. More recently, an able commentator has observed that "in times of stress a
president can comfortably assume that he can act without systematic institutional
restraints." Rossiter & Longaker, supra note 150, at xi.
167. See William H. Harbaugh, The Constitution of the Theodore Roosevelt
Presidency and the Progressive Era in The Constitution and the American Presidency
63, 67-68 (Martin Fausold & Alan Shank eds., 1991); Taft, supra note 16, at 143-47.
168. These fears are compounded by a recognition that no real countervailing
check through judicial review will exist. Perhaps a court will be able to say no more
than, "we can't tell you what all the defining characteristics of an emergency are, but we
can't say that the presidential judgment here is out of bounds." See, e.g., Martin v.
Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 12, 17-20, 28-33 (1827) (President is initial judge of
existence of emergency); see also Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 399 (1932)
(governor, as executive, has discretion to determine whether an emergency requiring
military aid exists); United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623, 627-28 (1871)
("immediate, imminent, and impending" danger and "extreme and imperative"
emergency required for military requisition of private property); Mitchell v. Harmony,
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posited in Steel Seizure would be sharply undercut. A requirement of
subsequent affirmative congressional ratification of the President's
emergency conduct would ameliorate this difficulty but would not en-
tirely avoid it, so long as the public generally approves of what the Pres-
ident has done.1 6
9
Yet, to deny the legal existence of a power that every government
must possess is also problematic. 170 To be sure, our legal tradition al-
ready denies presidential authority to act contrary to positive law.
Need we go still further, however, and deny all emergency power to the
President, even when those who deny the lawfulness of such a power
recognize its practical necessity? 17' President after President has as-
54 U.S. (24 How.) 115 (1851) (necessity of taking by an Officer is based on Officer's
opinion of the facts); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 47-48 (1849) (discussing
Mott with approval, giving President sole power to determine what is an emergency).
See generally Rossiter & Longaker, supra note 135, at 14-17 (discussing origin of
discretionary power in Luther and Mott). Perhaps, in practice, the judges require little
more than a presidential ipse dixit a proclamation of an emergency-and, in the case of
emergency covert operations, no such proclamation at all. Structural legislation can
ameliorate but not resolve the problem of the indefiniteness of any "emergency"
standard. See, e.g., The National Emergencies Act of 1976, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651
(1988) (establishing procedures for the declaration and termination of future
(undefined) emergencies); War Powers Resolution of 1973, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-1548
(1988).
169. In response, commentators have attempted to frame highly restrictive
definitions of what can properly count as an "emergency," in an effort to legitimate and
constrain Roosevelt's claim that the President must act when a "national imperative" so
demands. For example, Professor Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. formulated an eight-part test,
which required a "clear, present and broadly perceived danger to the life of the nation
and to the ideals for which the nation stands." Schlesinger, supra note 8, at 459.
Professor Schlesinger contemplates conduct "beyond the laws and Constitution." Id.
Richard Pious, a political scientist, proposes a thoughtful seven-part formulation, the
most important aspect of which is a "national emergency, when the continued existence
of the Union and the physical safety of the people is at stake, when delay might prove
fatal, and when traditional constitutional procedures would involve such delay." Pious,
supra note 12, at 84.
170. Eugene Rostow, a vigorous supporter of executive power, insists that "the
President's prerogative powers will survive, and indeed prevail, if Presidents fight for
them, because they correspond to the nature of things and the necessities of
government in the United States." Symposium, supra note 67, at 190 (Eugene V.
Rostow). Unlike the question of an independent presidential regulatory authority, the
issue of an emergency presidential power cannot be meaningfully resolved by any clear
non-controversial understanding of the nature of separation of powers. "Disagreement
about the doctrine is probably inherent because, as stated in The Federalist No. 47, a
large variety of institutional arrangements can satisfy the separation of powers norm....
[Moreover,] [miost late eighteenth century ... accounts of the ... doctrine were very
superficial." William B. Gywn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers in the
Age of the Framers, 30 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 263, 264 (1989).
171. "[I]t is not lightly to be assumed that, in matters requiring national action, 'a
power which must belong to and somewhere reside in every civilized government' is not
to be found." Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (quoting Andrews v.
Andrews, 188 U.S. 14, 33 (1903)). Of course, "that power exists in the Government
does not vest it in the President." Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.
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serted such a power, or perhaps more accurately, at least the need to
act.1 72 Although Steel Seizure seems to reject the existence of any execu-
tive emergency power, a careful examination of all seven opinions filed
does not support such a definitive assertion. An analysis of the concur-
ring and dissenting opinions indicates that a majority of the justices
embraced the existence of some residual presidential emergency
power.1 73 They divided on the question whether Congress nonetheless
had impliedly prohibited the President's conduct. 174 Moreover, de-
spite the government's argument and President Truman's statement,
no emergency existed. Ample time existed for congressional action,
579, 604 (1952) (Steel Seizure). Congress now has adequate power, but to be effective,
some emergency power must, at least on occasion, initially be in the Executive because
of the need for an immediate response. In the emergency context, "the Executive is
authorized to exert the power of the United States." Brief for the United States at 99,
United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915) (No. 278); see also Lobel, supra
note 117, at 1404-07 ("President has inherent power to do... anything not explicitly
forbidden by the Constitution."). President Lincoln put the point most eloquently, at
least if his remarks are not understood to sanction conduct contra legem: "'Was it
possible to lose the nation and yet preserve the Constitution? ... I felt that measures,
otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful, by becoming indispensable to the
preservation of the Constitution, through the preservation of the nation. Right or
wrong, I assumed this ground, and now avow it!'" Groth, supra note 133, at 766
(quoting President Lincoln).
172. "Whatever the six justices of the Supreme Court meant by their differing
opinions. . . . [the President] must always act in a national emergency." 2 Harry S
Truman, Memoirs: Years of Trial and Hope 478 (1956) (responding to the Steel Seizure
decision); see also Alan I. Bigel, Presidential Power and Political Questions, XXI
Presidential Stud. Q., at 663, 667 (1991) (concept of political question frequently
involved when measures responding to domestic emergencies taken by President).
Jefferson claimed an emergency authority for all "high" executive officials. See supra
text accompanying notes 117-18. The claim can be narrowed and made more
persuasive if limited to the President. Like Congress and the Supreme Court, the
President is special for many purposes. See, e.g., Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S. Ct.
2767, 2775-76 (1992) (discussing "unique constitutional position of the President"). In
Midwest Oil, the government's argument emphasized that the test of presidential power
to meet an emergency should not be the same as the standards applicable to any
administrative clerk. See United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
173. See Schlesinger, supra note 8, at 147-48.
174. Compare Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 585-86 (existing statutes did not give
President power to seize plants) and id. at 620-32 (Douglas, J., concurring) (same) and
id. at 601-02, 609-10 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (Congress had explicitly denied
President such power) and id. at 639 (Jackson, J., concurring) (same) and id. at 657-58
(Burton, J., concurring) (same) and id. at 662 (Clark, J., concurring) (same) with id. at
671-73 (Vinson, CJ., Reed and Minton, JJ., dissenting) (war legislation gave President
implied power to seize plants). Any presidential emergency power on behalf of the
United States, it should be emphasized, is justified only to the extent necessary to
overcome congressional inability to respond to the emergency. Accordingly, if the
Takings or Due Process Clause would otherwise require compensation for any
congressional conduct, then such a claim arises on the basis of the President's conduct.
The idea that the President can incur takings obligations without appropriations
troubled Justice Douglas. See id. at 631-32 (Douglas, J., concurring). But I see this as
an inescapable concomitant to the existence of an emergency power.
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both before and after the seizure, yet Congress did nothing. 175 To
transform political deadlock into an emergency would drain the con-
cept of emergency of all content.176
If we assume that the President can act in an emergency, our con-
stitutional theory would suggest that subsequent congressional ap-
proval is necessary, because that requirement seems to provide the
least intrusive presidential authority needed to cope with the emergency.
This requirement would seem to induce caution in the executive, while
not being so onerous as to deter the President from acting when neces-
sity warrants. Does this condition mean that any limitation on the Pres-
ident's authority to act beyond statutory authority in an emergency is
wholly illusory, because congressional ratification is available even if no
emergency existed, or even if the President has acted contrary to a stat-
ute? While the question is a troubling one, I think that it must be an-
swered in the negative. Absent statutory authority, the President
should not act unless a genuine emergency exists. Perhaps more im-
portantly, the remedial implications of the two situations differ. Con-
vinced of an emergency, a court should stay its hand until the President
has had a reasonable opportunity for congressional ratification. When
no emergency exists, or when the President acts contrary to positive
law, no similar judicial constraint should be exercised.' 7 7
II. THE MODERN "LAw ENFORCEMENT" EXECUTIVE
Before turning to the question of whether the President possesses
some inherent protective authority, it is necessary to say something
more about the legal dimensions of the modern "law enforcement" Ex-
ecutive, because it is against that background that any need to recog-
nize an independent protective power is best assessed.
In explaining his well-known "stewardship theory," Theodore
Roosevelt insisted that the President is "a steward of the people bound
actively and affirmatively to do all he [can] for the people"' 7 8 and that
175. While Professor Schlesinger does not believe that Truman's conduct was
justified on an emergency theory, see Schlesinger, supra note 8, at 458-59, but he
recognizes that international communism engendered a "profound conviction" of
"unprecedented, and at times unbearable, strain" for American foreign policy. Id. at
163. But see Edward Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick Without Straw,
53 Cloum. L. Rev. 53, 65 (1953) ("The ChiefJustice's dessenting opinion is impressive
for the delineation of the emergency .. "). For Corwin, the President has the power to
act in a "serious" emergency until Congress disapproves. See id. at 65-66.
176. See id. at 142.
177. Indeed, perhaps the requirement of irreparable injury for an injunction
should be relaxed because the President has contravened the fundamental constitutional
requirement that he act on the basis of statutory authority except in emergencies.
178. Theodore Roosevelt, An Autobiography 389 (1913). To be sure, Roosevelt
sometimes added that the qualification of this executive power should be invoked only
when "imperatively necessary for the Nation," id., but at least for him this limitation was
window-dressing. See Harbaugh, supra note 167, at 67; Taft, supra note 16, at 144-46.
[Vol. 93:1
PROTECTIVE POWER
"the executive power [is] limited only by specific restrictions and
prohibitions appearing in the Constitution or imposed by Con-
gress."' 79 Roosevelt's robust claim of executive power misstates the
constitutional theory of the American Presidency. As Steel Seizure makes
plain, executive officials ordinarily must point to the presence of legis-
lative authority, not to its absence, to justify conduct that burdens pri-
vate rights. While the collapse of the delegation doctrine has
transformed the underlying reality of the "law enforcement" Executive,
that collapse does not yet support the existence of a general, independ-
ent law-making executive power to act as a steward of the people.
A. Execution of the Law
From the beginning, the general understanding was that even the
"law-enforcement" model of "The executive Power" necessarily in-
cluded some measure of executive discretion "to fill in the details" in
implementing legislation. Hamilton strongly insisted that public ad-
ministration was largely an executive function, and he assumed that this
necessarily entailed some discretion as to means.' 80 Jefferson es-
poused a perhaps even more expansive version of executive power.
While consistently denying that the Executive could be invested with
"legislative" or "judiciary" powers, he wrote to Governor Cabell that
"'if means specified by an act are impracticable, the constitutional [ex-
ecutive] power remains, and supplies them .... This aptitude of means
to the end of a law is essentially necessary for those who are executive;
otherwise the objection that our government is an impracticable one
would really be verified.' "181 Jefferson's claim of a right to fill in the
details was not, however, understood as tantamount to presidential
possession of a blank check. The President could not violate positive
law;18 2 moreover, as Justice Brandeis put it, "[t]here [was] no express
179. Roosevelt, supra note 178, at 388.
180. See The Federalist No. 72, at 486-87 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961). "Upon [the] foundation of popular representation, Hamilton sought to erect
a structure of effective administration." Flaumenhaft, supra note 152, at 5; see id. at
75-76 (describing Hamilton's belief that administration "is an affair of detail").
181. Corwin, supra note 44, at 430-31 n.108 (quoting Letter from Thomas
Jefferson to Governor Cabell (Aug. 7, 1807)). Jefferson's comments were made in the
context of a hypothetical law that specified that "the service of thirty thousand
volunteers should be accepted," id. at 431, without any specification of the means of
acceptance. Determination of those means would then fall within the Executive's
discretion. See id.
182. What should fairly count as a congressional prohibition of presidential
conduct presents issues different from Jefferson's time. Jefferson presumed that
congressional authorization of one mode should not be presumed to foreclose other
alternatives. See id. at 431. That presumption made a good deal of sense at the
beginning of the nineteenth century, when the national government was just getting
started and Congress met infrequently. Courts might readily assume that legislation had
not prescribed completely the mode by which legislative policy was to be implemented.
But see Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 177-78 (1804) (while President may
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grant to the President of incidental powers resembling those conferred
on Congress by the [Necessary and Proper Clause]."' 8 3
Accordingly, Taft argued that, while explicit justification for every
presidential step was not required, nonetheless
the President can exercise no power which cannot be fairly and
reasonably traced to some specific grant of power or justly implied and
included within such express grant as proper and necessary to its exercise.
Such specific grant must be either in the Federal Constitution
or in an act of Congress passed in pursuance thereof.18
4
This standard, of course, marks-but does not define-a boundary be-
tween what can fairly be described as presidential discretion in imple-
menting legislation and unauthorized presidential law-making.
Jefferson noted that the proper scope of presidential authority must be
have had power, absent congressional action, to authorize one method of naval seizure,
congressional action "prescribe[s] ... the manner in which this law shall be carried into
execution"). In the modem era, however, perhaps a reversal or at least a weakening of
Jefferson's presumption is now in order. At the end of the twentieth century, in the age
of statutes and administrative rulemaking, courts might fairly hesitate to embrace such a
presumption. The concurring opinions in Steel Seizure, except for that ofJustice Douglas,
are, of course, consistent with this hesitation. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 586 (1952) (Steel Seizure); id. at 609 (Frankfurter, J., concurring);
id. at 639 (Jackson,J., concurring); id. at 660 (Burton,J., concurring). This reluctance to
acknowledge alternative presidential means might draw limited support from the private
rights of action cases; invoking legislative intent, the Court has now rather completely
shut the door on the implication of such rights, at least when a newly enacted
comprehensive congressional legislation includes a remedial framework. See, e.g.,
Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 14
(1981) ("In view of these elaborate enforcement provisions it cannot be assumed that
Congress intended to authorize by implication additional judicial remedies .... "). To
be sure, the President vindicates public, not private interests. But the point is the fair
implementation of what Congress has enacted. Beyond rulemaking, and Chevron
delegations, it is not evident that Congress intended additional executive discretion to
implement statutory directives. On the other hand, several decisions point in a contrary
direction, recognizing executive rights of action beyond those statutorily specified. See
Wyandoth Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 199-200 (1967); United States v.
Republican Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482, 491-92 (1960); Paul M. Bator et al., Hart and
Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 913 n.4 (3d ed. 1988)
[hereinafter Hart & Wechsler] (stating that "the circumstances in both cases were
unusual and difficult to anticipate in the framing of statutory remedies").
183. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 246 (1926) (Brandeis,J., dissenting). The
Steel Seizure dissent insisted that "the President is a constitutional officer charged with
taking care that a 'mass of legislation' be executed. Flexibility as to mode of execution
... is a matter of practical necessity." 343 U.S. at 702 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (quoting
In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 580 (1895)). Albeit urged only in what the dissent insisted was
an emergency context, this claim asserts a range of executive choice in implementing
statutory directives equivalent to the rational basis test of the modern Necessary and
Proper Clause cases.
184. Taft, supra note 16, at 139-40 (emphasis added). Taft added: "The grants of
Executive power are necessarily in general terms in order not to embarrass the
Executive within a field of action plainly marked for him, but his jurisdiction must be




left to "reason."1 8 5 This is not quite right. Just last term, the Supreme
Court more aptly referred to the "common understanding[s] of what
activities are appropriate to legislatures, [and] to executives"-that is, a
standard based upon convention, the contemporary understanding of
the legal community.1 8 6 However, application of conventional under-
standings to measure executive action ostensibly implementing legisla-
tion must reflect the perception that executive power "is at best
interstitial and ancillary to the policy-forming powers of congress."
1 8 7
The boundary between presidential law-making and presidential
law-application is, of course, context-sensitive and malleable: its appli-
cation necessarily will depend upon evolving historical understandings
and upon various intuitions that cannot be quantified or captured more
precisely in any legal formula. 188 Particularly during periods of na-
tional emergency, the distinction will seem problematic. Steuart & Bro.,
Inc. v. Bowles,18 9 which arose during Franklin Roosevelt's war adminis-
tration, provides a well-known example. The Office of Price Adminis-
tration (OPA) had administratively suspended a retail fuel oil dealer
from receiving oil for resale for one year because, contrary to the Price
Control Act, the dealer had violated an OPA rationing order. 190 Con-
ceding the validity of the underlying rationing order, the dealer none-
theless challenged the suspension order as a statutorily unauthorized
185. Jefferson, supra note 66.
186. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992).
187. See Black, supra note 77, at 848. That formulation gives the standard a
dimension analogous to judicially developed federal common law, but I am unclear how
close the parallel expression implies a parallel mode of analysis. The independent
"lawmaking" powers of the federal courts present issues too complex to be considered
in detail here. See generally Hart & Wechsler, supra note 182, at 849-59, and the
excellent symposium in a recent Pace Law Review, which contains articles by Professors
George D. Brown, Larry Kramer, Martha A. Field and Thomas W. Merrill. See 12 Pace
L. Rev. 227 (1992). Professor Merrill posits the relevance of Steel Seizure to the
development of federal common law, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Judicial Prerogative,
12 Pace L. Rev. 327, 332-33 & n.20 (1992), an orientation I share. See Henry P.
Monaghan, Book Review, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 889, 892 (1974). Professor Brown views
federal common law largely as implicating federalism concerns. See George D. Brown,
Federal Common Law and the Role of the Federal Courts in Private Law Adjudication-
A (New) Erie Problem? 12 Pace L. Rev. 229, 254-60 (1992).
188. These intuitions will also be affected by the perceived emergency of the
situation and by the nature of the executive decision-maker. One can expect that high
executive officials, particularly the President, will get the benefit of close calls. See, e.g.,
Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991) (upholding denial of federal funding for
abortion counseling); AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc) (permitting
withholding of government contracts from companies who contravened "voluntary"
wage and price controls), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979).
189. 322 U.S. 398 (1944). For an overview of the presidential exercise of power
during World War II, see Rossiter & Longaker, supra note 135, at 98-102.
190. Petitioner had obtained oil without surrendering the necessary coupons and
"delivered many thousands of gallons of fuel oil to consumers" without requiring
coupons. Steuart, 322 U.S. at 401. The suspension was far more likely to be effective
than a criminal prosecution brought pursuant to the Price Control Act. See id. at 407.
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"penalty." The government defended the suspension order on the ba-
sis of a different act, the Second War Powers Act of 1942, which, in
general terms, authorized the President or his delegate (the OPA) to
"allocate" needed "materials or facilities ... to such extent as he shall
deem necessary or appropriate in the public interest and to promote
the national defense."' 19 1 After describing the importance of the entire
rationing scheme, the Court rejected the challenge, relying on the Sec-
ond War Powers Act. Speaking for the Court, Justice Douglas thought
it clear that, under the Act, the President could divert a previous supply
of needed material from a wasteful factory to an efficient one. As Jus-
tice Douglas framed it, "[I]f the President has the power to channel raw
materials into the most efficient industrial units and thus save scarce
materials from wastage it is difficult to see why the same principle is not
applicable to the distribution of fuel oil."1192 While Bowles, in its struc-
ture, formally professes to be only an illustration of the Taft formula-
tion, the latitude of the Court's application demonstrates (were any
such demonstration needed) that context necessarily plays an impor-
tant part. 193
I wish, however, to draw the reader's attention to a different point.
Many current statutes now delegate to the Executive authority substan-
tially equivalent to an executive "necessary and proper" power.' 94
Moreover, under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 195 a legislative delegation may be made by implication. 196 Thus, a
broad congressional delegation may arise from "ambiguous" language,
191. Id. at 399 (quoting Second War Powers Act of 1942, ch. 199, § 301(a)(2), 56
Stat. 176, 178, 179).
192. Id. at 405-06. As Professor Corwin noted, "[Slanctions were constitutional
when the deprivations they wrought were a reasonably implied amplification of the substantive
power that they supported and were directly conservative of the interests that this power was created to
protect and advance. " Corwin, supra note 44, at 284 (emphasis added).
193. Rossiter and Longaker describe the case as one that "would seem to have
infinite and explosive possibilities," Rossiter & Longaker, supra note 135, at 99, and
give the President the equivalent of a Necessary and Proper Clause-"the president can
make just about any use of... law he sees fit." Id. at 100; see Corwin, supra note 44, at
284-85. In situations that do not involve national security issues, the courts are less
inclined to strain legislative grants of powers. One such example is SEC v. Sloan, 436
U.S. 103 (1978), in which the Commission's ten-day summary suspension for illegal
securities trading was held not to include the power to continue tacking on additional
ten-day suspensions indefinitely to effectively suspend trading. The Court said that the
power to suspend trading was "awesome" and thus a "clear mandate from Congress...
is necessary to confer this power." Id. at 112.
194. In one well-known decision, for example, the Supreme Court said, "[w]here
the empowering provision of a statute states simply that the agency may 'make... such
rules and regulations as necessary to carry out' [the act, the regulation will be upheld] so
long as it is 'reasonably related to the purposes of the enabling legislation.'" Mourning
v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 369 (1973) (quoting Thorpe v. Housing
Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 280-81 (1969)).
195. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
196. See id. at 842-44.
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as in Chevron,197 or as a by-product of general, umbrella-like legislative
authority, as in Haig v. Agee. 198 Haig warrants close attention here. The
Court stated the controlling issue as follows: "[W]hether the President,
acting through the Secretary of State, has authority to revoke a passport
on the ground that the holder's activities in foreign countries are caus-
ing or are likely to cause serious damage to the national security or
foreign policy of the United States."' 99 The Court concluded that the
following provision of the 1926 Passport Act was sufficient to confer
such authority on the President:
The Secretary of State may grant and issue passports, and cause
passports to be granted, issued, and verified in foreign coun-
tries by diplomatic representatives of the United States . . .
under such rules as the President shall designate and prescribe for and
on behalf of the United States, and no other person shall
grant, issue, or verify such passports. 200
This general language, the Court said, approved "the longstanding and
officially promulgated view that the Executive had the power to with-
hold passports for reasons of national security and foreign policy."' 20 '
Haig, therefore, recognized that the President can acquire the authority
to subordinate rights of American citizens to discretionary executive
foreign policy determinations solely on the basis of largely unfocused,
umbrella-like legislation.
20 2
197. See id. at 842-43.
198. 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
199. Id. at 282.
200. Id. at 290 (quoting The Passport Act of 1926, 22 U.S.C. § 211a (1988)
(emphasis added)).
201. Haig, 453 U.S. at 301. This practice, such as it was, developed well before
passports were legally necessary for travel. I do not address the merits of the Court's
reasoning. Nor do I address the claim that Haig was one of several decisions that
repudiated earlier decisions holding that general congressional delegations should not
be read to authorize executive infringement of civil liberties. For other examples, see
Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222 (1984) (regulations severely restricting travel to Cuba
upheld on basis of broad congressional grant of authority); Snepp v. United States, 444
U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980) (per curiam) (CIA can protect national security "by imposing
reasonable restrictions on employee activities that in other contexts might be protected
by the First Amendment"); cf. Harold Edgar & Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Curtiss-Wright
Comes Home: Executive Power and National Security Secrecy, 21 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L.
Rev. 349, 371-76, 384-86 (1986). After discussing cases, including Snepp and Regan,
Edgar and Schmidt conclude that although "[o]ur legal tradition insists that reasonably
clear statutory statements... precede... imposition[s] ... on constitutionally-protected
individual rights[,]" in the arena of national security the Supreme Court has consistently
supported "executive empowerment." Id. at 407-08.
202. Haig provides further evidence, were more needed, of the moribund nature of
the idea that Congress has a nondelegable duty to prescribe rules for the regulation of
society. Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. at 240-43, provides another example.
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B. Beyond Mere Execution: Midwest Oil
United States v. Midwest Oil Co. 203 is occasionally cited as a deci-
sion-the only decision, I should add-in which the Supreme Court up-
held presidential law-making contrary to the terms of an Act of
Congress.20 4 That interpretation, however, is untenable. Nothing in
the Court's opinion or in the dissent suggested that the Court had en-
dorsed such far-reaching doctrine. 20 5 Fairly read, however, Midwest Oil
does recognize the existence of some presidential authority to "burden
private rights" even absent direct statutory authority or Haig-like um-
brella legislation.
In Midwest Oil, Congress had provided that certain government
lands containing mineral oils were "'free and open to occupation, ex-
ploration and purchase by citizens of the United States [for a nominal
amount] ... under regulations prescribed by law.' "206 For various rea-
sons, some oil lands were being depleted so rapidly that governmental
ownership would last only a few months. Fearing that its own oil needs
would soon require the government to buy back at market prices the
very oil it was giving away, the Secretary of the Interior recommended
suspension of further grants as a conservation measure. 20 7 Acknowl-
edging doubt about his authority, 208 President Taft temporarily with-
drew some of the California and Wyoming lands "[i]n aid of"
legislation that would be proposed.20 9 The withdrawal order was chal-
lenged as contrary to the terms of the access statute.2 10
A divided Court rejected the argument. The Court's opinion be-
gan by stating that it "need not consider whether, as an original ques-
tion, the President could have withdrawn from private acquisition what
Congress had made free and open to occupation and purchase,"'211 be-
cause the access statute had been enacted against "a long continued
practice to make orders like the one here involved. ' 212 The Court then
said:
It may be argued that while these facts and rulings prove a
203. 236 U.S. 459 (1915).
204. See, e.g., Peter M. Shane & Harold H. Bruff, The Law of Presidential Power 60
(1988).
205. Indeed, the dissent took note of the government's explicit concession of a
"lack of [presidential] authority ... to deal with the laws otherwise than to see they are
faithfully executed." Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 505 (Day, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 466 (quoting Act of Feb. 11, 1897, ch. 216, 29 Stat. 526, superseded by
30 U.S.C.A. §§ 181 et seq. (1986 & West Supp. 1992)).
207. See id. at 466-67.
208. See id. at 467.
209. See id.
210. Petitioner's argument in the Supreme Court was straightforward: "The
executive power [to withdraw public lands] is dependent on congressional authority,"
and no such authority existed for the government's action. Id. at 461.




usage they do not establish its validity. But government is a
practical affair intended for practical men. Both officers, law-
makers and citizens naturally adjust themselves to any long-
continued action of the Executive Department-on the pre-
sumption that unauthorized acts would not have been allowed
to be so often repeated as to crystallize into a regular practice.
That presumption is not reasoning in a circle but the basis of a
wise and quieting rule that in determining the meaning of a
statute or the existence of a power, weight shall be given to the
usage itself-even when the validity of the practice is the sub-
ject of investigation.
213
Contrary to the understanding of some commentators, the Court's
analysis of presidential power was not confined to the limited issue of
presidential withdrawal of public lands. 214 After the language just
quoted, the Court cited numerous decisions in a wide variety of con-
texts in support of its reasoning. 215
Midwest Oil can support several different propositions. Considera-
ble language in the Court's opinion, for example, could justifiably limit
the decision to no more than a fact-specific implied delegation case-
with the President's construction of the access statute reasonable in
light of a long-standing administrative practice.216 For me, that read-
ing does not quite fit. No Haig-like umbrella provision existed under
213. Id. at 472-73.
214. See Lee R. Marks & John C. Grabow, The President's Foreign Economic
Powers After Dames & Moore v. Regan: Legislation by Acquiescence, 68 Cornell L. Rev.
68, 86 (1982). Marks and Grabow's argument confuses illustration of the principle with
the principle itself. See infra text accompanying notes 247-251.
215. Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 473; see also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 175
(1926) (citing cases in which an "interpretation . . .acquiesced in for a long term of
years, fixes the construction to be given [a statute's] provisions"). The dissenting
opinion in Midwest Oil denied that presidential authority could arise from the "tacit
consent of Congress in long acquiescence in such executive action resulting in an
implied authority from Congress to make such withdrawals in the public interest as the
Executive deems proper and necessary." Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 491 (Day, J.,
dissenting). The dissent could find "nothing in the Constitution suggesting or
authorizing such augmentation of executive authority." Id. (Day, J., dissenting) The
dissent went on to distinguish the prior withdrawals as either in accord with a declared
congressional policy, or the product of such fundamental conflicts in congressional
directives that withdrawal was necessary "until Congress had opportunity to relieve the
ambiguity." Id. at 492 (Day, J., dissenting). The dissent failed to explain why, in its
view, the latter conduct was permissible.
216. Cf. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,
843-45 (1984). Unless one is completely mesmerized by the epistemological and
linguistic charms of the plain-meaning rule, it was surely open for the Midwest Oil Court
to conclude as a matter of statutory construction that the access statute was not intended
to apply in the circumstances found by the President. In this respect, recall the early
appropriation cases, in which Presidents refused to spend appropriated funds when it
was clear that the congressional purposes would not be achieved. See, e.g., Sofaer,
supra note 44, at 170-73 (discussing executive control over expenditures during
Jefferson's terms). There is a line between presidential refusal to enforce a statute
because he or she believes, in the circumstances, that to do so is consistent with
1993]
COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW
which the executive order could, at least formally, be subsumed.
Midwest Oil extends the boundary of presidential law-making at least a
little distance beyond that recognized in Haig.21 7
Midwest Oil could also be confined to that presidential regulatory
power necessarily incident to the President's role as "chief administra-
tor" in connection with government lands and perhaps other prop-
erty.2 1 8 So viewed, the presidential withdrawal order could be
defended in "common [legal] understanding" as an incident of normal
public administration, rather than as impermissible presidential law-
making.2! 9 One must note, however, that the "common understand-
ing" has been quite different when the President has purported to lay
down norms in other contexts in which government property (includ-
ing government funds) is implicated, that is, when the goverment has
sought to subject government contractors or recipients of federal fund-
ing to such conditions as wage and price controls, affirmative action, or
prohibitions on abortion counselling referrals. 220
In fact, Midwest Oil has not been confined as a precedent to the
notion of the President as chief administrator. As we shall see, the
Court understands the decision to sanction presidential conduct invad-
ing private rights if this conduct is supported by congressional acquies-
cence or tacit consent,22' and the question then becomes what
congressional conduct suffices for that purpose. Congressional inac-
tion is not enough; Midwest Oil requires that, fairly read, "adjacent"
congressional will, and the same refusal predicated on a disagreement with the
legislative policy enacted by the statute.
217. In Our Chief Magistrate, Taft devotes only a single, unhelpful paragraph to the
Midwest Oil decision. See Taft, supra note 16, at 136. The long practice of congressional
acquiescence in such withdrawals, "justified the exercise of the power and made it legal
as if there had been an express act of Congress authorizing it." Id. This paragraph
follows a paragraph in which Taft claims that custom can create executive power and
thereby seem almost to amend the Constitution. Id. at 135.
218. See Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 474. This view of the decision would reflect the
nineteenth-century view that government largesse was second-class property. See
Monaghan, supra note 40, at 15-16. The opinion refers to Congress as the
"proprietor" of public lands, and to the President as the "agent in charge"; it notes that
the President had issued "a multitude of [comparable] orders... known to Congress,"
and it concludes that "acquiescence all the more readily operated an implied grant of
power in view of the fact that its exercise was not only useful to the public but did not
interfere with any vested right of the citizen." Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 474-75.
219. So viewed, the order simply triggered duties independently defined by the
common law (e.g., the duty not to trespass). Cf. Wells v. Nichols, 104 U.S. 444, 447
(1881) (Interior Department had "gradually come to assert the right" to recover timber
cut on U.S. land; appropriation legislation sufficient authority for appointment of timber
agents.).
220. See the discussion infra text accompanying notes 278-287.
221. See infra text accompanying note 250. Two even broader interpretations of
the opinion are that the President can invade private rights (1) if he has done so for a
long time without congressional challenge, or (2) at least in an emergency. Neither
such claim seems supported by the reasoning of the opinion.
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congressional legislation must presume the validity of a prior presiden-
tial practice. 2
22
So understood, Midwest Oil puts very little strain on the Steel Seizure
theory that the President must possess statutory authority in order to
justify the invasion of private rights. The Steel Seizure requirement, it
will be recalled, is satisfied by open-ended congressional delegations of
authority. Very little difference exists between sustaining longstanding
presidential invasion of private rights on the basis of Haig-like umbrella
provisions and sustaining such invasion on the basis of "adjacent" leg-
islation that assumes the validity of presidential conduct. The Court
understood the 1926 Passport Act to have been enacted by Congress
on the premise that the prior executive practice was valid.2 23 Thus, the
umbrella-like statute was read to ratify prior presidential conduct. The
family resemblance between Haig and Midwest Oil is strong.
C. Foreign Affairs
Differing accounts have been proffered about the origins of our
nation's "foreign affairs power," a term that is not itself mentioned in
the Constitution. United States v. Curtiss- Wright 'S 2 2 4 claim that the power
is "extra-constitutional" has been sharply challenged. 225 But from the
222. Professor Carter apparently believes that it is sufficient that Congress has not
resisted claims of presidential authority; no affirmative congressional action is necessary.
See Stephen L. Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution, 70 Va. L.
Rev. 101, 124 (1984) ("[Tjhe President can exercise a purportedly inherent power if
Congress has historically acquiesced and if Congress does not try to stop him."). Both
Professor Carter's formulation and mine recognize that some presidential power
affecting private rights can be acquired by prescription. I recognize that, from the
beginning, controversy has existed in the separation of powers area about any
"'doctrine of prescriptive constitutional rights.'" See Jefferson Powell, Languages of
Power: A Sourcebook of Early American Constitutional History 11-13 (1991) (quoting
22 Annals of Cong. 643 (1811) (statement of Rep. Porter)). Obviously, this Article is
not the place to consider so large a topic. I say here only that in the separation-of-
powers context, I am quite sympathetic to the proposition "that practice and
acquiescence under it for a period of several years .... affords an irresistible answer, and
has indeed fixed the [meaning of the Constitution]." Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
299, 309 (1803); see Currie, supra note 30, at 77, 92 (discussing Stuart). In 1830,
Madison wrote that it was hardly surprising that in a novel and complex venture
difficulties would arise; but that "a course of practice of sufficient uniformity and
duration to carry with it the public sanction shall settle doubtful or contested
meanings." Letter from James Madison to M.L. Hurlbert (May 1830), in 9 Madison,
Writings, supra note 96, at 370, 372. While the Court in Stuart referred to a judicial
practice whose origins were themselves contemporaneous with the ratification of the
Constitution, other longstanding executive and judicial practices have largely-but not
entirely-received similar treatment. But see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 958-59
(1983) (overturning decades-old practice of legislative vetoes on the basis of the
Presentment Clause and separation of powers considerations).
223. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 293-95 (1981); Dames & Moore v. Regan,
453 U.S. 654 (1981).
224. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
225. Professor Lofgren's excellent analysis concludes that "it is more accurate to
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beginning, virtually everyone recognized that in foreign affairs the
President enjoys a freedom of movement and authority quite different
from that in the domestic realm.2 26 As a starting point, accordingly,
virtually every modem commentator acknowledges "the very delicate,
plenary and exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the
federal government in the field of international relations-a power
which does not require as a basis for its exercise an act of Congress.
'227
Curtiss-Wright could be expanded to hold that the President inherited
say that the power is vested in the federal government because it is explicitly and
implicitly granted by the Constitution and that it ultimately derives not from Britain but
from whatever body [i.e., the states or 'the People'] legally ordained and established the
Constitution." Charles A. Lofgren, "Government from Reflection and Choice":
Constitutional Essays on War, Foreign Relations, and Federalism 188 (1986). It is
interesting to note that President Taft, who it can be argued was more aggressive in
foreign affairs than President T.R. Roosevelt, had no such understanding of the extra-
constitutional nature of foreign affairs power when he retired from the Presidency. See
Taft, supra note 16, at 104-18. Of course, all of this debate still leaves us pretty nearly
where we began: under Lofgren's analysis, are the national government's "foreign
affairs powers" to be viewed, in McCulloch fashion, as inferences from the enumerated
powers and the Necessary and Proper Clause, or are the important powers not
mentioned (e.g., purchase of territory) independently implied as part of the
"sovereign's" (the People's or the States') decision to establish a national government?
For a discussion of Jefferson's view on the nation's authority to acquire the Louisiana
Territory, see supra note 160. More importantly, the constitutional text itself is quite
meager in terms of its allocation of the country's foreign affairs power. See, e.g.,
Henkin, supra note 100, at 18-21. The net result has been a struggle over the direction
of foreign policy, with Congress and the President each possessing certain formidable
advantages, both legal and political. See generally Cecil V. Crabb & Pat M. Holt,
Invitation to Struggle: Congress, the President and Foreign Policy chs. 1-2 (4th ed.
1984); Michael Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy 27-33 (1990).
226. See, e.g., The Federalist No. 64, at 434-36 (John Jay) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961) (although President may form treaties only with advice and consent of Senate, "he
will be able to manage the business of intelligence in such manner as prudence may
suggest"). Jefferson went even further, writing that "[t]he transaction of business with
foreign nations is executive altogether." 3 Jefferson, Writings, supra note 66, at 161
(emphasis added). The President's authority now clearly includes more than simply the
right to speak for the country (as if speaking were not itself conducting foreign policy).
Cf. James Madison, Letters of Helvidius No. 3 (Sept. 7, 1793), reprinted in 6 Madison,
Writings, supra note 96, at 162-64 (arguing for the more restrictive view). Compare
Koh, supra note 21, at 94 (suggesting that Curtiss- Wright can be so limited) with Ruth
Wedgwood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of Jonathan Robbins, 100 Yale L.J. 229,
351-52 (1990) (suggesting that Curtiss-Wright correctly takes a "more radical" position
on executive power than Koh and others "have mistakenly suggested").
227. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320. Accordingly, the great "mass of decisions and
actions that are the stuff of the daily relations of the United States with other countries,"
Henkin, supra note 44, at 19, fall within the President's domain.
President Wilson observed that the "initiative in foreign affairs, which the President
possesses without any restriction whatever," meant that the President has "virtually the
power to control [foreign relations] absolutely." Wilson, Constitutional Government,
supra note 8, at 77. This fact, in turn, necessitates that the President stand at the front
of the government. See id. at 59. Years later, Professor Schlesinger wrote "The
Imperial Presidency was essentially the creation of foreign policy." Schlesinger, supra
note 8, at 208.
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the Crown's "federative power," except as it was specifically reallocated
to Congress generally, or to the Senate specifically. This seems to be
the central thrust of Hamilton's Pacificus letters.228 The claim is, how-
ever, historically dubious. Although the President's "special responsi-
bility... for the maintenance of foreign -affairs was understood," early
governmental practice was not consistent with a premise of a presiden-
tial "federative" power.229 Thus, whatever the range of autonomous
presidential authority in the foreign affairs context, presidential author-
ity stops well short of an independent, free-standing law-making au-
thority.230 Nor has the President acquired such authority by
prescription: 23' Professor Henkin rightly observes that "[n]o one has
suggested that under the President's 'plenary' foreign affairs powers he
can, by executive act or order, enact law directly regulating persons and
property in the United States.
'23 2
228. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
229. Casper, supra note 94, at 261.
230. See infra text accompanying note 233. Professor Koh writes that "the
Framers designed the checks-and-balances scheme to apply principally in the realm of
foreign affairs." Koh, supra note 21, at 83.
231. In particular, see Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 13
(1936) ("History and practice not only do not support, but they rather negative, ...
implied discretionary power."); see also Henkin, supra note 44, at 308 n.48 ("President
probably had authority pursuant to treaty... but not.., in the absence of treaty."). Yet
in Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981), the Court, in an obscure footnote, at least hints to
the contrary. See id. at 289 n.17.
Presidential authority in immigration has been held, at least in some instances, to
exist absent statutory language to the contrary. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-
Machain, 112 S. Ct. 2188, 2196 (1992) (After asserting that treaty did not preclude
criminal jurisdiction over a kidnapped Mexican, Court asserted "the decision of whether
respondent should be returned to Mexico, as a matter outside of the Treaty, is a matter
for the Executive Branch."); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542-43 (1950)
(suggesting presidential control over admission of aliens absent a statutory restriction).
PresidentJohn Adams' surrender ofJonathan Robbins, a seaman in the British Navy
who claimed American citizenship, to trial (and certain death) before an English court-
martial presents a more difficult issue. No statute authorized the President's conduct;
rather, as Taft stated, "[t]he matter [of extradition] stood on the naked words of the
treaty." Taft, supra note 16, at 86. Whether the Robbins affair is consistent with
Valentine is an interesting question, but marginal to present concerns. The Robbins
affair is explored in a first-class manner in Wedgwood, supra note 226.
Haig v. Agee makes clear that presidential control over passports rests at least
formally on statutory authority. From the beginning, the Executive issued passports on
the basis of considerations of national interest, but passports were not legally required
in a non-emergency context for travel by an American citizen. See Haig, 453 U.S. at
292-93. Travel without a passport seems to have been forbidden, however, during The
War of 1812 and the Civil War. See id. at 293 n.22. Legislation existed in 1812
prohibiting the State Department from knowingly issuing passports to aliens. See id. at
294 n.25. In 1861, an "emergency" restriction was imposed that the Haig Court
assumed-quite unconvincingly-to be authorized by the Passport Act of 1856. See id.
at 294-95; cf. Randall, supra note 44, at 149-50 (describing passport requirement in
context of a series of other measures of doubtful constitutionality undertaken by
Secretary of State Seward).
232. Henkin, supra note 44, at 57. I would substitute the word "citizen" for
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Early American history is particularly illuminating. The Embargo
Act of 1794233 and the Non-Intercourse Act of 1809234 rested on the
assumption that the President needed legislative authority to interfere
with foreign exchange actions by embargo or by tariff restrictions. 235
Washington's celebrated 1793 Proclamation of Neutrality provides an
even earlier illustration of the lack of independent presidential law-
making authority in the foreign affairs context. 236 Hamilton's defense
grounded the Proclamation in the President's duty to interpret treaties
and the law of nations.2 37 The Proclamation sought to avoid govern-
mental responsibility for the misguided conduct of some American citi-
zens, and it gave "warning to all within its jurisdiction . . . [of the]
penalties which the laws of the land (of which the law of Nations is a
part) annexes to acts of contravention. ' 2 38 The Proclamation itself
runs only three paragraphs, and, out of deference to Jefferson, it did
not even mention the word "neutrality." The first two paragraphs
briefly describe the reasons for the Proclamation. In the final and long-
est paragraph, Washington expressed Hamilton's premise:
"person." See supra note 39. The closest decision contrary to my view is Judge A.N.
Hand's district court opinion in United States v. Western Union Tel., 272 F. 311
(S.D.N.Y. 1921). At issue was whether, in the absence of congressional legislation, the
President could prevent the operation of submarine cables to foreign countries in a
manner he opposed. See id. at 313. The government argued that the President had
done so on a number of instances in the past and Congress had remained silent. See id.
at 316. Judge Hand was sympathetic to the argument that the President and the
Congress had concurrent authority in the matter, but in the end he avoided deciding the
issue of independent presidential authority by declaring the issue to be a nonjusticiable
political question. Id. at 316-19. I should add here that postal agreements between the
United States and foreign governments were made by the Executive without
congressional participation until the 1840s. See Taft, supra note 16, at 135 (citing this
development for the proposition that "[e]xecutive power is sometimes created by
custom, and so strong is the influence of custom that it seems almost to amend the
Constitution").
233. Ch. 41, 1 Stat. 372, repealed by Non-Intercourse Act of 1809, ch. 24, § 19, 2
Stat. 528, 533.
234. Ch. 24, 2 Stat. 528 (expired). The conditional delegation in the Non-
Intercourse Act of 1809 was upheld in The Brig Aurora, I 1 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382, 387- 88
(1813). See Fisher, supra note 23, at 253-56; see also Sofaer, supra note 44, at 291
(arguing that Congress made broad delegations in the foreign affairs context).
235. See Fisher, supra note 23, at 253-55 (describing early delegations concerning
embargoes).
236. 32 George Washington, Proclamation of Neutrality of 1793, reprinted in The
Writings of George Washington 430, 430-31 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939) [hereinafter
Washington Proclamation].
237. The proposition that the President has primary responsibility to interpret
treaties was strongly defended byJohn Marshall in his "sole organ" speech in the House
of Representatives. See Wedgwood, supra note 226, at 338-52.
238. 15 Hamilton, supra note 95, at 34. Hamilton closed with a defense of the
President's "duty, as Executor of the laws, to proclaim the neutrality of the Nation, to
exhort all persons to observe it, and to warn them of the penalties which would attend
its nonobservance." Id. at 43. For citations to sources discussing the Proclamation, see
Symposium, supra note 67, at 171-72 n.45 (Charles J. Cooper).
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And I do hereby also make known . . . that I have given in-
structions to those officers to whom it belongs, to cause prose-
cutions to be instituted against all persons, who shall, within
the cognizance of the Courts of the United States, violate the
law of nations, with respect to the powers at war, or any of
them.
23 9
That is, the Proclamation itself did not purport to define the primary
legal duties of American citizens; it simply triggered obligations inde-
pendently established by international law. These obligations existed
as part of our law wholly independent of the President's will.240
Although Chief Justice Jay charged the jury in accordance with the
premise of the Proclamation, an effort to bring "common law" criminal
charges failed in Henfield's case,2 4 1 well before the general collapse of
the concept of federal common law crimes.
2 42
Statutes constitute the main source of presidential authority to in-
vade private rights in the foreign affairs context. As Professor Koh
aptly observes, "The vast majority of the foreign affairs power the pres-
ident exercises daily are not inherent constitutional powers, but rather
powers that Congress has expressly or implicitly delegated to him by
statute." 243 What is more, statutes originally designed to confine exec-
utive discretion have been transformed into tools that permitted the
"president ... to conduct ... economic warfare ... by declaring a
national emergency with respect to a particular country ... virtually
without regard to whether bona fide 'emergencies' have existed."
24 4
The pattern continues: a recent executive order proclaimed that the
strife in what was once Yugoslavia "constitute[d] an unusual and ex-
239. Washington Proclamation, supra note 236, at 430.
240. Thus, the President's conduct in issuing the Proclamation was in principle
identical to that in question in United States v. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304 (1936). In
that case, the Presidential proclamation simply triggered duties independently
established by Congress.
241. 11 F. Cas. 1099 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793) (No. 6,360).
242. For a discussion of Henfield's Case, see Stephen Presser, The Original
Misunderstanding 67-86 (1991); United States v. Coolidge, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 415
(1816) (denying federal court jurisdiction in common-law crimes against the United
States); cf. 1 Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in U.S. History 117-18 (1922)
(arguing that by the decision in Glass v. Sloop Betsy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 6 (1794), "foreign
nations were formally notified that ... the legal effects of breaches of our neutrality...
might be tested in the Courts of the United States"); Gary P. Roue, Note, The Sound of
Silence: United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, The Jeffersonian Ascendancy and the
Abolition of Federal Common Law Crimes, 101 Yale LJ. 919 (1992) (illuminating
student note describing collapse of the idea of common law crimes).
243. Koh, supra note 2 1, at 45.
244. Id. (referring to the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C.
§§ 1701-1706 (1977)). In Federal Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548
(1976), the Court rejected an unconstitutional delegation challenge to the Trade
Expansion Act, which authorized the President to restrict imports when the "national
security" so required. Id. at 559. The factors to be considered by the President were
open-ended, showing the evident weakness in the foreign affairs context of any
strictures against delegation. Id. at 570.
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traordinary threat to the national security, foreign policy, and economy
of the United States," and on that basis declared a "national emergency
to deal with that threat. ' 245 The executive order reflects both the form
and the reality of the current literary theory: the President's need for
statutory authority has been met by lavish (and sometimes misused)
congressional grants, especially in the foreign affairs context. More-
over, in the foreign affairs context, the constitutional requirement of
"adequate" legislative authority is applied in a relaxed manner,246 and
decisions such as Haig v. Agee and Midwest Oil play an important role.
Dames & Moore v. Regan247 is an important illustration of the fore-
going. Petitioner challenged an executive order implementing settle-
ment of the bitter Iran-U.S. controversy. The order affected claims that
were then pending in the American courts against Iranian governmen-
tal entities. The Court found adequate congressional authority insofar
as the executive order nullified prior attachments and transferred fro-
zen Iranian assets.248 No such authority, however, could be found for
the order's suspension of the claims then pending in the American
courts in favor of international arbitration. After noting the long-
standing executive practice of settling claims, the Court concluded that
considerable existing congressional legislation was predicated upon the
validity of that practice. 249 The Court then said:
[Given] the inferences to be drawn from the character of the
legislation congress has enacted in the area, such as the IEEPA
and the Hostage Act, and from the history of acquiescence in
executive claims settlement-we conclude that the President
was authorized to suspend pending claims pursuant to Execu-
tive Order No. 12294. As Justice Frankfurter pointed out in
[Steel Seizure], "a systematic, unbroken executive practice, long
pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before
questioned ... may be treated as a gloss on 'Executive Power'
vested in the President by § 1 of Art. II." Past practice does
not, by itself, create power, but "long-continued practice,
known to and acquiesced in by Congress, would raise a pre-
245. Exec. Order No. 12,808, 57 Fed. Reg. 23299 (1992); see also Exec. Order No.
12,810, 57 Fed. Reg. 24,347 (1992) (blocking property of and prohibiting transactions
with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)). The orders were
based on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 et seq.,
and blocked assets of the governments of Serbia and Montenegro.
246. The Court has been quite explicit on this point. See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453
U.S. 280, 291-92 (1981) (holding that Secretary of State may revoke citizen's passport in
the interest of national security and U.S. foreign policy, as "congressional silence [in
foreign policy] is not to be equated with congressional disapproval"). Curtiss-ll'right
long ago made the same point in the delegation context. See United States v. Curtiss-
Wright, 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936); see also Algonquin, 426 U.S. at 558-60 (Congress
provided adequate standards to guide presidential discretion).
247. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
248. See id. at 669-74. This aspect of the opinion is sharply challenged by Marks
and Grabow, supra note 214, at 77-83, and in Koh, supra note 21, at 139.
249. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 685-86.
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sumption that the [action] has been [taken] in pursuance of its
consent . . . ." United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459,
474 (1915). See Haigv. Agee[, 453 U.S. at 291-92]. Such prac-
tice is present here and such a presumption is also appropri-
ate. In light of the fact that congress may be considered to
have consented to the President's action in suspending claims,
we cannot say that action exceeded the President's powers. 250
While the Court cited no precedent for extending the practice of execu-
tive claims settlement to include presidential interference with ongoing
judicial proceedings, 25 1 the perceived need for avoiding inflexible rules
constraining the President in settling major international controversies
clearly drove its reasoning.252 More interesting for our purposes, how-
ever, the Court's analysis fused together two closely related but analyti-
cally distinct ideas: Justice Frankfurter's statement in Steel Seizure is a
claim about the constitutional nature of executive power; Haig is a
claim of implied congressional ratification/delegation; Midwest Oil is
either or both of the foregoing. For me, Dames & Moore illustrates yet
again the nature and scope of the President's power to invade private
rights.
Two additional matters demonstrate the existence of some in-
dependent but limited presidential law-making authority. First, the
Supreme Court has apparently recognized some independent presiden-
tial law-making authority in foreign affairs when the president invoked
the recognition power; and second, some decisions seemed to sanction
presidential law-making in the application of the act-of-state or the for-
eign-sovereign-immunity doctrine in judicial proceedings.
First, in United States v. Belmont 253 and United States v. Pink,254 the
Supreme Court apparently assumed the existence of some independent
presidential law-making authority.255 Both decisions concerned the
Litvinov agreement, an executive agreement in which the United States
250. Id. at 686.
251. Its opinion has been the subject of criticism on that score. See Peter E. Quint,
The Separation of Powers Under Carter, 62 Tex. L. Rev. 785, 819-20 (1984) (implied
consent appropriate only for relatively minor matters); see also Marks & Grabow, supra
note 214, at 80-83, 85-87 (stating that Court furnished no support for contentions and
instead cited a series of distinguishable "vesting" cases as support for broad grant of
presidential powers); Evan T. Bloom, Note, The Executive Claims Settlement Power:
Constitutional Authority and Foreign Affairs Applications, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 155,
162-63 (1985) (arguing that Court in Dames & Moore failed to provide a standard for
constitutional analysis of future executive branch claims settlements).
252. For another striking example, see Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean
Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221 (1986) (sustaining Secretary of Commerce's refusal to certify to
President that executive order "demonstrated the effectiveness" of international
whaling convention).
253. 301 U.S. 324 (1937). For a detailed account of Belmont, see Stephen M. Millet,
The Constitutionality of Executive Agreements: An Analysis of United States v. Belmont
(1990).
254. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
255. Pink, 315 U.S. at 229-30; Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330; see also Rossiter &
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recognized the Soviet Union and gave extraterritorial effect to one of
its expropriation decrees. No one disputed President Franklin
Roosevelt's authority to recognize the government of the Soviet
Union, 25 6 but the executive agreement's provision giving effect to the
expropriation decree outside the Soviet Union was contrary to the
otherwise applicable New York substantive law. The Supreme Court
held that the agreement displaced contrary state law.2 57 While neither
Belmont nor Pink involved the rights of American citizens, nothing in
either opinion suggests that this fact was of importance to the Court's
separation-of-powers reasoning.258 For me, these results illustrate a
more general proposition: the President's "specific" constitutional
powers, such as the Commander-in-Chief power and the powers "im-
plied" from presidential duties, now (whatever the original understand-
ing) imply some independent presidential law-making power.259
Longaker, supra note 135, at 153-59 (policy of presidential independence affirmed by
Belmont and Pink).
256. See also Restatement Foreign Relations, supra note 64, § 303(4) cmts. g-j; id.
reporters' notes 7, 11 ("[T]he President, on his own authority, may make an
international agreement dealing with any matter that falls within his independent
powers under the Constitution."); Millet, supra note 253, at 174 ("The President can
make executive agreements ... only in the areas where he has exclusive constitutional
authority: administrative procedure, recognition of foreign sovereigns, and military
affairs."); Taft, supra note 16, at 78-81 (discussing the "quasi-legislative and quasi-
judicial duties" of the President).
257. See Pink, 315 U.S. at 232; Belmont, 301 U.S. at 327.
258. The Pink Court did emphasize this point in its analysis to dispose of a separate
due process challenge:
There is no [constitutional] reason why [the federal government] may not,
through such devices as the Litvinov Assignment, make itself and its nationals
whole from assets here before it permits such assets to go abroad in satisfaction
of claims of aliens made elsewhere and not incurred in connection with
business conducted in the country.
Pink, 315 U.S. at 228.
259. See id. at 229-30; Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330; see also Henkin, supra note 44, at
56-65 (arguing that acts within zones of exclusive presidential authority have effect of
law); Louis Henkin, The President and International Law, 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 930, 934
(1986) ("Acts within [presidential] constitutional authority may... themselves make law
and have effect as law .... ). For me, the difficult question is the extent to which the
President's specific powers are "exclusive" in the sense that they cannot be superseded
by congressional legislation, rather than simply "concurrent" and thus subject to the
will of Congress. See, e.g., United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 141 (1872)
(invalidating congressional interference with President's pardon power). Texas v.
White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869), expressed a different premise with regard to
presidential regulatory power incident to the President's acting as Commander-in-Chief.
The Court said that
so long as the [civil] war continued, it cannot be denied that [the President]
might institute temporary government within insurgent districts occupied by
the National forces, or take measures, in any State, for the restoration of state
government faithful to the Union, employing, however, in such efforts, only
such means and agents as were authorized by constitutional laws.
Id. at 730. The Court stressed, however, that Congress was the ultimate master. See id.;
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But no such implied law-making authority can inhere in the general
grants of the executive power contained in the Vesting and Take Care
clauses. Otherwise, the fundamental premises of the constitutional or-
der are overturned. Consider, for example, Belmont and Pink. Unless
confined to executive recognition agreements, these decisions imply
that legally the President might be able to dispense with Congress: so
long as the President could find a foreign policy concern and a willing
foreign partner, the President could issue executive orders affecting
private rights, at least when not acting contrary to statute. To overturn
these executive orders, Congress would have to overcome a presiden-
tial veto, which means that the President would need the support of
only one-third plus one of the members of one House of Congress.
Even if successful, the congressional role would be substantially limited
to that of a checking function, a pattern contrary to our constitutional
traditions. The Constitution contemplates no such law-making prerog-
ative in the President. Unfortunately, dictum in Dames & Moore v. Regan
muddies the water here. No "specific" presidential power clause sup-
ported the executive order, yet at the close of its opinion the Court
cited both Belmont and Pink in a free-standing, "by-the-way" manner.260
The Court placed no real reliance on these decisions, however; its cas-
ual, unfocused dictum should, therefore, not be viewed as inadvertently
extending the President's law-making power to any executive agree-
ment that settles diplomatic disputes.2 61
Second, in the development of both the foreign-sovereign-immu-
nity and the act-of-state doctrines, Presidents have in the past asserted
the right to determine when either doctrine is properly invoked injudi-
cial proceedings.2 62 Congress has now enacted extensive regulation in
see also Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553, 558 (1897) (President has power to
convene general court martial "in absence of legislation expressly prohibitive");
Santiago v. Nogueras, 214 U.S. 260, 265-66 (1909) (upholding military government in
Porto Rico pursuant to Commander-in-Chief Clause until Congress acts after treaty of
peace with Spain in 1898); Currie, supra note 30, at 313-14 (discussing White); Rossiter
& Longaker, supra note 135, at 90 n.44 (General Orders, No. 100, Articles of War,
prescribed by President); id. at 120-23 (describing President's authority over conquered
territory); Taft, supra note 16, at 98-99 (describing role of President in territories
acquired after Spanish-American War).
260. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 682-83 (1981).
261. But see United States v. Holliday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407, 419 (1865) (deferring
to President on status of Chippewas as Indian tribe for purpose of statute restricting sale
of liquor). Currie claims that this was a "political question" case. See Currie, supra
note 30, at 304 n.122. Whether or not he is correct, Currie's discussion highlights the
point that the practical result of the "political question" doctrine may be to invest the
President with some law-making power. Cf. Bigel, supra note 172, at 37.
262. The doctrines have common intellectual underpinnings. See Alfred Dunhill of
London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 693-94, 705 (1976) (difference between sovereign
immunity and act-of-state doctrines unimportant for purposes of this case); Restatement
Foreign Relations, supra note 64, §§ 443-444, 451-460; Henkin, supra note 44, at
57-64. But see Dunhill, at 728 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that the doctrines are
distinct, and that "exceptions . . . to sovereign immunity ought not be transferred
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both areas, and seems to have precluded any independent presidential
"regulatory" role.263 But even before that point, a number ofjustices
had become uncomfortable with suggestions that, independently of
statute, the President could turn off-and-on again the act-of-state doc-
trine, or could determine the extent to which state law is preempted by
the foreign affairs power of the United States. 264
D. The Chief Administrator
A final dimension of the "law enforcement" executive deserves fur-
ther consideration. The prior discussion of Midwest Oil suggested the
potential impact on private rights of the President's role in public ad-
automatically... to the act-of-state doctrine"). The view that judicial deference to the
Executive should be viewed as deference to Executive applications of international law
rather than as deference to discretionary executive foreign policy determinations gives
plausibility to the Executive's claim of authority. See Wedgwood, supra note 226, at
260-61; see also Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101
Yale L.J. 969, 1003-05 (1992) (arguing that executive interpretations of law may create
precedents for courts). Nonetheless, to the extent that the courts defer to the Executive
acting without statutory authority, it is the latter who claims the right to define the legal
rights of American citizens.
263. See 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1988) (act-of-state doctrine); Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). Pursuant to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, the
courts independently decide whether foreign states may be subject to suit in the U.S. on
the basis of criteria defined by the statute. See, e.g., Republic of Arg. v. Weltover, Inc.,
112 S. Ct. 2160, 2164-69 (1992) (holding that Argentina's bond refinancing constituted
"commercial activity" with "direct effect" on United States and thus rendered Argentina
amenable to suit). More light on the Executive's role may be shed by Nelson v. Saudi
Arabia, in which, at the government's urging, the Court has granted a petition for
certiorari. See Nelson v. Saudi Arabia, 923 F.2d 1528 (11 th Cir. 1991) (holding that
Saudi government's recruitment and hiring of U.S. citizen within United States rendered
Saudi Arabia amenable to suit), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 2937 (1992).
264. In First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759, 765-70
(1972), only three Justices espoused an executive prerogative in the act-of-state area.
Cf. W.S. Kirkpatrick v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 110 S. Ct. 701, 704 (1990)
(outlining possible exceptions to act-of-state doctrine based on "modem international
comity" rather than on executive permission); Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 724-25 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (noting that "task of defining the role of theJudiciary is for this Court, not
the Executive Branch"). On the executive role in sovereign immunity, see Dunhill, 425
U.S. at 695-706 (looking, in part, to executive branch to determine whether to extend
act-of-state doctrine to commercial acts of foreign governments); see also id. at 724-28
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (arguing that Executive's importance with respect to act-of-
state doctrine did not necessarily dictate similar results in cases involving sovereign
immunity); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974) (judicial power cannot be
shared with executive branch). Of course, here as elsewhere, Congress knows how to
delegate discretion to the Executive. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1988) (act of
state); Banco Nacional, 406 U.S. at 789 n.13 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that less
deference to Executive is appropriate in situations involving act-of-state doctrine than in
those involving sovereign immunity); Kraft Gen. Foods v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 112 S.
Ct. 2365, 2372-74 (1992) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (declining to follow executive
assertion of no-preemption of state law in the foreign commerce context); Zschernig v.
Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432-41 (1968) (same).
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ministration. 265 Writing nearly a century ago, the first students of pub-
lic administration-Freund, Wyman, Goodnow, and later Willoughby-
insisted, in varying degrees, that the Constitution itself secured only
the President's "political" independence. 2 66 For them, the President's
administrative (and, a fortiori, regulatory) powers depended entirely on
statute. Thus, Ernst Freund insisted that "one of the fundamental prin-
ciples of our administrative system [is] no executive power without ex-
press statutory authority. ' 26 7 This claim was plainly wrong even when
written; it had no basis in the case law, at least if the words "no" and
"express" are given anything approaching their ordinary meaning.
Well before Midwest Oil, the Supreme Court had endorsed a spacious
conception of the Executive's "managerial" power to fill in the details
of statutes. Very early on, for example, the Supreme Court recognized
a right in the Executive "to enter into a contract, or to take a bond, in
cases not previously provided for by some law."' 26 8 Similarly, the Court
265. This topic goes quite unnoticed by Professor Corwin, except for his passing
reference to President Truman's loyalty-security program, which, though Corwin does
not mention it, regulated government contractors as well as government employees.
Corwin himself thought it obvious that the loyalty-security program implemented
Congressional legislation, but even his description resembles more of a Haig/Midwest Oil
analysis. See Corwin, supra note 44, at 115-25 (discussing administration of loyalty-
security program).
266. Grundstein offers an excellent review of those writers. See generally
Grundstein, supra note 23. These early commentators pointed to Marbury v. Madison's
sharp contrast between judicial protection of vested rights and judicial interference
when the President
is invested with certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is
to use his own discretion .... The subjects are political. They respect the
nation, not individual rights, and being intrusted to the executive, the decision
of the executive is conclusive. The application of this remark will be perceived
by adverting to ... the department of foreign affairs.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-66 (1803). These writers apparently
conflated the terms "political" and "discretionary." Taft, however, does make such a
distinction, differentiating between situations in which executive's acts are beyond
judicial review because they involve discretion and those that are similarly insulated
because they are political. See Taft, supra note 16, at 47. These early commentators
recognized and fully approved of the fact that the President had gained ascendancy in
public administration, but insisted that this was largely because Congress had so
ordained. The best (though controversial) modern account of separation-of-powers
concepts and public administration is by my colleague Peter L. Strauss. See Peter L.
Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth
Branch, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 573, 640-67 (1984) (arguing that Congress' power to create
and control public administration must take President's need for day-to-day oversight of
government into account); see also A. Michael Froomkin, Note, In Defense of
Administrative Agency Autonomy, 96 Yale LJ. 787, 798-808 (1987) (Congress' power
to structure executive branch implies power to create administrative agencies partially
shielded from President's removal power).
267. Ernst Freund, The Law of the Administration in America, 9 Pol. Sci. Q. 403,
410 (1894) (emphasis added). Freund added, "In contrast . . . we find in Europe
executive powers independent of statute, discretionary powers of action . Id.
268. United States v. Tingey, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 115, 128 (1831).
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sustained the standing of the Executive, without express statutory au-
thority, to enforce the contract and property rights of the United States,
a matter to which I will return.269
In United States v. MacDaniel,270 the Court deferred to the depart-
ment head's construction ("usage") of an ambiguous statute governing
an employee's compensation, while acknowledging that future depart-
ment heads could change that construction. Speaking more generally,
Justice McLean wrote that "practical knowledge" made clear that "the
head of a department, in the distribution of its duties and responsibili-
ties, is often compelled to exercise his discretion. ' 271 He added:
[The department head] is limited in the exercises of his pow-
ers by the law; but it does not follow, that he must show statu-
tory provision for everything he does. No government could
be administered on such principles. To attempt to regulate,
by law, the minute movements of every part of the compli-
cated machinery of government would evince a most un-
pardonable ignorance on the subject. Whilst the great
outlines of its movements may be marked out, and limitations
imposed on the exercise of its powers, there are numberless
things which must be done, that can neither be anticipated nor
defined, and which are essential to the proper action of the
government.
272
This view seems clearly correct, and the result is that the chief adminis-
trator's authority to fill in details could entail some incidental burdens
on private rights. Surely, acting under the most general statutes or
under no statute at all, the executive could prescribe rules for regulat-
ing access to federal buildings and lands. A violation of their content
would in turn constitute a trespass under the general standing law. The
incidental impact on the liberty or property interests of private parties
would not in "the common understanding" be viewed as executive
269. See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 182, at 910-11 (collecting cases). In these
suits, it should be noted that the Executive did not claim authority to define the primary
legal rights and duties of the affected private parties; those rights were independently
defined by statute or common law. In the contract cases, the law generally permitted the
parties to specify the terms of their bargain, and the Executive operated within that
framework. The Executive claimed only a right of action (as chief administrator) to
enforce the pre-existing legal duties.
270. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 1 (1833).
271. Id. at 14.
272. Id. at 14-15. This understanding of the executive's managerial authority was
readily embraced in several Attorney General opinions, and it seems to have
underpinned a good deal of actual administrative practice. See Appointment of Acting
Purser, 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 357, 365 (1854) ("The filling up a vacancy by an appointment
of one to act ad interim ... is in its nature an executive, ministerial and administrative
power."); Navy Regulations, 6 Op. Att'y Gen. 10, 12-19 (1853) (opining that Executive
has no power, outside a specific statutory grant, to promulgate rules for the Navy).
During the Civil War, Lincoln issued a general order fashioning rules of war to govern
the military, an act quite arguably inconsistent with U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. See
Randall, supra note 44, at 38-39; supra note 259.
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"law-making," that is, as altering a prior legally protected baseline of
freedom.
MacDaniel itself could be viewed as another case of implied delega-
tion under umbrella-like statutes or as simply explicit recognition of
executive power that necessarily includes some independent authority
to "fill in the details" in managing the internal affairs of government.
273
The latter conception seems to me far more persuasive. That concep-
tion is implicit in the writings of Hamilton and Jefferson and in the
early case law. Nonetheless, limits exist as to the kinds of presidential
conduct that fairly can be justified as simply an incident to public ad-
ministration. 274 Moreover, these limits must be understood in the con-
text of the modern "administrative state," with its extensive licensing
and entitlement programs. 275 No precise boundary between manage-
ment and law-making can be formulated, and, no doubt, the boundary
will reflect contemporary understandings of what properly may be de-
nominated as "merely" public administration. But that some such
boundary exists seems clear. For example, in Rust v. Sullivan,276 no one
supposed that the President's authority as chief administrator alone ob-
viated his need for statutory authority to impose his anti-abortion coun-
selling restrictions. 2
77
Currently, the most troublesome cases regarding the scope of le-
gitimate public administration-as opposed to impermissible presiden-
273. Implied delegation concepts might also explain early executive agreements,
governing international postal conventions, that were entered into without statutory
authority. See supra note 232.
274. See Navy Regulations, 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 413 (1862). The Attorney General's
opinion dealt with the power of the President to fix the relative rank of Navy line and
civil staff officers. The Attorney General concluded that the President had no such
power absent a statute, because such conduct "is in no just sense an exercise of
Executive Power, for it is the prescription of a rule and not the execution of a rule already
prescribed." Id. at 414. Cf. Grundstein, supra note 23, at 228 n.3 (quoting Ernst
Freund, who described as one of the "fundamental principles of our administrative law
... [the] minute regulation of nearly all executive functions .... ).
275. With its licensing and entitlement programs, the modern administrative state
erodes earlier efforts to sharply divide administrative law into its "internal" and
"external" branches, with the former confined to the realm of the relationships between
administrative officials and their superiors. See, e.g., Bruce Wyman, The Principles of
the Administrative Law Governing the Relations of Public Officers § 50, at 180 (1903).
But the general distinction between internal governmental management and law-making
has not gone by the boards. For a discussion of the controversy on the point in the First
Amendment context, compare International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee,
112 S. Ct. 2701, 2705 (1992) (when government acts as proprietor rather than as
legislator, its actions will not be subjected to highest scrutiny) with id. at 2716 (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (admonishing majority for introducing "strict doctrinal line between the
proprietary and regulatory" functions of government). It must be recognized, however,
that the distinction may play a different and lesser role when the Bill of Rights is
concerned. See id. at 2712 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that government may not
wholly disregard First Amendment even when acting as proprietor).




tial law-making-concern government contractors. These contractors
must now comply with restrictions not clearly related to the nature or
cost of the product they supply, but to their own internal management.
For example, contractors must comply with presidentially imposed af-
firmative action programs. 278 This requirement was initially estab-
lished by Executive Order 11246, the statutory origins of which, as the
Supreme Court gingerly observed in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown,2 79 "are
somewhat obscure and have been roundly debated by commentators
and courts."
'28 0
Earlier, similar concerns of legality had surrounded President
Carter's wage and price control program. A sweeping delegation of
wage and price control authority to the President had expired.28 ' Pres-
ident Carter, by executive order, nonetheless managed to impose the
controls by, in substance, denying government contracts worth more
than five million dollars to contractors who would not comply with his
"voluntary" wage and price standards. 2 82 In the same year as Brown, a
divided en banc court for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded in
AFL-CIO v. Kahn2 83 that the restrictions were sufficiently cost-related as
to be authorized by federal procurement legislation.28 4 Three circuit
judges dissented,28 5 as did three justices from the denial of certio-
278. Affirmative action programs currently affect more than 95,000 entities
collectively employing 27 million workers, and involve contracts worth a total of $184
billion. See Steven A. Holmes, Affirmative Action Plans are Now Part of the Normal
Corporate Way of Life, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22, 1991, at A20. More than 500 persons are
employed by the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs to monitor the
compliance process. See Chester E. Finn, Jr., Quotas and the Bush Administration,
Commentary, Nov. 1991, at 17, 21.
279. 441 U.S. 281 (1979).
280. Id. at 304. Section 201 of the Executive Order directed the Secretary of Labor
to "'adopt such rules and regulations and issue such orders as he deems necessary and
appropriate to achieve the purposes [of the Executive Order].'" Id. (quoting Exec.
Order No. 11,246, § 201, 3 C.F.R. 339 (1965 Supp.), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1988)). The Court held that the Order did not authorize regulations permitting the
release of affirmative action programs filed by government contractors, finding these
regulations in conflict with the Trade Secrets Act, which barred disclosures not
"'authorized by law.'" Id. at 315-16 (citing Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1905).
Justice Marshall concurred, concluding that the Court did not decide that the Executive
Order "must be founded on a legislative enactment." 441 U.S. at 320 (Marshall, J.,
concurring). See generally Michael Brody, Congress, the President, and Federal Equal
Employment Policymaking: A Problem in Separation of Powers, 60 B.U. L. Rev. 239,
269-81 (1980) (arguing that Executive Order 11,246 imposes certain legal obligations
distinct from those imposed by Congress under Title VII and that the order contravenes
the will of Congress).
281. The delegation was sustained in Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher
Workmen v. Connally, 337 F. Supp. 737, 744-63 (D.D.C. 1971).
282. Exec. Order No. 12,092, 43 Fed. Reg. 51375 (1978).
283. 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979).
284. See id. at 787-96.




rari.28 6 The Kahn majority intimated that presidential affirmative ac-
tion programs could also rest on the same procurement legislation.
But even that majority expressed deep reservations about an earlier
Third Circuit suggestion that "implied Presidential authority" alone
sufficed to support such programs.287
The judicial effort to locate adequate statutory authority for the
President's affirmative action and wage and price control programs
finds its counterpart in Midwest Oil's effort to find adequate congres-
sional approval. This search for sufficient legislative warrant rests on
the intuition that the President's administrative role provides frail sup-
port for conduct that, in "the common understanding," burdens pri-
vate rights. Moreover, the search reflects another intuition: the
President's administrative role cannot be analogized to that of the mod-
ern Chief Executive Officer in a major corporation. That officer does
have law-making authority. The modem CEO wields the authority de-
scribed by T.R. Roosevelt's stewardship theory; that officer can act un-
less restricted. A CEO could impose affirmative action, price controls,
and other downstream restrictions on those who deal with the corpora-
tion. But the American President is not a CEO. Our tradition is that no
official-from the President down-can invade private rights unless au-
thorized by legislation.
III. THE PROTECTIVE POWER
Some of the precedents relied upon to establish the existence of an
emergency presidential power can also be read to establish a narrower
authority: an executive power to preserve, protect, and defend the per-
sonnel, property, and instrumentalities of the national government. In
addition to spelling out a justification for this claim, I consider the
probable contours of such a protective power.
A. In re Neagle and In re Debs
We begin with a consideration of two perplexing late nineteenth-
century decisions: In re Neagle288 and In re Debs.289 In each case, the
Court spent considerable energy in demonstrating what no one would
now deny: that the protection of federal officials and instrumentalities
286. See AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 443 U.S. 915 (1979) (Brennan, White, and Marshall,
JJ., dissenting); see also Kimberley A. Egerton, Note, Presidential Power over Federal
Contracts Under the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act: The Close
Nexus Test of AFL-CIO v. Kahn, 1980 Duke L.J. 205, 217-33 (arguing that Kahn Court
had failed to articulate clear limits on presidential regulatory power and suggesting
examination of congressional intent to determine those limits).
287. 618 F.2d at 791 n.40 (criticizing Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442
F.2d 159, 170-71 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971)). The court noted that in
the case before it, the government had made no such claim. See id. at 787.
288. 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
289. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
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and the protection of interstate commerce fall within the regulatory
power of the national government. The underlying difficulty in both
cases was the absence of a plainly controlling statute to which the Presi-
dent could point to support his conduct. No reference was made to any
concept of emergency power in the national government, but the Court
seemed deeply reluctant to acknowledge the lack of existing governmen-
tal authority, despite the lack of any apparently controlling legislation.
Accordingly, the Court was compelled to fashion novel and difficult
propositions of law in order to sustain the President's conduct. In so
doing, however, the Court purported to follow the format of the "law
enforcement" executive: (a) the relevant legal norms were located in
the structure and relationships established by the laws and the Consti-
tution; and (b) the President's conduct was viewed as fairly and reason-
ably implementing those norms. 290
In Neagle, the Attorney General had assigned a federal marshal to
guard Justice Field, whose life had been threatened, while he was on
circuit duty in California. 291 The marshal killed Justice Field's assailant
in a railroad dining car, and for that conduct he was held by the state on
homicide charges. The marshal sought his discharge on a writ of
habeas corpus, and the litigants focused on whether his detention was
contrary to the "laws of the United States," and thus, "the Constitu-
tion." 29 2 The ultimate issue turned on whether the Attorney General
had lawfully assigned the marshal to protect Justice Field. If not, the
marshal possessed only the authority of a private citizen under Califor-
nia law, which meant that ajury could find that he had committed crimi-
nal and tortious conduct. 293 Eminent counsel appeared for the
marshal: the Attorney General and Mr. Joseph H. Choate. They con-
ceded that "[i]t is not pretended that there is any single specific statute
making it [the Attorney General's] duty to furnish this protection. ' 29 4
At the close of its opinion, the Court purported to find adequate
statutory authority for the marshal's conduct. Congress, it said, had
invested federal marshals with the statutory powers of the local sheriff,
which the Court found fully adequate to sustain the marshal's defense
290. Thus, in form, the Court here too did not permit the President to define the
content of primary rights and duties of private parties; it simply recognized the existence
of executive action taken to implement the underlying norms.
291. The actual facts would make a first class movie. Neagle, 135 U.S. at 3-7,
42-54. Professor Carl Swisher's biography ofJustice Field includes some facts omitted
from the Court's opinion out of a sense of delicacy. See Carl B. Swisher, Stephen J.
Field: Craftsman of the Law 328-61 (1930).
292. Neagle, 135 U.S. at 27. The Attorney General's argument collapsed the
distinction between statutory and constitutional issues. See id. at 12.
293. Cf. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 178-79 (1804) (holding military
officer liable for tortious damages when Court concluded that instructions given to him,
although misleading, did not legalize his act, which without those instructions was
plainly a trespass).
294. Neagle, 135 U.S. at 27.
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of Justice Field.29 5 But what is of most interest is the main ground of
the Court's opinion. The Court insisted that the constitutional struc-
ture itself implied the Executive's right to protect federal officers in the
discharge of their duties. 29 6 At this point, a step seems to have been
assumed: that "the protection implied by the nature of the government
under the constitution" 29 7 imposes duties not only upon state officials
but also upon private parties. 298 Although it has not fared well and is
in tension with our general understanding, the concept that, even apart
from the Thirteenth Amendment, the Constitution itself imposes some
duties directly on private parties was an important idea in the constitu-
tional jurisprudence of the late nineteenth century.29 9 For the Court,
then, the issue was whether, even without statutory sanctions, the Presi-
dent's "take care" responsibilities included vindication of a constitu-
tional norm:
Is this duty [to protect federal officials] limited to the enforce-
ment of acts of Congress or of treaties of the United States
according to their express terms, or does it include the rights,
duties and obligations growing out of the Constitution itself,
our international relations, and all the protection implied by
the nature of the government under the Constitution?
30 0
The Court's answer was in the affirmative, but the reasoning was
unclear.
In re Debs3 0° arose out of the famous Pullman strike of 1894. The
Attorney General sought an injunction alleging the existence of a con-
spiracy to use force, intimidation, violence, and the destruction of
295. See id. at 68-69.
296. See id. at 54-58.
297. Id. at 64.
298. As the dissent observed, historically Congress had relied on state law for the
protection of federal officers. See id. at 96 (Lamar, J., dissenting).
299. See, e.g., Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 294-95 (1892) (holding that
citizen in custody of United States Marshal for offense against United States has right to
be protected from lawless violence). Neagle and Logan are not the only examples from
this era of the emergence of novel constitutional doctrine from the lack of clearly
relevant specific statutory authorization. The Court frequently reached out to doctrine
that ensured that the national government was not seen as impotent in circumstances
when it simply "couldn't" be. See, e.g., In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 536-37 (1895)
(opining that relegating the enforcement of federal laws and rights to the states "would
tend to defeat the independence and the supremacy of the national government"); Ex
parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 662-67 (1884) (holding that federal government could
pass laws to protect rights "essential to the healthy organization of the government
itself"). Of course, the entire "state action" problem could have been avoided if the
Court had held that it was not the Constitution but the statutes that implied protection
for federal officers. By implication, the statutes would also invest the President with
authority to vindicate that protection.
300. Neagle, 135 U.S. at 64. This essay is not the occasion to develop a full inquiry
into the troublesome question of what it means to say that the President is implementing
constitutional norms rather than statutory directives. See infra note 320 and
accompanying text.
301. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
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property in order to obstruct the carriage of the mails, and, more im-
portantly, the processes of interstate commerce.3 0 2 No act of Congress
expressly prohibited the complained-of conduct or authorized the exec-
utive to seek an injunction. Accordingly, the case might have been de-
scribed in Steel Seizure terms: the executive was executing no policy save
its own. A unanimous Court, however, concluded otherwise. The Pres-
ident was seen as executing some uncertain mixture of legal norms em-
bodied in the Constitution and existing statutes that mandated
unobstructed channels of interstate commerce: "As, under the Consti-
tution, power over interstate commerce and the transportation of the
mails is vested in the national government, and Congress by virtue of
such grant has assumed actual and direct control, it follows that the
national government may prevent any unlawful and forcible interfer-
ence therewith. 303
The national government's power having been established, and
some legislation, albeit not sufficiently dispositive, having been cited,
what then of the President's conduct? Congress, the Court said, could
have legislated criminally against the obstruction; but the Court asked,
"is that the only remedy?"30 4 Answering its own question in the nega-
tive, the Court stated that "[t]he entire strength of the nation may be
used,"30 5 which, for the Court, meant that the President was free to use
"the army of the Nation, and all its militia" to remove the obstruction
to interstate commerce.30 6 From the latter premise, which, I should
add, petitioners' counsel apparently conceded,30 7 the Court concluded
that "[w]hen the choice is between redress or prevention of injury by
force and by peaceful process, the law is well pleased if the individual
[i.e. the executive] will consent to waive his right to the use of force and
await [the law's] action."308 The remainder of the Court's opinion was
devoted to showing that, in addition to his authority to protect the
property and contract rights of the United States, the President had the
authority to remove obstructions to interstate commerce. In reaching
its conclusion, the Court cited numerous English and state
authorities.3
09
302. See id. at 565-70.
303. Id. at 581.
304. Id. The Court did not stop to notice that Congress could have legislated
civilly too, for example, by prohibiting such obstruction and authorizing the Executive
to seek an injunction. Cf. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 160(j) (1988) (authorizing injunction after certain procedures are exhausted).
305. 158 U.S. at 582.
306. Id.; cf. Story, Commentaries, supra note 13, § 782 (President has no authority
to use public force to enforce treaties).
307. See 158 U.S. at 573-77; cf. 10 U.S.C. §§ 332-334 (1988) (authorizing
President to use armed forces when unlawful obstructions make it impracticable to
enforce laws of United States).
308. 158 U.S. at 583.
309. See id. at 586-96.
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Essentially, Debs raised two questions. First, why was the obstruc-
tion of rail traffic illegal? No express congressional prohibition existed.
The Court believed that the obstruction was illegal as a result of a com-
bination of the Commerce Clause itself and of the implications of ex-
isting statutes. Indeed, the Court intimated that the Commerce Clause
alone made the obstruction illegal: "If a State with its recognized pow-
ers of sovereignty is impotent to obstruct interstate commerce, can it be
that any mere voluntary association ... has a power which the State
itself does not possess?" 310 This seems wrong. The Commerce Clause
is a limitation on state action. Private obstructions to interstate trade
may violate antitrust laws, but not the Commerce Clause. The argu-
ment based on then-existing federal statutes is also implausible: to
read any of the statutes cited in the Court's opinion as having, by impli-
cation, forbidden the conduct complained of in the suit seems exces-
sive. Of course, adding the Commerce Clause and the statutes together
goes nowhere. Summing zeroes yields zero, as it always does.
Second, assuming that the obstruction to interstate commerce did
contravene existing federal law, what is the source of executive stand-
ing to invoke judicial process? Arguably, the railroads had an implied
right of action to do so, but it is unclear why the executive had such
standing. In addition, in measuring the President's authority, the
Court does not explain why common law suits by English and state offi-
cials are relevant.311
What for us remains of deepest interest, however, is that in both
Neagle and Debs the Court sought to meet the presidential law-making
objection without either overtly invoking emergency concepts foreign
to our jurisprudence or abandoning the idea of the "law enforcement"
executive.
B. A Protective Function
Since 1792, the President has had the statutory authority to use the
military to enforce federal law when the processes of civil government
are unable to do so because of domestic violence. 31 2 Quite arguably,
this power exists absent statute; Debs and other decisions so imply in
referring to the "peace of the United States," which the President could
protect. 31 3 Be that as it may, Neagle can be defended, and Debs at least
310. Id. at 581.
311. Arguably no such "inherent" power to vindicate constitutional norms should
be recognized. Compare Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405, 425-26 (1925)
(Holmes, J.) (relying on obstructing commerce rationale of Debs and treaty obligations)
with United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 199-201 (3d Cir. 1980)
(Executive cannot sue to enforce Fourteenth Amendment rights absent statutory
authority).
312. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 332-334 (1988) (corresponds to Act of May 2, 1792, ch. 28,
1 Stat. 264 (repealed 1795)).
313. See, e.g., In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 60-68 (1890). Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S.
371, 395 (1879), stated, apparently for the first time, that the "incontrovertible
1993]
COLUMBIA LA W REVIEW
understood, in similar terms: inherent in the concept of the American
Chief Executive is the power (and perhaps the duty) to use force as
necessary to enforce federal law when a breakdown in the normal civil
process has occurred, and not only to defend the United States against
sudden attack, but also to "protect" the government's personnel, prop-
erty, and instrumentalities.3 14 While this latter "protective" power
finds its clearest illustrations in cases of immediate danger, it is, in prin-
ciple, not so limited. It includes the general right of the executive,
without express statutory authority, to make contracts and, more im-
portantly, to sue to protect the personnel and the property interests of
the United States, and when necessary to use force and other resources
to protect them.
The President takes an oath to "preserve, protect and defend the
Constitution of the United States." 3 15 The Neagle dissent justly ob-
serves that this oath must be understood in the context of a Constitu-
tion that assigns law-making power to Congress alone. The Oath
Clause, however, need not be read as purely formal. It describes in
some measure what the President was expected to do. Hamilton de-
scribed the need for executive "energy" in terms that contemplate
more than executive protection against foreign attack.316 Hamilton re-
ferred to a similar need for an executive protection power to ensure
"the steady administration of the laws" and to guard "against those
irregular and highhanded combinations, which sometimes interrupt the
ordinary course of justice," and finally, to guard "against the enter-
prises and assaults of ambition, of faction and of anarchy. '3 17 Execu-
tive authority, he added, included the use of force, if necessary, to
enforce the laws of the United States.
318
Hamilton's position reflected a great deal of then-current English
and American political and legal thought, which emphasized protection
of the individual as one of the major functions of government.3 19 We
principle" that the government may by means of physical force execute its powers and
functions "necessarily involves the power to command obedience to its laws, and hence
the power to keep the peace to that extent." Id. at 395. This concept of governmental
authority refers to the President's power to ensure that the enforcement of federal law is
not overcome by force or violence, a power recognized by 10 U.S.C. §§ 332-34 (1988).
314. 10 U.S.C. §§ 332-334 (1988) authorizes the use of force to enforce federal law
when there is a breakdown in civil government. Our concern, of course, is with
situations far less drastic.
315. U.S. Const. art. II, § 1.
316. See The Federalist No. 70, at 471 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961).
317. Id.
318. "[Tjhe execution of the laws and the employment of the common strength,
either for this purpose or for the common defence, seem to comprise all the functions of
the executive magistrate." The Federalist No. 75, at 504 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob
E. Cooke ed., 1961). See generally Flaumenhaft, supra note 152, at 85-98 (discussing
Hamilton's views on role of the Executive).
319. From Hobbes on down, political philosophers emphasized that "protection"
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may assume here that at the national level of our governmental system,
this protective function exists largely in Congress alone, not in the Ex-
ecutive (unless delegated). We may thus assume that, without statutory
authorization, the President does not possess a general, free-standing
"protective" power to enforce federal law, even to enforce the guaran-
tees of the Fourteenth Amendment.320 But a limited presidential
power respecting the personnel, property, and instrumentalities of the
government that the President is supposed to administer is a different
matter.32 1 This is the claim of executive authority reflected in Neagle.
But the most salient illustration of this power, however, is President
Lincoln's conduct before the outbreak of the Civil War. Repeatedly de-
nying that he desired war, Lincoln publicly justified all of his conduct in
protecting Forts Sumter and Perkins in terms of protecting the person-
nel and property of the United States. 322 Indeed, even President
of the individual in both person and property is a core purpose of government. See
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 272 (Crawford B. McPherson ed., 1968) ("The end of [a
subject's] Obedience is Protection"). The concern for the security of "men's bodies and
properties . . . is an emphatically modern principle emanating from the doctrines of
Hobbes and Locke." See Richard Cox, Executive and Prerogative: A Problem for
Adherents of Constitutional Government, in 11 E Pluribus Unum: Constitutional
Principles and the Institutions of Government 102, 104 (Sarah Thurow ed., 1988).
Protection of liberty and property was a central purpose of the creation of an effective
national government, and also of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection
Clause. The latter clause was designed not so much as a guarantee of equal laws, but of
the equal protection of the laws. See Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges and
Immunities Clause, 101 Yale L.J. 1385, 1434-36 (1992); Earl A. Maltz, The Concept of
Equal Protection of the Laws-A Historical Inquiry, 22 San Diego L. Rev. 499, 499
(1985); StevenJ. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 41 Duke LJ. 507, 563-66 (1991).
320. See United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187, 199-201 (3d Cir.
1980). Such power is reserved to the President in the event of a breakdown in civil
government. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 332-334 (1988); see also Maeva Marcus & Robert Teir,
Hayburn's Case: A Misinterpretation of Precedent, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 527, 534-41
(suggesting that presidential authority to vindicate national law was broader than now
understood).
321. Cf. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 226 (1821) (recognizing
inherent power in Congress to punish for contempt because "if there is one maxim
which, necessarily rides over all others, in the practical operation of government, it is,
that public functionaries must be left at liberty to exercise the powers which the people
have entrusted to them.").
Professor Heyman's recent study shows that in English constitutional and political
theory and in the early American experience, the Executive was strongly associated with
the idea of protection, especially when enforcing the protections of existing laws. See
Heyman, supra note 319, at 519-20.
322. See David M. Potter, Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis xxxi (1971).
Professor Potter's careful introduction to the 1962 edition reviews the conflicting
evidence on the point. Lincoln's inaugural address set the tone: "You [secessionists]
have no oath registered in heaven to destroy the Government, while I shall have the
most solemn one 'to preserve, protect, and defend it." First Inaugural Address
Abraham Lincoln, in The Inaugural Addresses of Presidents of the United States 141
(United States Government Printing Office 1989).
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Buchanan refused to yield Fort Sumter after the initial stages of seces-
sion, although no one believed that he would use force to put down the
secession itself.
3 23
In this century, illustrations of the protective power appear, but in
less sharp a focus. The elaborate modem loyalty-security programs ini-
tially created by Presidents Truman and Eisenhower through executive
orders provide one modern example of the exercise of the protective
power-one that fully requires an article of its own. It is, however, a
topic for which this Article has implications?324 Loyalty-security pro-
grams impose restrictions not only on government employees, but also
on those dealing with the government. Their modem form originated
with executive orders of Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, neither of
which purported to rely on statute and both of which expanded prior
limited secrecy programs throughout all levels of the government.3 2 5
The result was, inter alia, to exclude some contractors from government
programs. Immediate analogies are, therefore, suggested to Rust v. Sul-
livan, to the affirmative action cases, and to the wage and price control
cases, in which the executive orders were assumed to be invalid if not
adequately authorized by Congress.3 26 I believe, however, that in gen-
eral terms the executive orders were lawful exercises of a protective
function inherent in the President's foreign affairs and Commander-in-
Chief powers. The President has authority to protect his version of na-
tional security against dangers resulting from misuse of government
property and information in which the government had a direct and
continuing interest. Department of Navy v. Egan3 2 7 sustained this view in
strong terms:
The President, after all, is the "Commander in Chief of
the Army and Navy of the United States." U.S. Const., Art. II,
§ 2. His authority to classify and control access to information
bearing on national security and to determine whether an indi-
vidual is sufficiently trustworthy to occupy a position in the Ex-
ecutive Branch that will give that person access to such
323. See Potter, supra note 322, at 253-54; David M. Potter, The Impending
Crisis: 1848-1861, at 538-45 (Dan E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1976); Cox, supra note 44, at
213-16.
324. The topic is surveyed with great wit, elegance and sense in Schlesinger, supra
note 8, at 331-76; see also Developments in the Law-The National Security Interest
and Civil Liberties, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1130, 1198-99 (1972) (discussing statutory and
constitutional authority for classification system created by Executive Order).
325. See Schlesinger, supra note 8, at 339-40. The expansion had its origins in
the Cold War: "The secrecy system was, so to speak, the privilege of permanent
government. It was a radiation from the national security establishment." Id. at 331.
Of course all executive orders here or elsewhere are subject to the Bill of Rights
limitations. See United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 314-21 (1972)
(government's need to safeguard domestic security using electronic surveillance
trumped by Fourth Amendment warrant requirement).
326. See supra text accompanying notes 276-299.
327. 484 U.S. 518 (1988).
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information flows primarily from this constitutional invest-
ment of power in the President and exists quite apart from any
explicit congressional grant.328
Alas, I ultimately discovered that I cannot claim paternity for the
idea that some protective function is an attribute in "The executive
Power." The Steel Seizure dissent quoted from the government's brief
submitted by a legendary advocate, Solicitor General John W. Davis, in
Midwest Oil, which said: "'As we understand the doctrine of the Neagle
case, . . . it is clearly this: The Executive is authorized to exert the power
of the United States when he finds this necessary for the protection of the
agencies, the instrumentalities, or the property of the Govern-
ment.' ",329 1 agree. Of course, on occasion, presidential use of the
protective power can perhaps be shown to be "legislative" in nature.
But, as I have said, any boundary between impermissible law-making
and permissible public administration is not analytical, but conven-
tional. Limited and protective presidential conduct would not ordina-
rily be understood to be presidential law-making, whatever the
analytical resemblance.
The foregoing discussion raises the question whether the "protec-
tive function" is a power of the President alone, or of any officer who
exercises official responsibility. I think the latter, although the Presi-
dent's responsibilities are unlimited in range when compared with
those of any subordinate official. 330 This conclusion requires re-exami-
nation of the so called "official immunity" cases. I begin from the
premise that no executive official, the President included, can disregard
the commands of positive law, express or implied. What result, how-
ever, when, acting under general statutes, an executive official commits
what otherwise would be a tort or breach of contract? The case law
bars damages against officials exercising discretionary powers who act
within the "outer perimeter" of their duties. 331 This formula masks
considerable confusion. If officials act within the "outer perimeter" of
their duties, is the reasoning that an immunity for damages exists de-
spite the premise that the conduct was wrongful, or is it a conclusion
328. Id. at 527 (citing Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 890 (1961)).
329. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 691 (1952) (Steel
Seizure) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for United States at 88, Solicitor
General John W. Davis in United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915) (No.
278). Mr. Davis was carried for the steel companies.
330. This view seems to be endorsed in In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 588-89 (1895)
(citing cases in which courts recognized protective power of administrative officials
within the general areas over which they have statutory authority). This might be one
distinction between a presidential protective power and a claim of presidential
"emergency" power, which might inhere in the President alone. The latter power, if it
exists, might turn on the special character of the Presidency (although Jefferson believed
that it was inherent in all high officials). See supra text accompanying note 117.
331. See, e.g., Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 485-96 (1978) (reaffirming Little v.
Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804)).
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that the underlying conduct was authorized and, as such, valid?3 32
While I do not wish here to pursue all the complexities, on the analysis
offered, whatever protective conduct falls within the outer perimeter of
an official's role is valid conduct, not simply wrongdoing shielded from
damage liability.
C. The Limits of the Protective Power
The claim for recognition of an executive protective power is ad-
vanced to meet only the separation-of-power objection. What limits ex-
ist on the protective power, if it is not to amount to recognition of a
general presidential emergency power to act without statutory author-
ity? My response is that the protective power contended for here is
limited to the protection of the personnel, property, and instrumentali-
ties of the United States. 333 Examples of appropriate responses to such
clear and direct threats include Lincoln's defensive moves prior to the
opening of the Civil War, the protection of Justice Field, and suits
brought to vindicate the contract and property rights of the United
States.
1. Private Parties. - Little justification exists for extending the pro-
tective power analysis to the routine protection of the rights of private
parties under federal law. 33 4 I find deeply troublesome, therefore, Nea-
gle's approval of the "Kotza" incident-the case of the "embryo"
American citizen as Taft characterized it.335 Mr. Kotza, a Hungarian,
had declared his intention to become a U.S. citizen. On that basis
alone, a U.S. naval vessel compelled an Austrian vessel to surrender
him to U.S. custody. "Upon what act of Congress then existing can
anyone lay his finger in support of the action of our government in the
332. Of course, conduct validly authorized under congressional legislation cannot
constitute a tort or breach of contract under state law, unless the authorization itself is
unconstitutional.
333. As indicated supra note 312 and accompanying text, federal statutes confer
power on the President to use military force to vindicate federal law when there is a
breakdown in federal government. "Whether the statutes [10 U.S.C. §§ 332-334
(1988)] prohibit any independent exercise of power by the President [to use troops to
protect 'the peace of the United States'] is an unsettled question." Rossiter & Longaker,
supra note 135, at 197. In In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1890), however, the
Attorney General argued that Congress could not control the President's protective
duty. This is at best surely an overstatement, although it may be that the President
could not be so controlled if no reasonable protective mechanism existed. I believe that
the statutes codify inherent presidential "protective" authority in this regard, but I do
not defend that position in this paper.
334. I quite agree with the circuit authority holding that, absent statutory mandate,
the President has no standing to enforce Fourteenth Amendment rights against the
states. Cases considering the right of the United States to sue in the absence of statutory
authority are collected in Hart & Wechsler, supra note 182, at 915. The situation is
different of course, when there is a complete breakdown in civil government, in which
case the use of the armed forces is authorized. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 332-334 (1988); supra
note 320.
335. Taft, Our Chief Magistrate, supra note 16, at 92.
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matter?" asked the Court.33 6 Taft explained this incident as a valid ex-
ercise of the President's Commander-in-Chief powers. These powers
"grow not out of any specific act of Congress, but out of that obliga-
tion, inferable from the Constitution, of the government to protect the
rights of an American citizen against foreign aggression. ' 33 7 He added
what in retrospect is, to say the least, an exceedingly curious comment:
In practice, the use of "the naval marines for such a purpose has be-
come so common that [it] is treated as a mere local police measure,
whereas [use of] troops of the regular army ... seems to take on the
color of an act of war. ' 3
38
Based on incidents such as that involving Mr. Kotza,339 modern
Presidents now insist on the right to use force to protect American citi-
zens anywhere in the world against foreign aggression.3 40 In the mod-
em world, this claim means that the President can commit acts of war
anywhere, as the recent events in Grenada and Panama show. Perhaps
these incidents can be fairly defended as aspects of a special presiden-
tial protective role as Commander-in-Chief and sole organ for the con-
duct of foreign affairs. But I am skeptical. Recognition of any such
presidential prerogative would eviscerate the constitutional assignment
of the war power to Congress. One could also argue, of course, that
the President has acquired by prescription the right to wage small-scale
wars.34 1 If so, that presidential prerogative goes well beyond the gen-
eral protective function contended for here.
2. Indirect Threats. - When the President purportedly acts to pro-
tect U.S. interests threatened as a by-product of a dispute between pri-
vate parties, the situation is, ordinarily at least, beyond the protective
function. Consider Debs, even on the (doubtful) assumption that Con-
gress had impliedly prohibited obstruction of interstate commerce.
Absent statutory authority, that prohibition is not one that the Presi-
dent is empowered to enforce. The sole conceivable interest of the
United States itself was in protecting the transmission of the mails, yet
the injunctive decree affirmed by the Supreme Court went considerably
further than that.34
2
336. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 64 (1890).
337. Id. at 95.
338. Id.
339. See, e.g., Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4,186)
(Justice Nelson, sitting as circuit justice, sustained President's authorization to naval
commander to bombard Greytown in Nicaragua to protect the lives and property of
American citizens there); see also Schlesinger, supra note 8, at 55-56 (discussing
Durand); Koh, supra note 21, at 84 (same).
340. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 21, at 88 (President Carter's use of Neagle and
Durand to support claim to inherent, constitutional power to use force to protect
American citizens abroad).
341. See Monaghan, supra note 21, at 26-27. But see Memorandum Amicus
Curiae of Law Professors, supra note 28, at 3-8 (arguing that President must consult
with and receive authorization from Congress before engaging in war).
342. See In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 570-72 (1895). Compare the facts underlying
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Similarly, neither President Roosevelt's war-time plant seizures nor
President Truman's steel seizures involved the exercise of protective
power as I would define it. No direct threat to the property of the
United States existed; all that had occurred were controversies between
third parties that threatened to interrupt governmental operations. In
such circumstances, presidential intervention is in the "common under-
standing" akin to law-making.3 43 I do not wish to be categorical here,
but some line between direct and indirect interference with the func-
tions of the national government should be maintained, at least pre-
sumptively.3 44 I do not believe that, ordinarily, interferences with
governmental operations that result from third-party controversies fall
within the protective function, any more than I believe that the Execu-
tive on its own can seize property of private litigants to ensure the fu-
ture payment of a litigant's debts to the United States.
3. Defining Primary Conduct. - Ordinarily, a prohibition against un-
lawful "primary conduct" must exist before any executive official can
invoke the protective power. When it can be seen as determining the
content of the primary legal duties of American citizens, the President's
conduct cannot ordinarily be justified under the protective power. New
York Times Co. v. United States3 45 is a good illustration. In seeking to
enjoin private publication of the Pentagon Papers, the government
placed no reliance on any statute in its argument before the Supreme
Court. The government's brief simply referred to the President's au-
thority "to protect the nation against publication of information whose
disclosure would endanger the national security. '3 46 Thus, in contrast
to the situation in Haig, no source outside the President's will (i.e., the
President's own conception of the national interest) was cited as ren-
dering the decision to publish illegal.3 47 In essence, the President
claimed the right to define the primary legal duties of those who had
received unauthorized government documents, and then to enlist the
Debs with President Nixon's use of the military to sort and deliver mail in the 1970 postal
strike. That conduct is sharply criticized in James B. Jacobs, Socio-Legal Foundations of
Civil-Military Relations 56-75 (1986). For a comprehensive discussion of presidential
use of troops in the context of domestic violence and an argument that the regulations
implementing the statutes go beyond what the statutes authorize, see Rossiter &
Longaker, supra note 135, at 196-204.
343. For an excellent critical discussion of the use of federal and state military in
labor disputes, see Jacobs, supra note 342, at 51-75.
344. Like most legal lines, this line will on occasion be blurred. It is not clear to
me, for example, whether the forcible interference with the mails in Debs should be
characterized as a direct threat to government operations or simply as a by-product of a
third-party dispute.
345. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
346. Brief for the Petitioner at 13, New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
713 (1971) (No. 1873).
347. In his opinion in New York Times Co. v. United States,Justice Black, the author of
Steel Seizure, denies "that the President has 'inherent power' to halt the publication of
news by resort to the courts." See 403 U.S. at 719 (Black, J., concurring).
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courts to enforce those duties.3 48 "In sum, the courts were to become
executors of the President's discretion."3
4 9
4. Deprivations of Individual Liberty. - Korematsu v. United States3
50
suggests a final potential limit on the reach of the protective function.
The curfew, relocation, and internment programs of people of Japa-
nese descent during the Second World War may very well have violated
the Constitution at least with respect to the American citizens among
the internees.35' But, as noted, we are concerned only with the separa-
tion-of-powers dimensions of such programs. The President's order
rested both on whatever constitutional powers he possessed and on ex-
plicit congressional delegation. Suppose, however, that the President
had acted on his own, without statutory sanction; more specifically, sup-
pose that the claim was just as it was in Korematsu, namely, that the Pres-
ident acted on the belief that some number ofJapanese were prepared
to engage in sabotage, but because it was unclear which individuals
would so act, wholesale curtailment of rights was necessary. Would his
conduct have been a valid illustration of the protective power? On the
separation-of-powers issue, the answer is not free of doubt.3 52 If the
threat to national security is real, its diffuse and hard to detect character
should not alone bar protective action.
The protective power is, it must be recalled, no talisman. Its limits
are, in the end, practical ones, limits that, as the Court said in Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife,353 are grounded in our "common understanding"
of what conduct is appropriately "executive" in our scheme of separa-
tion of powers. 354 There may be controversy over what the under-
standing is. If so, here, as elsewhere, history and the felt intuitions of
the times are likely to count far more than anything else. My own con-
348. See Edgar & Schmidt, supra note 201, at 360-61. Unlike Haig, where a similar
national security claim was made with respect to a citizen's right to travel, no statute
could be cited as justification for such presidential law making. A similar inherent power
argument was made in United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297 (1972) (No.
70-153). The Court did not reach the issue because it held that the Fourth Amendment
barred the conduct at stake. See id. at 321.
349. Rossiter & Longaker, supra note 135, at 183.
350. 323 U.S. 214 (1944); accord Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 95-99
(1943) (upholding constitutional authority of Congress and President, based on
protective power, to impose curfew on all persons ofJapanese descent).
351. Korematsu itself arose as a criminal prosecution under an Act of Congress for
violating an executive order. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216. The conviction was
upheld-and the Executive Order vindicated-on the basis of a power to protect that
was "commensurate with the threatened danger." Id. at 219-20.
352. The Court has consistently avoided questions of this order. The Court relied
on congressional approval in Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 92, as it did in the creation of the
military commission in Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 29 (1942); accord Ex parte Endo,
323 U.S. 283, 297-303 (1944) (holding that Executive Order authorizing removal of
people ofJapanese ancestry from military areas did not authorize prolonged detention
of such people).
353. 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992).
354. See id. at 2136.
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clusion is that my thesis need not countenance the presidential conduct
in the Japanese curfew, relocation, and interment program. Lincoln's
unauthorized wartime arrests notwithstanding, so drastic and massive
an invasion of the liberty of American citizens would in common under-
standing be thought to be so contrary to our traditions and aspirations




Controversy over the precise dimensions of "The executive
Power" should not obscure the existence of a valid presidential power
to protect the personnel, property, and instrumentalities of the United
States. As the Attorney General argued in Neagle, "'No one questions
the right or duty of the President to furnish guards for the mail or an
escort for a paymaster carrying government treasure wherever danger
is apprehended.' ",356 Perhaps, however, the existence of such an in-
dependent power is now academic. "Delegation" reasoning alone
would support such a power, even if the delegation were not explicit.
But if, for example, an executive authority to bring suit to enforce the
contract rights of the United States is understood to rest upon implied
delegations under generally worded statutes, then the substance of
what I contend for, a protective power, will exist, albeit under a differ-
ent label: statutory construction. Behind the delegation reasoning
would exist "postulates which limit and control. '357 Courts will rou-
tinely read protective powers into existing statutory authority, because
the need to recognize such a power will drive statutory construction,
and not vice versa. In the nineteenth century, the opportunities to de-
fend presidential conduct simply on the basis of an existing statutory
authority seemed more difficult, as Neagle, Debs, and Midwest Oil show.
It was, accordingly, necessary to fashion apparently novel principles
that would reflect the deeply felt conviction that the President pos-
sessed a protective power.
355. Cf. Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1513, 1565-66 (1991) (arguing for use of separation-of-powers concept to protect
civil liberties). In the past, the Court has expressed separation-of-powers concerns
when individual liberty interests are clearly implicated, but recent decisions evince no
such concern. See supra note 201.
356. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, 14 (1890) (argument of Attorney General).
357. Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934).
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